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ABSTRACT 
My aim in this thesis is twofold: to advance philosophical understanding of the 
contested therapy / enhancement distinction and its ethical implications; and to 
achieve this via the integration of empirical data into the philosophical and ethical 
debate. Despite its implications for justice in healthcare, and despite the 
abundance of theoretical literature, little is known about how human enhancement 
is understood within its own context. 
The division between therapy and enhancement is nominally defined by whatever 
is identified as ‘normal’ health. This seems unproblematic, however it is extremely 
difficult to offer a clear, non-relative account of normality that is not beset by 
logical and semantic difficulties, or modified by historical, socio-cultural, 
technological, economic, and geographical contingencies. 
This raises a challenge: if what is ‘normal’ cannot be clearly identified, how can we 
clearly identify the difference between therapy and enhancement? If we cannot 
clearly identify the difference between therapy and enhancement, how can we 
ensure that our medical policies are ethically appropriate in distinguishing 
between who may and may not receive assistance? 
The empirical data communicate relevant views held by medical professionals 
whose work involves a prominent ‘enhancement’ drug, recombinant human 
erythropoietin (EPO). I use the insights gained from analysing theory and data to 
develop a refined account of the therapy / enhancement distinction which 
integrates the two. I use this as the basis for developing normative conclusions and 
policy recommendations in response to the ethical challenges posed by any future 
proliferation of enhancement technologies.  
I use the philosophical approach of Critical Realism for integrating the theory and 
data and constructing the normative conclusions developed. This is the first time 
critical realism has been used in empirical bioethics, and this thesis therefore also 
makes an original methodological contribution to the field. 
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FOREWORD 
The idea for this thesis was motivated by two inter-related observations. Firstly, 
medical science and technology are moving increasingly rapidly. Secondly, to the 
extent that what is technologically possible influences our abilities, norms, 
expectations, and the social context in which we live, this influence will increase as 
development accelerates. 
One aspect of this of particular contemporary significance is the contested 
relationship between therapy and ‘human enhancement’. Human enhancement, 
which captures the idea of using medical science to go ‘beyond therapy’ to improve 
on normality rather than restore it is an ambiguous concept precisely because it 
implies a norm. If norms are changing increasingly rapidly, how is it possible to 
gain a clear understanding of it? 
The prospect of human enhancement raises numerous philosophical questions. 
The potential to dramatically extend or add to our capabilities, or to go further and 
fundamentally change our nature, invites ontological and epistemological 
reflection on what it means to be human. It also brings to the fore serious ethical 
issues. How should we respond to these technologies? Is it morally desirable or 
acceptable to modify ourselves in this way? If so, who decides? How should this 
potential be managed? Is there a limit beyond which it would be morally 
unacceptable to enhance? Perhaps it is morally obligatory for mankind to enhance, 
if to do so would confer significant enough benefits. 
Visions of enhanced humanity – or indeed a posthumanity - have roots in myth and 
science fiction. However man’s history has been one of overt and relentless 
technological advancement. In the present, mankind’s increasing biotechnological 
power is now bringing many of these previously hypothetical questions into the 
present. To this end its potential socio-ethical impact should be considered, with 
reference in particular to its own context – that of medicine and health policy. 
 Notwithstanding antecedents from inside and outside academia, the history of 
explicitly bioethical scholarship in human enhancement is only around 20 years 
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old. In this time, however, it has migrated from the margins into the centre ground 
and the philosophical and ideological battle ground has been staked out. Positions 
have been established and the theoretical terrain has been comprehensively 
mapped. 
Now that the terms of the debate have been set out, what is missing is information 
concerning how the various positions are understood, comprehended, agreed with, 
or disputed from within the extant social context in which biomedical 
enhancement technologies are emerging. Medical practitioners and scientists will 
inevitably be involved in negotiating ethical dilemmas concerning enhancement if 
they are to arise, and knowledge of their views is thus crucial.  
Despite the relevance of these views for dealing with the ethical challenges raised 
by enhancement technologies, little is known about them at present. It is in 
response to this lack of information when compared with an abundance of theory 
that I devised this project. In the thesis I build on existing theory with qualitative 
data that I have collected which give an insight into how human enhancement is 
understood within contemporary clinical and research practice. 
I use the insights from these data to refine our understanding of human 
enhancement and its ethical implications. The products of this analysis are a 
refined theoretical model of enhancement and its ambiguous relation to therapy, 
and preliminary policy proposals for how the ethical challenges could be met in 
practice. The proposal makes recommendations that both defend what is valuable 
about enhancement, and uphold what is central to the ethical integrity of medicine. 
In keeping with philosophical tradition, bioethical scholarship of enhancement is 
characterised by a divergence of opinions. Disagreement is ubiquitous. Whilst not 
theoretically problematic, this poses problems for applying ethical conclusions in 
practice. The work in this thesis is therefore important. In adding data to a theory-
heavy field I advance ethical conclusions that ground a negotiation of opposing 
positions and thus identify a way forward for future research. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1) Overview 
In this chapter I introduce the therapy / enhancement distinction and explain why 
the delineation of these two concepts represents a complex philosophical and 
moral challenge. I will outline the concept of human enhancement itself and 
explain why its relationship to therapy is problematic and more ambiguous than it 
appears. I will show how the integrity of the therapy / enhancement distinction 
turns on the integrity of the underlying concept of ‘normal’ health. I will then 
explain why the concept of ‘normal health’ is ambiguous, and thus broadly frame 
the problem to be considered in the rest of the thesis. I will also very briefly 
provide some historical and scholarly context for human enhancement that will be 
expanded in more detail within the literature review of the following chapter. 
Having outlined the problem I will go on to describe the imbalance between 
philosophical theory and empirical data within bioethical scholarship on 
enhancement. I will explain why the collection of relevant data is necessary for 
advancing the field, and justify how these data may be integrated with the 
currently inconclusive theoretical debate in order to provide a basis on which to 
develop appropriate and practical normative conclusions.  
I will conclude with a summary that explains how the thesis will proceed overall. 
In particular I will outline the conditions that must be satisfied by the exemplar for 
enhancement that I select for the empirical component, in view of the preceding 
explanation of what is needed and currently missing from the literature. Finally I 
will suggest that the interdisciplinary methodology of Critical Realism is a useful, 
appropriate and original analytic frame for the investigation, in view of its ability 
to successfully integrate philosophical theory and social scientific data.  
1.2) What is Human Enhancement? 
At its most basic the verb ‘to enhance’ is synonymous with improvement; the 
heightening of a certain characteristic; an increase or elevation in value; or the 
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magnification of something’s qualities1. Thus, when the prefix ‘human’ is attached, 
the term ‘human enhancement’ captures the idea of improving ourselves. 
Human enhancement as a field of bioethical scholarship in its own right is a recent 
phenomenon, although it has several historical antecedents. These include the idea 
of the radically upgraded ‘trans’ or ‘post-human’ (More, 2013; Kurzweil, 2005; 
Bostrom, 2009); the related concept of the ‘cyborg’ which emerged in the mid-to 
late 20th Century (Halacy, 1967; Haraway, 1985); and the eugenic movements of 
the first half of the 20th Century (Resnik, 2000; Agar, 2008).  The broader idea of 
improving on the ‘given’ human also extends much further into history than this. 
The modern roots of ‘enhancement’ can be traced beyond the Enlightenment and 
the Scientific Revolution – for example through the work of Nietzsche (1895), 
Bacon (1620), and Picca della Mirandola in the 18th, 17th, and 15th Centuries 
respectively. 
Still further back in Antiquity prototypical mythic accounts of an enhanced human 
can be found, for example in the Epic of Gilgamesh (Bostrom, 2005); or in the story 
of Prometheus, the ‘shaper’ of mankind (Raggio, 1958), who stole fire from the 
Gods and gave it to humans, enabling them to exert control over their natural 
destiny in the world. Of particular relevance to medicine within this myth is the 
idea of self-repairing and re-generating internal organs (Ankoma-Sey, 1999; Taub, 
2004). 
The verb ‘to enhance’ can thus be used in any number of contexts and it is not self-
evident that human enhancement should be understood as a phenomenon in 
medicine alone. For example, my abilities have been greatly increased via cognitive 
enhancements such as language acquisition and education, although these are not 
medical enhancements. Equally ‘enhancement’ does not by itself specifically refer 
to patients, since someone is only a patient once they fall under the concern of the 
medical profession. While one is receiving medical assistance one is a patient, and 
before or after this one is not. 
                                                          
1 http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/62342?redirectedFrom=enhance#eid 
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Despite these observations the context to which the term ‘human enhancement’ 
typically refers in the philosophical and bioethical literature is that of 
contemporary medicine, and frequently within biomedicine more specifically. This 
thesis investigates human enhancement within a biomedical context, which is the 
predominant sense in which it is used within the literature. For this reason I will 
therefore also restrict my usage to this sense of the term. Savulescu et al (2006) 
endorse the view that the word ‘enhancement’ necessarily connotes an increase in 
value. John Harris (2009, p. 131), a trenchant advocate of human enhancement 
defends this unambiguous characterisation: 
‘If it wasn’t good for you it wouldn’t be an enhancement. In terms of human 
functioning an enhancement is by definition an improvement on what went before.’ 
An account of human enhancement of this kind defined in relative abstraction does 
not, however, take into several important ethical considerations, for example: how 
the definition might apply within a specific context such as the institution of 
medicine; the clinical and research knowledge and practices necessary for 
succeeding in human enhancement; the wider implications for society if 
technological options for enhancement were to proliferate; or the practical ethical 
challenges associated with it. Whether or not the desire to improve ourselves using 
medical technologies should in reality be judged positively in this way is therefore 
a more complex question than is suggested by Harris’ account (Bostrom & 
Savulescu, 2009; Kamm, 2009; Lin & Alhoff, 2008).  
1.3) The Therapy / Enhancement Distinction 
Biomedical enhancement necessarily entails some conception of improvement via 
means identified as ‘medical’ in nature. More specifically, however, it denotes the 
idea of improvement from and above ‘normal’ health, rather than improvement by 
remediation to ‘normal’ health. It is the latter form of ‘improvement’ here - the 
restoration of normality - which largely determines the institutional structure of 
medicine and its decision making criteria (Friedson, 1970).  
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Reflection on medicine and its goals has led philosophers and bioethicists to posit 
a difference between therapy and enhancement on the basis that the two concepts 
appear distinct. Given a standard account of ‘what medicine does’, those 
interventions described as ‘enhancements’ appear to represent a form of medical 
assistance that is distinct from the usual  ends of the medical enterprise insofar as 
they aim at supranormality rather than the restoration of normality. Numerous 
similar accounts of the distinction exist, all of which are variants on the central 
idea described by Bostrom & Roache (2008, p. 1): 
‘In broad terms, therapy aims to fix something that has gone wrong, by curing 
specific diseases or injuries, while enhancement interventions aim to improve the 
state of an organism beyond its normal healthy state.’ 
A philosophical ambiguity presents itself, however, when we try to clearly 
delineate ‘therapy’ from ‘enhancement’, as they are conceptually linked by a 
shared goal of conferring improvement. Thus, despite the apparent clarity of the 
distinction, the relationship between the two concepts is in fact more ambiguous 
than it appears. After all, a standard desire or expectation of medical assistance is 
that it will increase, improve, or enhance our health to a normal or otherwise 
acceptable state. A problem of conceptual separation thus emerges, since a key 
goal of therapy is that it ‘enhances’ one’s health (Juengst, 1997; Pellegrino, 2004; 
Scripko, 2010). Consequently if it is a condition of a therapy’s effectiveness that it 
enhances, the category of interventions known as ‘therapy’ is logically reducible to 
the broader concept of enhancement. 
Given the semantic difficulty of clearly separating the meanings of therapy and 
enhancement we can begin to see a traditional philosophical problem of vagueness 
coming into view (Hempel, 1939; Fine, 1975). Whether or not we accept the 
reducibility of therapy to enhancement at face value, there is an irremovable 
conceptual connection between the ‘therapeutic’ assistance that we receive from a 
doctor to return us to normal health, and those ‘extra-therapeutic’ measures which 
we do not typically receive from a doctor that are nominally captured by the 
concept of ‘enhancement’.   
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Thus, therapy and enhancement share a conceptual anchor in both having a goal of 
improvement, and yet they appear to refer to different phenomena.  How, then, do 
we clarify them more specifically? To what extent are the concepts similar? To 
what extent do their meanings differ? Moreover, given that medicine has 
normative ends, what implications do different answers to these questions have 
for making morally justifiable decisions in practice, within the socially embedded 
institutional structure of medicine? 
A range of opposing positions has been advanced concerning the separability of 
therapy and enhancement. To frame the argument broadly, however, two poles can 
be staked out. At one extreme there is the claim that the therapy / enhancement 
distinction is logically incoherent because it dissolves under analysis once we 
realise that therapies aim to ‘enhance’ in some way. A further contribution to this 
argument is made by the related difficulty of giving a clear account of the ‘normal’. 
An appeal to ‘normal’ health also grounds the opposing argument, however, which 
defends the integrity of therapy / enhancement distinction by virtue of real 
differences between normal and ill-health. 
The two poles can be represented using the following quotes. The first comes from 
Savulescu (2006, p. 304), who highlights the weakness of an attempt to clearly 
delineate therapy from enhancement: 
‘Enhancement is, indeed, a wide concept. In the broadest sense, it means “increase” or 
“improvement.” For example, a doctor may enhance his patient’s chance of survival 
by giving the patient a drug.’ 
By contrast the second, from Sandel (2004, p. 2), implies that the distinction is real 
and defensible: 
‘…enhancement employs medical means for nonmedical ends—ends unrelated to 
curing or preventing disease or repairing injury.’  
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As I will show throughout the thesis, however, the debate concerning the reality of 
the therapy / enhancement distinction is more complex than is evident from these 
two positions alone. 
1.4) Therapy and Enhancement as a Heuristic 
In extreme cases the therapy / enhancement distinction is a useful heuristic2 for 
distinguishing between ‘medical’ and ‘non-medical’ applications of technology 
(Pellegrino, 2004). There is, for example, a significant empirical difference between 
administering chemotherapy in order to try and prevent death from cancer on one 
hand, and providing a performance enhancing drug to an athlete so that he or she 
can win a race on the other.  
The fact that this heuristic is generally effective for ranking needs into a hierarchy 
of severity means that the distinction is an effective ‘rule of thumb’ which has a 
‘useful, if modest, bearing’ (Daniels, 2000, p. 309) on determining who may and 
may not receive assistance. In cases where the heuristic can distinguish clearly 
between instances of therapy and enhancement it has practical efficacy for making 
decisions appropriate to the biomedical model of health. This is model underpins 
the structure and diagnostic rationale of western medicine and, as Gillett (1994, p. 
1127) writes:  
‘...attempts to isolate distinct and identifiable diseases which are causally produced 
by some underlying patho-physiological condition...Medicine then produces a 
technological solution to the problem of nullifying the threat posed by this 
condition...The medical model is reductive. It works most comfortably where there is 
a biochemical and/or structural defect that provides a simple key to understanding 
the disease being studied.’ 
The medical model is thus effective within clearly defined empirical parameters in 
which detectable defects determine and nominally limit the boundaries of medical 
                                                          
2 http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/86554?redirectedFrom=heuristic#eid – the Oxford English 
Dictionary describes a heuristic process as a ‘method for attempting the solution of a problem’. An 
informative reference that it also provides from the field of computing studies is: ‘A process that may 
solve a given problem, but offers no guarantee of doing so...’ 
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practice. According to the criteria that it employs, to provide assistance for states 
that do not fall under the purview of the medical model is to ‘enhance’ rather than 
to ‘treat’, and such practices are thus deemed external to the concerns of medical 
professionals. 
The situation becomes complicated, however, when we note Juengst’s (1997, p. 
126) argument that a clear line cannot be drawn between the two to the extent 
that ‘enhancement’ may contribute to the achievement of the goals of ‘therapy’. He 
makes the following observation with respect to genetic enhancement, which is a 
candidate for potentially radical enhancements in future, should the relevant 
technologies become sufficiently advanced: 
‘...to the extent that disease prevention is a proper goal of medicine, and the use of 
gene transfer techniques to strengthen or enhance human health maintenance 
capacities will help achieve that goal, then the treatment/enhancement distinction 
cannot confine or define the limits of the properly medical use of gene transfer 
techniques...’ 
In view of an ambiguity such as this, scrutiny of the therapy / enhancement 
distinction entails questions concerning the identification of an appropriate 
threshold for medical assistance, given that the goals of these two apparently 
different kinds of intervention may share certain goals. Moreover given that these 
are not only theoretical dilemmas but applied ones, we may reasonably ask further 
ethically pertinent questions concerning their resolution, as Bostrom & Savulescu 
(2009, p. 3) indicate: 
‘Precisely what capacity is being enhanced in what ways? Who has access? Who 
makes the decisions? Within what cultural and sociopolitical context? At what cost to 
competing priorities? With what externalities? Justifiable ethical verdicts may only be 
attainable following a specification of these and other similarly contextual variables.’ 
We will see in the following chapter that a considerable and diverse literature 
exists concerning these complicated issues. For the time being, however, we can 
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roughly sketch out the means by which this remit is defined and the ethical 
principles which pertain to it. 
Firstly, let us assume that it is a moral responsibility of the medical profession to 
minimise as far as possible or eliminate the suffering and harm caused by different 
threats to and limitations of health. This principle is consistent with both ancient 
and modern conceptions of medical responsibility (Moravcsik, 1976; Gillon, 1994; 
Fleischauer & Hermeren, 2006). Since the amount of resources available is always 
finite and health needs differ in severity, some way of fairly apportioning the 
former according to the latter must be decided upon (Daniels, 2001; Brulde, 2011).  
The heuristic judgement implied by the therapy / enhancement distinction is that 
people in ‘normal’ or ‘good’ health do not need assistance, but those people in 
states of ‘subnormal’ or ‘poor’ health do, and this in turn helps to calibrate the 
system of resource allocation for reducing the harm and suffering caused by 
biological or physiological states which deviate beneath the norm (Kamm, 2002). 
‘Normal’ health generates no need for assistance, whereas ‘poor’ health does 
(Capps, 2011). Medical assistance in instances of ‘abnormal’ health constitutes 
‘therapy’, whereas in cases of ‘normal’ health it constitutes ‘enhancement’ 
(Bostrom & Roache, 2008). ‘Therapy’ is a proper goal of medicine, whereas 
‘enhancement’ is not (Kass, 2003).  
The nominal distinction made between therapy and enhancement according to the 
biomedical model is recognisable to us because we view it from within a social 
context in which this model prevails. It is expected that assistance should be 
granted once health falls beneath a certain threshold, and the level of expectation 
thus tapers off correspondingly the further that we move above this threshold, 
relative to the amount of resources available (Holtug, 1999; Savulescu, 2006). 
This account thus broadly frames the character of the modern western medical 
system (Mechanic, 1973; Baronov, 2008). It also supplies the criteria according to 
which: medical professionals acquire specialist knowledge and are subsequently 
licensed to practice (Parsons, 1975); (fluid) diagnostic assessments and treatment 
23 
 
decisions are made (Blaxter, 1978; Conrad, 1992); decisions are made about 
policies that sanction, legalise, and licence medical techniques, products, and 
applications (Stevenson & Scambler, 2005); and, consequently, society’s 
expectations are raised of what it can and cannot expect in terms of medical 
services (Creuss & Creuss, 2008). 
1.5) Professional Ethical Practice and the Hippocratic Oath 
Freidson (1970) and Zola (1973) highlight the considerable degree of power and 
autonomy enjoyed by the medical profession in adjudicating between reasonable 
and unreasonable uses of its resources in a way that affects the whole society that 
it serves.  Despite the institutional power of medicine, however, Juth (2010) and 
Stevenson & Scambler (2005) observe that a reorientation in favour of awarding 
more autonomy to patients has taken place in countries such as the UK and USA in 
recent decades. 
This reorientation away from a historically paternalistic approach to medical 
decision making (Schwartz, 1992; Cohen, 2000) has taken place in recognition of 
the ethical importance of respecting autonomy, since to do so reduces the risk of 
medical coercion occurring and action being taken that is against a patient’s 
wishes. Whilst such a reorientation may have been necessary (Graber & Tansey, 
2005; Entwhistle et al, 2010), controversy still exists over what constitutes the 
appropriate balance between respecting patient autonomy on one hand, and the 
clinical expertise of a doctor on the other, in terms of what it means to act in the 
patient’s best interests (O’Neill, 1984; Graber & Tansey, 2005; Loewy, 2005). 
This tension is significant with respect to enhancement. If an individual seeks 
assistance to ‘enhance’ themselves in some way by virtue of having no medically 
recognisable need to do so, then a doctor may refuse it on the basis that to do so 
would fall beyond his professional competence and duties. In this respect to refuse 
is to thwart the autonomy of the individual seeking help. This is despite that, as the 
quote from Juengst indicates, it may be in the individual’s interests to enhance him 
or herself irrespective of whether any ‘medical need’ is present and in a way that 
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may be consistent with the harm prevention goal of medicine. Given that human 
enhancement procedures are defined as those which may be beneficial to the 
individual but for which there is no ‘medical need’ according to institutional 
criteria, the balance between individual patient autonomy and professional 
responsibility is of central ethical relevance to the debate. 
An early codification of the ethical responsibilities of a physician is the Hippocratic 
Oath, whose usage dates back to the 4th Century BC (Fleischhauer & Hermeren, 
2006, p. 20). According to a recent survey medical students trained according to 
the principles of western medicine must still swear on a formulation of this Oath 
(Sritharan et al, 2001, p. 1440). It therefore continues to constitute a part of the 
normative underpinning of medical practice, and Antoniou et al (2010, p. 3077) 
pay tribute to its ‘time enduring character’. Given the technological and societal 
differences between the 4th Century BC and the 21st Century AD, however, 
opinions diverge as to the extent of its normative appropriateness in the present 
day. Jotterand (2005, p. 109), for example, adopts the sceptical view that:  
‘...the extent to which the Oath has been, or still is, a basis for medical ethics is rather 
controversial and unclear.’ 
If the normative demands of the Oath do accurately inform the institutional 
character of medicine in the 21st Century, however, then it should be possible to 
infer from these something about the services that should and should not be 
sanctioned in practice. This relationship can also be viewed in reverse: if the 
institutional character of medicine properly realises the normative prescriptions of 
the Oath, then there will be a correspondence between the actual boundaries of 
practice in the former, and the theoretical professional ethical responsibilities 
outlined in the latter. In many respects this correspondence exists. For example, 
the physician’s continued responsibility to treat the sick and prevent harm is 
reflected by the Oath’s declaration that (Markel, 2004, p. 2028): 
‘I will apply dietetic measures for the benefit of the sick according to my ability and 
judgment; I will keep them from harm and injustice.’ 
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On the other hand, however, historical declarations exist within the Oath which, in 
contemporary liberal societies, are more ethically controversial given socio-ethical 
norms which now prevail. As Markel (2004, p. 2028) also indicates, this early 
version of the Oath promises that: 
‘I will not give to a woman an abortive remedy...’ 
Clearly, disapproval of abortion still exists and is widespread in certain 
communities, for example by followers of some religions. Disapproval is not 
unanimous, however. In those societies in which abortion is legal and tolerated, 
legality and tolerance highlight disparities between ancient and modern 
conceptions of the appropriate boundaries of medical practice. Moreover Kao & 
Parsi (2000, p. 886) note that there is no single version of the Oath used by all of 
those who enter practice, and find that oaths ‘vary in substantive content’. 
These disparities indicate that a direct correspondence may not always obtain 
between the practices of medicine, and the normative goals which they are meant 
to represent and which it is incumbent on physicians to deliver. To this extent, 
what constitutes a proper actualisation of the goals of medicine, and therefore by 
extension what would count as their transgression, is contestable. As Parens 
(1998, p. 2) writes in relation to the issue of therapy and enhancement: 
‘The treatment / enhancement distinction is often used in the context of 
conversations about what falls within and what falls outside the proper goals of 
medicine. But as anyone who has participated in or observed such a conversation 
knows, there is no universally accepted conception of the goals of medicine. The lack 
of such a consensus has much to do with the fact that there is no one universally 
accepted conception of what health is. And thus neither is there a universally 
accepted definition of what “going beyond health to enhancement” means.’ 
This commentary thus identifies both the significance and the problematic nature 
of conceptions of ‘health’ and ‘normality’ for providing a way of distinguishing 
between therapy and enhancement. Therapy and enhancement are only clear to 
the extent that ‘normal health’ can be identified, and it is the identification of 
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‘normal health’ upon which the integrity of the biomedical model of health 
depends. The identification of ‘normal health’, however, is not straightforward. 
1.6) Normality and the Therapy / Enhancement Problem 
Although therapy and enhancement are conceptually linked by a shared goal of the 
improvement of health and / or functioning, on a basic reading of the distinction 
the difference between them is that they seek improvement from empirically 
different starting points, as we saw in the earlier quote from Bostrom & Roache 
(2008). According to this view therapies seek to improve from subnormality to 
normality, whilst enhancements use normality as their starting point to achieve 
supranormality. Thus, they are distinguished from each other by a threshold of 
normality. The distinction is, as Bess (2010, p. 647) notes, ‘pegged’ to a definition 
of normality. This carries a problem, however, since norms of health are not 
necessarily static: 
‘The treatment/enhancement distinction, therefore, presents us with a moving target 
because it is pegged to the concept of “health”—and the meanings of this latter word 
tend not only to vary between the positive and negative definitions but also to shift 
from culture to culture and epoch to epoch.’ 
To the extent that what normal health ‘is’ is statistically defined relative to a 
population, many indicators that are used to give an account of the normal are in a 
state of flux. This is to say that what ‘is statistically normal’ for a given population 
may be statistically abnormal, relative to the same population a hundred years in 
the past or future. De Vito (2000), for example, offers a very recent and rapid 
example of this in the increase of average life-span in the West by around 25 years 
over the past 50.  
Alternatively there may be geographical differences, since something may be 
statistically abnormal in one population relative to a different population 
elsewhere. For example, the ‘normal’ haemoglobin content of the blood differs 
relative to altitude according to corresponding fluctuations in the oxygen content 
of the air (Brookhart et al, 2008). These two examples demonstrate that a 
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permanent and non-relative account of ‘normal’ health can be difficult to identify. 
Insofar as there is ambiguity in identifying ‘normality’, there is a corresponding 
ambiguity in distinguishing between therapy and enhancement. Further examples 
of this difficulty can be seen in the diversity of accounts of ‘normal health’ within 
the relevant literature outlined in chapter two. 
The examples given here are just two instances in which the identification of a 
fixed account of normal health according to biological indicators is problematic, 
even within limited historical or geographical parameters. If we take a broader 
view we will see that change in norms also occurs on a much larger scale. This can 
be seen particularly acutely if we consider the causal influence of technological 
innovation upon the generation of new norms of health and illness. Ellul (1962), 
Mechanic (1973), and Stempsey (2006), for example, argue that new technological 
capabilities generate new functional norms with increasing rapidity by 
persistently altering expectations about what is possible. Stempsey (2006, p. 234) 
writes: 
‘If health is a goal of medicine, it is not a static goal precisely because technological 
development forces us to expand our thinking about the very nature of the body, its 
limitations, and what it might possibly be able to do. Technology creates the 
possibility of new ends that can only be met by means of technology. Once this 
dynamism is begun, it can proceed toward an ever-expanding set of ends for the 
human. What is needed to accommodate this way of thinking is a dynamic conception 
of health.’  
This observation is particularly relevant within the context of medical technology 
in the 21st Century insofar as it is norms of health which nominally determine 
what and what should not be treated by way of medical assistance. As Babich 
(2007) and McGinn (1980) note, similar hypotheses are also evident in earlier 
observations about technology such as those advanced by Bacon (1657), Nietzsche 
(1886), and Heidegger (1950). Heidegger (Ibid, p. 4) uses the concept of 
‘enframing’ to describe a process of continual re-categorisation by humans of what 
is available to them in the world. According to this characterisation the world is 
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understood as ‘standing reserve’ which is ‘revealed’ differently according to the 
ways in which he is able to manipulate it technologically. In this way man’s 
relationship to technology is understood as one of a constantly changing set of 
norms:  
‘What is modern technology? It too is a revealing. Only when we allow our attention 
to rest on this fundamental characteristic does that which is new in modern 
technology show itself to us...Agriculture is now the mechanized food industry. Air is 
now set upon to yield nitrogen, the earth to yield ore, ore to yield uranium, for 
example; uranium is set upon to yield atomic energy, which can be released either for 
destruction or for peaceful use...that expediting is always itself directed from the 
beginning toward furthering something else...’ 
Warnock (2003) and Canton (2004) develop this line of argument in relation to 
modern medicine. According to Warnock’s argument (Ibid, p. 459) the deliberate 
alteration of nature by mankind cannot be prevented, as it is inevitable that 
humans will seek to manipulate it in ways which enable them to transcend the 
limitations that it imposes: 
‘Nature has an intrinsic value...But we also value the power that the new 
biotechnology may have to provide medical science with the means to cure or 
alleviate conditions so far without remedy...there is one sense in which the use of the 
new technology whether in agriculture or in medicine is far from contrary to the 
grain of Nature. For man is a part of Nature and his role in the natural world is to 
improve his environment and to try to ameliorate the ills that threaten the whole 
species...’ 
We can apply these arguments to the context of developments in medical practice 
and research. If they have correctly apprehended the logic of innovation then 
fluctuations in normality according to what is technologically possible will 
influence the position of the threshold that delineates ‘therapeutic’ applications of 
technology from ones that ‘enhance’, according to the categorisations that we 
presently employ.   
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1.7) Enhancement Present and Future 
The debate on human enhancement has increased in both breadth and depth over 
recent years. The recent surge of interest and scrutiny has occurred partly in 
response to rapid developments in medical technologies and the societal and 
utopian expectations of what may be realised by present research trajectories in 
future. 
Bostrom (2005) notes that human enhancement is now a mainstream concern in 
bioethics, having over the past two decades migrated from the margins of 
scholarship into the centre ground. Two interconnected reasons for this can be 
identified: firstly, biomedical technology is advancing rapidly; secondly, it is a 
tendency of humankind that it seeks improvement of the conditions in which it 
finds itself. As Hauskeller writes (2011, p.1): ‘Progress has often been driven by 
utopian dreams of a better world’. A level of technological modification of ourselves 
and the world, described in myth as mentioned previously, and more recently in 
science fiction, may be moving increasingly from the potential to the actual, as our 
ability to manipulate and exert control over biological and physical processes 
grows. 
One salient prediction of the biomedical engineering of mankind and society can be 
seen in Aldous Huxley’s canonical work ‘Brave New World’ (1932), to which 
Francis Fukuyama makes frequent reference in terms of present developments in 
biotechnology in ‘Our Posthuman Future’ (2002). More recently, in his novels 
‘Atomised’ and ‘The Possibility of an Island’ Michel Houellebecq has explored a 
number of transhumanist, posthuman and enhancement themes such as mind 
uploading, immortality, and human reproductive cloning. The first two of these are 
fields in which science and engineering research is visibly proceeding (de Grey, 
2005; Hayworth, 2012; Rothblatt, 2012), and third is one in which research is – 
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controversially – ongoing3, despite its widespread illegality (Zavos & Illmensee, 
2006).  
Interest in the hypothetical ‘posthuman’ end of human enhancement (Fukuyama, 
2002; Kuzweil, 2007; More, 2013) has now extended beyond the initial confines of 
futurist philosophical speculation to related spheres of bioethical interest such as 
sociology and anthropology (Rose, 2010; Pyyhtinen & Tamminen, 2011; Conrad & 
Potter, 2004), law (Kolber, 2006; Bostrom & Roache, 2010); and policy studies 
(Greely et al, 2008; Bostrom & Sandberg, 2009). Interest has also filtered into the 
public arena, in the form of non-academic news4; exhibitions and public events5. In 
2003 the President’s Council for Bioethics in the USA carried out an early 
engagement with the ethical issues at stake in human enhancement6, and more 
recently a range of policy-orientated consultations have been carried out both in 
continental Europe7, and the UK89. 
Debate is growing concerning what the appropriate response should be to an 
acceleration in enhancement technologies (Bostrom & Savulescu, 2009; Coenen et 
al, 2010). Although this growth has been propagated by observations of actual 
occurrences in science and technology, the growth of the debate supports the 
observation that as yet no clear, settled normative policy response exists to guide 
decisions about enhancement that would be in society’s interests (Juengst, 2009; 
Greely, 2010; Drabiak-Syed, 2011). 
One reason for this is that despite the widespread ethical significance that an 
expansion in human enhancement may have, contemporary options are very 
limited. Rosoff (2012), for example, contends that despite the eugenically 
motivated concerns about genetic enhancement and the possibility of altering the 
                                                          
3 http://zavos.org/zavosportal/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=107 / 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4554704.stm  
4 http://www.bbc.co.uk/search/news/?q=human%20enhancement  
5 http://www.wellcomecollection.org/whats-on/exhibitions/superhuman.aspx  
6 http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/pcbe/reports/beyondtherapy/index.html  
7
 http://www3.nd.edu/~mlee20/NBR_Enhancement.pdf / http://epochproject.com/  
8
 http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/sites/default/files/files/Novel_neurotechnologies_Chapter_8_Non-
therapeutic_applications.pdf  
9
 http://royalsociety.org/uploadedFiles/Royal_Society_Content/policy/projects/human-
enhancement/2012-11-06-Human-enhancement.pdf  
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downstream genetic constitution of future generations, the knowledge and 
technology required for its realisation is currently so distant from us that we 
should think in more immediate terms. 
At present effective enhancement extend to only a limited range of aesthetic, 
cognitive, and physical interventions and is thus relatively modest in its capacity to 
improve or transform (Bostrom & Roache, 2008; Bostrom & Sandberg, 2009), 
relative to some of the radical predictions being made about what may be 
achievable in future such as mind-uploading or immortality (de Grey, 2005; 
Kurzweil, 2005; More, 2013) 
Despite the presently limited range and potency of current enhancements, the 
ethical issues that they raise indicate what will be of moral significance if 
knowledge and research advances such that powerful enhancement technologies 
do emerge. This is true not only for policy at a society-wide level, but also in the 
more parochial context of everyday clinical and research practices, and 
incremental changes to medical procedures that may occur from the emergence of 
new norms of new technologies and the new norms of health which correspond to 
them. Bioethical debate on these issues is currently defined by a range of 
inconclusive theories concerning what constitutes enhancement, and within which 
there is little agreement.  
If the enhancement potential of medicine proliferates, and the desire for 
enhancement grows amongst the general population it is not clear what, 
institutionally speaking, medicine ought to do in terms of its obligation to balance: 
i) the duty of care that doctors bear to their patients; ii) recalibration of the 
concept of ‘medical need’ if norms of health change increasingly rapidly; and iii) 
demands of justice relating to the equitable distribution of finite medical 
resources. These responses can in many cases be mapped onto many broader and 
pre-existing debates within moral and political philosophy, for example as a 
reassessment of historical oppositions in the philosophy of justice such as 
Rawlsian liberalism (Allhoff, 2005; Selgelid, 2013) and Nozickian libertarianism 
(Harris, 2010; Capps, 2011), within the context of enhancement.  
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1.8) Enhancement and Empirical Bioethics 
As a field of scholarship no longer in its infancy the epistemological and moral 
‘battle lines’ circumscribing the human enhancement debate have now been staked 
out (Greely et al, 2008; Berghmans et al, 2010). There is, however, an imbalance 
within the field relating to its weightiness towards theory against the relative 
scarcity of empirical data (Hotze et al, 2011; Wasson et al, 2011).  
Relatively few products exist which have a significant history of both therapeutic 
and enhancement use according to the biomedical model of health. This lack of a 
relevant history contributes to the largely speculative nature of the field (Jones, 
2006; Rosoff, 2012). Notwithstanding for the time being the apparent difficulty of 
deriving normative claims from states of affairs - namely the ‘is / ought’ problem – 
(Hume, 1739) little systematically obtained empirical data exists which 
investigates how enhancement is perceived and understood from within its own 
context. 
The practical context of the enhancement debate is medical professional practice 
in the 21st Century. It is those working within this context who will have to make 
decisions about what would constitute a balanced ethical response to the 
possibility of an expansion in enhancement technology. It will therefore be 
valuable to gain insight into how medical professionals conceive and negotiate the 
issues in view of their responsibilities for the health of those within their care. 
These responsibilities are not incumbent on those engaged in philosophical 
speculation about enhancement, and the rational ethical debate in which 
philosophers are involved will therefore be enriched by data that arises from this 
material context. 
Although the idea of improving the body and extending its capabilities is not new, 
the means by which we may be able to realise these ideas within the context of 
modern medicine are entirely new. Few substantial historical examples exist 
which can be used to advance the theoretical and ethical discussion in a way that is 
tractable with policy or can meet the pressing demands of justice in healthcare. If 
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relevant empirical data can be collected that brings to the surface pertinent 
practical ethical concerns, it will be possible to refine our theories and advance the 
debate. 
Taking this into account a clear path forward is visible. If we require some way to 
make the theoretical debate more tractable with practice, then we must identify 
and analyse an example or examples of the purported and problematic therapy / 
enhancement distinction. It will then be possible to collect relevant empirical data 
and apply it to the theoretical positions outlined in the debate.  We will then be in a 
better position to recast the therapy / enhancement distinction in a way that 
achieves a balance between theory and data.  
The nuances that data informed by context can offer to the philosophical and 
ethical debate are essential for developing normative conclusions and 
recommendations that are ethically consistent with medical practice and health 
policy. Empirical information that can provide insight into how enhancement is 
perceived and understood by medical professionals, and which can be examined in 
the light of the numerous theories which populate the field, is therefore what is 
needed at this stage of the enhancement debate.  
In order to achieve these objectives an appropriate methodology is required. This 
project is one of empirical bioethics, and therefore combines philosophical (i.e. 
normative, conceptual) analysis with social scientific (i.e. qualitative, empirical) 
data. The investigation is interdisciplinary, and an analytic approach that can 
bridge philosophical and social scientific approaches to ethical issues is required. 
Given the aims of this project I advocate the use of Critical Realism (Bhaskar, 
1974). This is a philosophy of social science which provides a way of coherently 
integrating the insights and approaches of both. Critical realism is an approach 
which has hitherto been little used in bioethics. In chapter three I will show that it 
constitutes a robust and useful methodology for normative and conceptual 
analysis which seeks to draw on the valuable empirical data that social scientific 
research can provide. 
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One final methodological point should be made before continuing. Given that this is 
a piece of ethics research, a range of moral theoretical perspectives could have 
been used as an analytic frame for the work. For example deontological, 
consequentialist, and virtue ethics analyses would undoubtedly yield useful 
results. That I attempt to generate ‘practical’ ethical conclusions rather than ideal 
ones, however, merely reflects my belief that success in applied ethics consists in 
acknowledging that moral theoretical approaches conflict. In view of this optimal 
progress depends instead on balancing these approaches and negotiating a path 
between them towards the ‘best possible’ available solution. 
1.9) Conclusion 
From this broad sketch of the therapy / enhancement distinction and the 
challenges that it poses, I will draw some preliminary conclusions. The challenge 
presented by the ambiguous therapy / enhancement distinction is in one respect 
not new, since it is one of conceptual clarification between concepts whose 
boundaries overlap, and it is thus a recapitulation of the traditional philosophical 
problem of disambiguating overlapping concepts. Moreover the idea of ‘enhancing’ 
the human is not new either, as antecedents of the contemporary idea  can be 
found in pre-scientific antiquity and myth, when the practical technological means 
to realise a vision of the enhanced human were not available. 
Thus in one sense we are dealing with ancient problems and ideas. On the other 
hand, however, the contemporary context of rapidly evolving medical technology 
in which the question of enhancement presents itself indicates that these issues 
require detailed consideration. In view of the wide ranging ethical implications 
that enhancement technologies and potential policy responses to them may have, 
some way of anticipating these implications and formulating normative 
conclusions that are ethically sound is required.  
Given the historical depth of the concept of enhancement, and the recent rapid 
expansion in scholarly scrutiny and analysis about its possible implications within 
the context of 21st Century medicine, the main theoretical positions have now 
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been staked out and established. Persuasive arguments exist both for and against 
the therapy / enhancement distinction and a range of ethical views have been put 
forward on either side. However, the debate is inconclusive. 
Although appearing unproblematic, under examination the therapy / enhancement 
distinction is unstable. The first reason for this is that it is logically vulnerable to 
the claim that therapy is a species of enhancement, since both share the 
fundamental goal of improving health, functioning, wellbeing, or some 
combination of the three. If this is true and therapy is logically reducible to 
enhancement, the erosion of the distinction has problematic implications for the 
fair allocation of resources: if no clear line can be drawn between therapies and 
enhancements, why should enhancements not be accessible from a doctor both in 
principle and in practice? To discriminate against enhancement on the basis of 
such a logically weak distinction is vulnerable to claims of arbitrariness.   
Secondly, the distinction is empirically vulnerable. The integrity of the distinction 
relies on a convincing account of ‘normal’ health and / or functioning, since 
normality is the line according to which a judgement is made about whether an 
intervention is therapeutic or enhancing in nature. Norms of health, both statistical 
and perceived, are influenced by a range of historical, geographical, social, cultural, 
economic, and technological contingencies, however. Given that ‘normality’ is a 
concept in a state of permanent flux, the location of the line between therapy and 
enhancement is correspondingly impermanent. 
Thirdly, the combination of these ambiguities has implications for justice in 
healthcare. Resources are limited and heath needs differ in severity. Medicine 
nominally treats the sick rather than the well, and the well are thus prima facie 
excluded from most decisions about the allocation of healthcare services. If the 
category into which the constituents of each are put depends on a set of norms that 
are in flux, however, how is this heuristic for the allocation of resources to be 
retained in a way that is useful and ethically sound? It is these questions which 
motivate the research carried out in this thesis and which we will now begin to 
investigate, starting with a review of the relevant theoretical literature in chapter 
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two, which will help to show in greater detail where gaps in knowledge presently 
exist.  
1.10) Summary 
In this chapter I have introduced the therapy / enhancement distinction and 
explained why it represents an important practical ethical challenge that should be 
addressed. I have outlined some of the difficulties associated with using concepts 
of health and disease for distinguishing effectively between therapy and 
enhancement. I have also explained the challenge posed by factors such as 
historical and cultural variation in norms of health which influence how the 
distinction is understood. I have emphasised the powerful impact of medical 
technology on definitions of health and disease. I have also raised the issue of 
ethical relevance entailed by this concerning the fair allocation of scarce medical 
resources. 
I have outlined the current imbalance between theoretical literature and empirical 
data within the current bioethical debate about human enhancement, and 
explained why more empirical information is required in order to resolve this 
imbalance. I have stated my aim to collect relevant empirical data about how the 
philosophical and ethical challenges of human enhancement are perceived from 
within the context of contemporary medicine in order to clarify the ambiguous 
therapy / enhancement distinction and produce a refined account of the 
relationship between the two. 
Having broadly sketched out the problem to be investigated within the thesis, in 
chapter two I will provide a review of the relevant literature. This will help to 
identify what information is required to assist in the achievement of the aims of 
the thesis as a whole. Following this, in chapter three I will justify the use of critical 
realism as an effective philosophical methodology for combining the theoretical 
and empirical components of the research, prior to describing and explaining the 
empirical component in chapter four. 
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Thereafter in chapter five I report the main findings of relevance which emerged 
from the empirical study. In chapter six I carry out a philosophical analysis of these 
findings in light of existing theory towards refining our understanding of the 
therapy / enhancement distinction. Finally in chapter seven I develop 
philosophical and ethical conclusions on the basis of the preceding analysis and I 
make policy recommendations for how the refined understanding of therapy and 
enhancement can be applied. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38 
 
Chapter Two: Literature Review 
2.1) Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to identify the main issues of relevance within the 
theoretical debate about human enhancement and how it can be distinguished 
from therapy. The review will highlight those aspects of the debate that require 
further investigation, and how the understanding of these can be advanced by the 
research to be presented in this thesis. Given the interdisciplinary nature and 
context of the research, the review will include not only philosophical but also 
relevant social scientific literature. This will offer a wider conception of the ways in 
which the relevant concepts can be understood. Moreover, since medicine and 
healthcare are socio-cultural institutions and this project is one of applied moral 
philosophy, we require a suitably interdisciplinary approach to the relevant 
theoretical literature.  
Human enhancement is a broad subject and it is not possible to deal with all the 
relevant literature which exists in the space available. For example the review 
excludes fields such as disability studies within which relevant work about 
enhancement has been written. Despite the relevance of accounts of disability to 
the enhancement debate, the concept of disability itself is not the focus of this 
project, and hence is not included within the literature reviewed. This review 
concentrates on those aspects of the debate which are of greatest relevance to 
understanding the therapy / enhancement distinction in general, and the ethical 
implications of enhancement within a medical context in particular. 
Prior to investigating human enhancement itself we need to examine the various 
conceptualisations of health that have been advanced within the literature. This is 
necessary because the therapy / enhancement distinction turns on an 
understanding of what is understood by the term ‘normal’ health, and its 
difference from subnormal and supra-normal states.  Following the review of 
health concepts we will examine changes in norms of health, and the relation of 
these changes to enhancement. We will also briefly consider the hypothetical 
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transformation which may represent a final end of enhancement, that of the 
posthuman. 
We will consider various ethical arguments for and against human enhancement. 
In particular this analysis will include those which appeal to ‘naturalness’, since 
these are of great relevance to understanding the therapy / enhancement 
distinction. Following this I will present an overview of the state of the art in 
existing technologies for human enhancement and situate the contemporary 
debate relative to what is possible at the present time. The review will cover the 
relation of these various themes to clinical and research practices in medicine, and 
highlight what is missing from the ethical debate at present. 
2.2) Concepts of Health, Disease, and Illness: Philosophical Literature 
2.2.1) Biostatic vs Evaluative Theories  
It is a tautology to state that normal health is normal. As Canguilhem (1989, p. 137) 
observes, however, ‘one could say that continuous perfect health is abnormal’. 
Implicit in this observation is the judgement that ill-health and disease are aspects 
of normality. Thus, in order to use and understand the concept of normality we 
must first carry out an analysis of health, illness, and disease. 
Philosophical conceptions of health, illness, and disease are numerous and diverse. 
They range along a spectrum from ‘value-free’ descriptive biological and statistical 
accounts at one end, to evaluative psychological and sociological accounts at the 
other end. This distinction can be understood as opposing claims concerning the 
nature of health states as fundamentally objective or subjective. Between these 
two poles there exists a range of alternative accounts which attempt in different 
ways to reconcile the difficulties with the polar accounts and derive utility from the 
relative benefits of each. 
The first kind is the descriptive or 'biostatic' model espoused by Boorse (1975). It 
is supported to different degrees by Lennox (1995), Wakefield (1995), and Harris 
(2001). This theory is also known as the 'medical' model, as it corresponds closely 
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to the diagnostic criteria and rationale used within the context of western 
medicine. Boorse (1975, p. 542) offers the following summary: 
'...health is normal functioning, where the normality is statistical and the functions 
biological....on our view disease judgements are value-neutral...if diseases are 
deviations from the species biological design, their recognition is a matter of natural 
science, not evaluative decision.' 
Boorse's argument has been widely criticised, despite its implicitly widespread use 
in western medical practice. In view of this Khushf (2007, p. 24) asks why it is that 
Boorse’s account remains influential ‘if he is so obviously wrong’, and goes on to 
answer his question by suggesting that Boorse’s model must accurately capture at 
least some aspects of health. In terms of treating disease, for example, he argues 
that ‘it would be very hard to find anyone who does not see some role for descriptive, 
fact-based considerations’. 
Opponents of Boorse have attempted to improve on his model. Opposition is 
frequently grounded in a disagreement with his claim that judgements about states 
of relative health are value-neutral. De Vito (2000) and Nordenfelt (2006) argue 
that judgements of health are inescapably value-laden because the deficiencies in 
functioning that diseases generate tend to limit our capabilities, and these 
capabilities are, as Toulmin (1975, p. 61) suggests, ‘preconditions for almost any 
other imaginable human good’. 
Consonant with this view Thomasma & Pellegrino (1981, p. 8) suggest that ‘a 
fundamental need of a living organism’s health can be said to be an absolute, 
intrinsic value’. Hence, within this category of views it is argued that discussion of 
health necessarily precludes the disaggregation of implicit value judgements, even 
from those accounts which allege to be purely descriptive. Following this 
Nordenfelt (2001) insists that health must be judged as relative to goals. 
Since goals are subjectively desired because of the value that they hold for the 
person seeking them, Nordenfelt argues that it is impossible to separate discussion 
of these from implications of value. He suggests that this is reflected by our day-to-
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day use of terms such as health, disease and illness, of which any accurate theory 
must take account. Agich (1983, p. 38) concurs, arguing that Boorse ‘oversimplifies 
the complex entanglement of descriptive and evaluative elements in disease 
language’: 
‘The conceptual purity which is gained for theoretical health and disease on this 
account is purchased at the exorbitant price of excusing medicine from the concrete 
social cultural world. But it is in this world that disease language functions and to 
this world that philosophical accounts of the language of disease must be relevant.’ 
The statistical and evaluative positions stand in opposition to each other and are 
each partially successful in providing a comprehensive account of health. Although 
they are both plausible positions to some extent, neither supplies a full explanatory 
account in every possible case. Boorse holds that health is equivalent with physio-
biological functioning that can be described as statistically normal, and yet this 
characterisation leads to inconsistencies, as Nordenfelt notes (1993, p. 279): 
‘Many bodily or mental states which are intuitively considered to be diseases or signs 
of ill health, need not involve any statistically abnormal function. Given a certain very 
harsh environment, for instance a very hard climate, a certain reduction of function 
can in fact be the statistically normal one.’ 
Despite these deficiencies, however, Boorse's biostatic theory is able to criticise 
evaluative accounts because of their inconsistencies. If it is true, for example, that 
the primary characteristic of ill-health is impairment of goals, rather than 
deviation from a statistical species-norm of functioning, then a great many 
physiological states that do not correspond to our everyday use of the term 
‘disease’ could be considered as such. For example Boorse (1975, p. 544) observes 
that one may be impaired by being below average ‘in any valuable physical quality, 
e.g. height, strength...’ and indeed that it may also be undesirable to have normal 
human frailties ‘such as a need for sleep and regular access to food and water’. It 
does not follow from these limitations that they are diseases, however, simply 
because they are negatively valued. 
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Wakefield (1995, p. 237) agrees, arguing that objections to a biostatic explanation 
of disease can be dealt with by rejecting the claim that apparently value-laden 
terms such as ‘goals’ are truly 'value-laden' at all. He suggests that terms such as 
this are in fact descriptive, and their use in health discourse is misconstrued by 
those propounding a relativist or evaluative explanation: 
‘...the fact that one might say that survival is the "purpose" of a certain naturally 
selected mechanism does not at all imply that one attributes a value - the desirability 
of survival - to nature. Rather, one is using intentional language to assert that a 
certain kind of complex non-intentional and non-value-laden causal relationship 
exists among the mechanism...’ 
Wakefield argues that to construe health as an evaluative concept is to mistake 
apparently subjective aspects for objective ones, and hence that explanatory 
accounts of this kind are reducible to a more basic, mechanistic, explanation of the 
difference between normal and abnormal functioning. 
The two opposing positions are each partially effective, but neither encompasses 
all of the aspects that are relevant to health discourse. Boorse’s biostatic model 
does not give weight to the subjective negative experience of ill-health, whilst 
Nordenfelt's evaluative model opens the door for a great many subjectively 
negative but statistically normal physical states to be considered as diseases. On 
this reading almost anything could be a 'disease'. Various attempts have been 
made to reconcile or integrate these positions in order to give a fuller account of 
health. I will now examine some of these in more detail. 
2.2.2) Reconciliations  
Although Boorse’s model has relatively few strong adherents, conditional support 
for it is evident in theories which also incorporate evaluative components. Lennox 
(1995) proposes a synthesis of evaluative and biostatic elements on the basis that 
some value-based metric for successful functioning is inevitable in judgements of 
health. He suggests that the invocation of values cannot be avoided in making these 
judgements. Lennox (1995, p. 500) concedes that Boorse’s ‘reductionist’ account 
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has significant explanatory power in successfully distinguishing between the 
relative adequacy of functional states, since: 
'The judgement that 'health' refers to a state of successful functioning requires a 
standard of value, by reference to which organic functions may be judged successful 
or unsuccessful.' 
Lennox points out that despite the difficulty of disaggregating value judgements 
from a concept of health, the reductionist is entitled to ask how a relativist can 
seriously defend severing completely the empirical link between health and 
statistical normality. If there is no necessary connection between the two, the 
reductionist is entitled to demand a more persuasive account of the reasons for 
their correlation. Margolis (1976, p. 246) defends the deep connection between the 
descriptive and the normative in the following way: 
‘The notion that human beings have a natural function is essential to the 
eudemonism of Plato and Aristotle and it is, in a way, presupposed by the claims of 
somatic and psychiatric medicine insofar as they suppose themselves to be value-
neutral sciences.’ 
Alternative accounts contend that the problem inherent to reductive accounts of 
health as, for example, statistical normality is that they cannot explain different 
kinds of ill-health. For example, Young (1982) and Marinker (1975) propose a 
tripartite model. Marinker (Ibid, p. 82) explains:  
‘The first mode of unhealth is disease. This is a pathological process...The quality 
which identifies disease is some deviation from a biological norm....The second mode 
of unhealthy is illness. Illness is a feeling, an experience of unhealth which is...interior 
to the person of the patient. Often it accompanies disease, but the disease may be 
undeclared...Sometimes illness exists where no disease can be found...The third  mode 
of unhealth is sickness...Sickness is a social role, a status, a negotiated position in the 
world, a bargain struck between the person henceforward called 'sick', and a society 
which is prepared to recognize and sustain him.’ 
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Marinker’s approach is intuitively appealing as it corresponds to our everyday use 
of the terms, and to this extent it satisfies the condition that Nordenfelt suggests 
any adequate explanatory system must meet. Nevertheless, conceptual 'fuzziness' 
remains. Sadegh-Zadeh's (2000, p. 607) acknowledges the ambiguity of the 
concepts ‘health’, ‘disease’ and ‘illness’ and argues that the different states cannot 
be dealt with by 'yes or no principles'. As such he suggests that all three must be 
subject to the 'principle of graduality'. 
This, again, corresponds to our everyday use of the terms health, illness and 
disease: we understand that it is possible to feel very ill or only slightly ill, to have 
a disease which is either mild or serious, and to feel fluctuations in our health. He 
describes the model that he wishes to construct as one which is 'lifeworldly 
grounded' (Ibid, p. 621), capturing what is conceptually significant about health, 
and incorporating both the empirical reality of pathology, and the subjective 
experiencing of illness. Hofmann (2002, p. 653) offers a related account, and 
suggests that despite their differences, the concepts are interdependent. Insofar as 
'they represent different perspectives on human ailment', they require 
correspondingly different responses. 
Hare (1986), Lewis (1953), and Boyd (2000), also argue that a full 
conceptualisation of health must incorporate both the descriptive and the 
evaluative components that come to bear upon the relevant terms and their usage. 
For example, although Hare (1986, p. 176) states that his account ‘rests heavily on 
the notion of natural function’, he also notes that some degree of evaluation is 
unavoidable when talking about health, since the judgement that something 
functions ‘badly’ entails the implicit judgement that it ought to be repaired (Ibid. p. 
178): 
‘To call a thing bad is to imply that it has qualities which, other things being equal, 
ought to be avoided or remedied in things of the kind in question. If I have bad 
eyesight, for example, I ought to go to the oculist and he ought to prescribe spectacles 
if they will make my eyesight better.’ 
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Similarly, Boyd (2000) characterises health as metaphor for the concept of 
‘wholeness’, adducing the ancient etymological connection between the two words 
in support of this characterisation. He argues that health can only be fully 
understood by taking into account the extent to which a person is physio-
biologically able to fully realise a vision of the kind of life that he or she wishes to 
lead. This account is appealing; however the re-characterisation of health as 
wholeness does not produce a substantial clarification of the concept of health as 
such. 
One way of resolving this conceptual imprecision might be to formulate a theory 
away from an ideal of absolute health, towards one which more explicitly explains 
the relationship between our (objective) capabilities and our (subjective) goals. 
Pörn (1993, p. 296) offers such a model, proposing an account of health 
understood in terms of 'adaptedness’: 
‘...does the combination of the ability with a set of environmental circumstances 
constitute a capacity that is sufficient for the realization of a goal of his? If the 
answer is affirmative, there is an agreement between his capacity and his goal, a kind 
of balance...I shall use this kind of generalized adaptedness in my characterization of 
health.’ 
Notwithstanding the differences between Boyd and Pörn, the two accounts share 
an acknowledgement of the epistemic difficulties associated with providing a 
complete theory of health. Although Pörn believes that this difficulty can be 
overcome by equating health with adaptedness, he also concedes that 
'adaptedness' is a personal matter and not one which can be generalised. In this 
respect, despite Pörn‘s attempt to reduce the ambiguity of the concept of health by 
substituting it with ‘adaptedness’, it shows itself to be equally as enigmatic as 
Boyd’s substitution of health with ‘wholeness’. An analysis of these accounts thus 
suggests that a fully comprehensive account of health remains elusive. 
In spite of the persistent conceptual imprecision, variations of Pörn’s account of 
health as a kind of agreement between one’s goals, environment, and capabilities 
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are found elsewhere. For example, Kovacs (1998, p. 36) offers a heuristic 
conceptualisation of health ‘as somatic and mental ability to adapt to reasonable 
social norms’. There is also some parity between Pörn’s account and that proposed 
by Canguilhem’s principle of ‘biological normativeness’. Since to talk of goals is to 
imply a value judgement of certain courses of action, Canguilhem (1975, p. 186) 
regards health as a state which is ‘normative in relation to the fluctuations of the 
environment’.  
Hesslow (1993) proposes a different solution, however. In view of the inherent 
complexity of health concepts he gives an account which removes reference to the 
labels disease, illness, and sickness completely. He contends that in view of the 
failure of other theories to clarify the meaning of these terms, any correct account 
must find a different way to explain the relationship between illness, disease, and 
sickness, and the healthy state from which they deviate.  
Hesslow's theory is grounded in the assertion that it is only of secondary relevance 
to those who provide medical assistance how kinds of ill-health or dysfunction 
should be ontologically categorised. Rather, what is of primary importance is 
whether and how the ‘fault’ can be repaired. Employing a similar reductive 
characterisations to Veatch’s (1981, p. 539) account of health professionals as 
‘technically competent experts’, and Bayles’ (1981, p. 665) ‘physicians as body 
mechanics’, he uses the analogy of a mechanic fixing a car in illustration of this 
argument, claiming that it is not important to the mechanic what kind of fault has 
occurred, but simply that a fault has occurred at all.  
In this respect Hesslow appears less concerned with which procedures should or 
should not be considered as appropriate to medical practice and administered 
under its remit. Instead he argues that we cannot rely on the fact that something is 
administered within a medical context to tell us whether or not it is a disease or an 
illness. 
Some evidence in support of this is available in the case of cosmetic plastic surgery, 
which is one of very few historical instances of medical enhancement. If Pertchuk 
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et al (1998), Gimlin (2000), Henderson-King & Henderson-King (2004) Delinksy 
(2005), Brown et al (2007) are correct, the key motivation for seeking cosmetic 
plastic surgery is dissatisfaction with ‘normal’ appearance, rather than the clear 
presence of a disease or illness. Hesslow (Ibid. p. 7) suggests that the salient factor 
determining whether someone requires medical assistance is not whether they are 
‘ill’ or ‘diseased’ as such, but whether it is possible to remedy whatever the ailment 
they have - or perceive themselves to have - that is negatively affecting their life: 
‘Cosmetic surgery is growing in importance and will probably continue to do so. Sex 
change operations are not motivated by the conviction that gender can be a disease. 
If and when 'cures' are found for, say, male baldness or normal intelligence, they will 
become major medical articles. Many physicians are occupied with attempts to give 
people supernormal functions or capacities, as illustrated by sports medicine and 
research on longevity.’ 
Implicit in this argument is the view that the social context in which an individual 
finds themselves partially determines their relative health. Given that societies and 
the norms embedded within them change over time, and given also that health 
improvement is temporally conditioned, several authors have rightly pointed out 
that norms of behaviour, practice or states of being can change in their social 
acceptability over time, and in either direction. 
Infanticide, for example, has not always been considered an unacceptable practice 
(Barilan & Weintraub, 2001); and masturbation (Bullough, 1987) and 
homosexuality (Margolis, 1976) were at different points in the past incorrectly 
classified as diseases. Hesslow believes that the emphasis within the study of 
clinical practice is not what constitutes a state of health or disease, but what is 
medically or technologically possible in terms of sustaining or improving the 
functioning of the body. 
Despite the philosophical orientation of the accounts examined so far, many of 
them invoke other humans, society, technology, and the environment as influences 
upon an accurate definition of health. Insofar as health beliefs are tied to prevailing 
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medical cultures, if the beliefs underpinning these cultures differ then 
conceptualisations of health are also likely to differ. Given the significance of socio-
cultural influences on health and how it is understood, we will now move on to 
examine theoretical accounts found within relevant literature from the social 
sciences. 
2.3) Concepts of Health, Disease, and Illness: Social Science Literature 
Albrecht (2006, p. 268) contends that philosophical questions play an 
‘undergirding’ role in the construction of social scientific theories within the study 
of health and illness. One implicitly philosophical view is the widely held position 
across the social sciences that health concepts cannot be understood in abstraction 
from their context. That their definitions are subject to changes in this context is 
thus a central assumption of the social and anthropological studies of medicine. 
Fabrega (1981, p. 493) writes: 
‘It is a truism that conceptualisations about disease have important social 
implications. Medicine, an institution of society, is defined in terms of its concern with 
disease. The very definition of disease… is a product of historically determined social 
happenings. Medical activities, thus, are rooted in socially structured categories.’ 
Siebers (2001) objects, however, that a purely social model will not do all the work 
necessary for providing a full account of health, illness, and disease because the 
intrinsically harmful and life-threatening nature of certain pathological processes 
cannot be empirically refuted. Consistent with a recognition of the influence of 
both internal and external influences on health, Engels (1981, p. 599) advocates a 
‘biopsychosocial’ account: 
‘...a medical model must also take into account the patient, the social context in which 
he lives, and the...system devised by society to deal with the disruptive effects of 
illness, that is, the physician role and the health care system…By evaluating all the 
factors...rather than giving primacy to biological factors alone, a biopsychosocial 
model would make it possible to explain why some individuals experience “illness” 
condition which others regard merely as “problems of living”...’ 
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What is captured by this account is the claim that a full account of health and those 
states identified as deviant from it are determined by a mixture of factors that 
encompasses not only disease pathology, but socio-cultural contingencies as well. 
The suggestion that these socio-cultural contingencies may be considered as 
determinants of health to the extent that they promote or inhibit one’s ability to 
live a normal life is one which also appears in the philosophical theories of 
Toulmin (1975), Agich (1983), Pörn (1993), Lennox (2003), and Nordenfelt 
(2006). Thus, some degree of interdisciplinary parity is evident in this respect. In 
addition it follows from these accounts that once society’s norms change, 
definitions of health will also change correspondingly. 
2.3.1) Anthropological & Sociological Theories 
Although differences exist between accounts of health found in medical 
anthropology and sociology, they tend to share a key feature. This is the conviction 
that health cannot be understood in abstraction from the network of which it is a 
part. Millard (1992, p. 3) offers the following definition of this disciplinary view: 
‘Medical anthropology takes up the analysis of health in the context of culture, social 
behavior, economic systems, and human biology...the examination of health issues 
extends to include knowledge, meaning, social behavior, and biology generally 
related to well-being, suffering, misfortune, the life cycle, and survival.’ 
Thus, anthropological accounts view the meaning of ‘health’ as fluctuating in 
correspondence with changes in the social, cultural, economic, historical, and 
technological network of which it is a part. Adherents of this view point out that 
what is considered ‘normal’ for a human will be at least significantly constituted by 
the norms that happen to prevail within that person’s particular culture or society 
at a given time. Hence Benedict’s (1934, p. 286) claim that: 
‘A normal action is one which falls well within the limits of expected behaviour for a 
particular society. Its variability among different people is essentially a function of 
the variability of the behaviour patterns that different societies have created for 
themselves.’ 
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Similarly Unschuld (1978, p. 54) claims that 'medical thought...is specific to a 
particular world view'. The relativity of health concepts is also a key theme in the 
work of Kleinman (1978, 1997, 1999), Kleinman & Sung (1979), Frake (1977), 
Hahn & Kleinman (1983), and Good (1977). The authors defend their position with 
evidence from ethnographic studies carried out in regions of the world where 
‘western’ medicine does not dominate. These studies draw attention to the fact 
that in many pre-industrial regions 'there is nothing which could be called a 
“professional” sector...' (Currer & Stacey, 1986, p. 117). Consequently the traditional 
or folk medicine practices that dominate in these areas (Jiang-Bao, 2000) are, as 
Press (1980, p. 45) describes them 'largely magicoreligious and cannot be analysed 
in universal terms which could include Western medicine’. 
This represents a sharp contrast to the biomedically-orientated form of healthcare 
that dominates in industrialised western nations, one whose structure is acutely 
rationalist, empirical, 'precisely definable by its scientific stringency' (Wiseman, 
2004, p. 327), and whose 'technological triumphs are its defining image' (Kleinman, 
1997, p. 320). This structure represents a model that 'works most comfortably 
where there is a biochemical and / or structural defect that provides a simple key to 
understanding the disease being studied' (Gillett, 1994, p. 1127), but equally one 
whose values are informed by 'a narrow technical agenda of professionally defined 
principles' (Kleinman, 1997, p. 320).  
From a bioethical perspective, medical anthropologists have argued (perhaps 
understandably, given the necessarily cross-cultural remit of their work) that a 
weakness of high-tech western medicine is that disease pathology is its ‘paradigm 
object’ (Sadegh-Zadeh, p. 607). From this viewpoint medical decisions may give 
insufficient weight to the subjective, evaluative, and moral concerns of persons 
experiencing ill-health, which can come in forms other than the pathological. Good 
(1977, p. 28) claims that this aspect of healthcare cannot be ignored if it is to be 
effective, claiming that '...human illness is fundamentally semantic and 
meaningful...all clinical practice is fundamentally interpretive'.  
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Among the more trenchant anthropological criticisms of western medicine and its 
account of health made is the accusation that the high commercialism and profit 
motive of the model distort the true picture of a plurality of conceptions of health, 
for which one model of treatment alone may not be appropriate. Frankenberg 
(1980, p. 198) argues that the dominance of this model, as a function of its 
economic success and identification with 'the high status attributes of Western 
science', obscures the therapeutic legitimacy of alternative accounts.  
Frankenberg (1980, p. 198) is especially critical of the dominance of the western 
medical model, claiming that it represents 'a characteristic overstatement of the 
merits of Western technology including medicine'. The distorting effect of this 
dominance is also claimed by others in different ways (Han, 2002; Wolff, 1964; 
Young, 1981), all of whom criticise the explicitly scientific empiricist bias which 
characterises the model. Kleinman (1979, p. 7) claims that: 
'For researchers in clinical medicine, healing is an embarrassing word. It exposes the 
archaic roots of medicine and psychiatry, roots which are usually buried under the 
biomedical science facade of modern health care. It suggests how little we really 
know about the most central function of clinical care.' 
The suggestion here is that the explicitly rationalist bias of western medicine 
creates distance between the pathological and existential aspects of health, 
disease, and illness. These elements could, if combined, contribute to a richer and 
holistic model more able to deal with the qualitative aspects of the experiences of 
'the sick person, since it is what happened to him that must be explained' (Lewis, 
1976, p. 120). 
The disjunctive aspect of the rationale of western biomedicine identified by 
Kleinman is consistent with the earlier observations of the sociologist Max Weber, 
who argues that the ultra-rationalism of modern medicine will inevitably entail 
circumstances whose outcomes are contrary to fundamental ethical principles of 
health care. In his 1918 lecture ‘Science as a Vocation’ (1996, p. 128) Weber argues 
that what is most fundamentally at stake, ‘Whether life is worth living and when’, 
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becomes subordinate to the assumption that more life must be necessarily good 
simply because this is the goal towards which medical practice aims: 
'...the general “presupposition” of the medical enterprise is...that medical science has 
the task of maintaining life as such and of diminishing suffering...Yet this is 
problematical...the medical man preserves the life of the mortally ill man, even if the 
patient implores us to relieve him of his life, even if his relatives...grant his 
redemption from suffering.'  
The view articulated here is that 'health' has a multiplicity of subjective, normative, 
aspects and is not necessarily equivalent or reducible to the technological control 
of human biological systems. Indeed, given the plurality of interpretations of health 
found across human cultures and societies, Idler (1979, p. 728) argues that it is 
simply ‘empirically false’ to claim understanding of a concept such as illness 
without taking into its broader context into account.  
Bakx (1991, p. 26) writes that although ‘folk’ beliefs about health can be found in 
technologically advanced societies, in these societies such beliefs have become less 
widespread, viewed increasingly as 'residues from some pre-modern past'. This 
change in perception is, as Davies (1997) argues, correlative with increasing 
urbanisation and technological sophistication in general. Consistent with this 
account, Gursoy (1996, p. 578) suggests that in the west the biomedical model has 
over the past 300-400 years become the social orthodoxy: 
'The scientific paradigm was born in the 16th and 17th centuries when Newtonian 
physics and Cartesian rationality replaces the softer and more organic logic of a 
world view based on religion and an Aristotelian respect for nature. A displacement 
of paradigms was realised when a desire to predict and control events gradually 
replaced a less intrusive quest for meaning and significance.'  
Hewa & Hetherington (1995) also argue that the developments which occurred 
during the Scientific Revolution of the C16th and C17th have been particularly 
influential on the contemporary understanding of health, given modern medicine’s 
‘self-consciously systematic’ (Jordanova, 1995, p. 374) approach to the rectification 
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or reversal of adverse or undesirable biological, physical, or cognitive processes. 
This is true whether such dysfunctions are instances of objectively identifiable 
pathological deviation beneath a statistical norm, or subjectively perceived 
shortcomings that are not pathological but are nonetheless limiting in some way. 
Objective medical conditions of the first kind (e.g. heart disease, diabetes, cancer, 
Parkinson's disease) are frequently (though not always) relatively straightforward 
to classify. To describe procedures within the second category, however, as ones 
which are medical by virtue of addressing a legitimate 'medical' need can be more 
problematic. Some examples of these include: the prescription of hormone 
treatment to restrict the height of tall teenage girls (Rayner et al, 2010); cosmetic 
plastic surgery to reverse signs of ageing or enhance attractiveness (Rogers, 1976; 
Sarwer & Crerand, 2004; Delinsky, 2005); 'off-label' competitive use of 
neuropharmaceutical stimulants (Coveney et al, 2008; Williams et al, 2008); and 
cryonic freezing for extreme, or eventually indefinite, life extension (Romain, 2010; 
Underwood et al, 2008). 
In cases such as these a species-typical characteristic is perceived to confer some 
disadvantage in need of amelioration or rectification. It is this subjective 
identification of ‘faults’, whether or not they should genuinely be understood as 
diseases or states in need of rectification that contributes to the blurring of the 
concept of ‘health’. The examples given in the previous paragraph all relate to a 
further issue of relevance within theories of health, namely changes in perceptions 
of what constitutes normal health and the factors which influence them.  
2.4) Norms of Health 
Moravcsik (1976, p. 344) offers a historical analysis of health concepts from 
antiquity to the present day. On the basis of this he concludes that our fundamental 
understanding has neither undergone any radical advance nor increased in 
sophistication: 
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 ‘We do not seem to have a better answer than the one Plato proposed: we must 
assume a conception of natural bodily functioning and regard as medical treatment 
those efforts that aim at the preservation or restoration of this functioning.’ 
Consistent with this assertion, and despite significant differences between the 
theoretical explanations of health advanced, Mordacci (1995, p. 478) makes the 
observation that they are largely united by some conception of ‘normal’ health, 
whether this norm is expressed in statistical or experiential terms: 
‘The fundamental feature of the concept of health seems to be the reference to a 
'norm', in both the bio-statistical and the normative-ideal sense. Many of the 
definitions of health that have been given refer to one or both of these two meanings 
of 'norm'.’ 
On the other hand Amundson (2000, p. 36-43) is critical of adherence to ‘normal 
functioning’ and considers it misleading, since biological life is characterised by 
diversity. Consequently he is also critical of theories which valorise the normal, 
and implies that such valorisation may be implicitly sinister: 
‘Variation is ubiquitous...Ian Hacking dates the origin of the concept of normality to 
the rise of statistics in the nineteenth century. He says that normality ...uses a power 
as old as Aristotle to bridge the fact/value distinction, whispering in your ear that 
what is normal is also right’’ 
Thus, opposing views exist concerning the value of ‘normality’, and by implication 
the acceptability of altering it. The concept of ‘normal health’ has, as we will see, 
significant implications for the therapy / enhancement distinction.  Stempsey 
(2006) and Mechanic (1973), for example, argue that innovation in and increasing 
integration with medical technology generates new norms of functioning, and 
these arguments are relevant to theories of human enhancement. 
Scholars of science and technology studies and medical sociology have argued that 
new social norms and norms of health will emerge that are increasingly 
characterised by the ‘cybernetic’ union of human biology and technology (Dunbar-
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Hester, 2010; Verbeek, 2008; Ihde, 2003). Franklin (2006) develops Haraway's 
famous claim in 'A Cyborg Manifesto' (1991, p. 168) that 'we are all chimeras' 
because: 
'...the extent to which biological knowledge, biotechniques, and biology “itself” 
reshape each other, and co-evolve, may never before have been made so explicit as 
today, through the redesign of the biological in the context of bioscience, biomedicine 
and biotechnology.'  
This question of the potential for technology to create new biological or 
physiological norms is of significant interest within philosophical analyses of 
health. Stempsey (2006) for example, examines the changing relationship between 
medicine and technology via a synthesis of the philosophy of Heidegger (1950), 
Jonas (1984) and Canguilhem (1975). Stempsey’s argument (Ibid, p. 227) is that: 
'...one of the characteristics of emerging medical technologies is that these 
technologies lead to new conceptions of health. When technologies enable the body to 
respond to more and more challenges of disease, we thus establish new norms of 
health.’ 
Stempsey argues it is inevitable that over time medical technology will alter 
humankind. Moreover given that medical research aims at understanding the 
mechanisms of the body such that they can be brought under our control, the level 
of control and successful manipulation that we can exert creates these new norms. 
Vos & Willems (2000) argue that these norms will in turn change our expectations 
about the degree of control to which we are entitled in the form of access to 
medical services or procedures. 
Ellul (1962, 1976, 1978) makes a similar argument in relation to technological 
change more generally, and develops a critique grounded in a question over the 
end point of continuous development. He argues that the growing technologisation 
of human life presents an increasingly technologised further set of goals and 
possibilities towards which human activity can be directed, resulting in a 
characterisation of ‘technology as man’s new environmental order’. Consequently he 
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identifies technology as possessing  a degree of autonomy of its own insofar as it 
has the capacity to direct the nature of its own existence as well as that of others. 
This is of relevance to presently unconventional interventions which may become 
more common medical practices in future, assuming a sufficiently successful 
research trajectory. One extreme example of this is cryogenic freezing, wherein a 
human individual or his or her head is frozen and preserved immediately after 
death until such time as medical technology is able to reanimate the body and 
enable the person to continue living indefinitely. There are several cryonic 
preservation facilities throughout the World - the Cryonics Institute10, for example, 
founded by Robert Ettinger in 1964, currently maintains 103 bodies in cryogenic 
stasis. 
Similarly, institutes such as SENS , led by the gerontologist Aubrey de Grey, are 
carrying out research into regenerative medicine with the aim of enabling humans 
to reverse ageing and live indefinitely. This is significant in view of the observation 
that ageing itself is not typically considered a disease at present (Caplan, 1981; de 
Grey, 2005). Rather, it is the deleterious by-products of ageing identified as 
diseases which require treatment (Temkin, 2010; Barazzetti, 2010; Bond, 2010). 
Caplan argues, however, that there are grounds for considering ageing to be a 
disease in view of these deleterious by-products which it entails.  
Following a re-characterisation along these lines De Grey (1997, 2005) also 
understands ageing as a process in need of a ‘cure’ which can be permanently 
inhibited such that death need never occur. Fox (1976, p. 245) makes an argument 
which, if true, implies that the emergence of institutes such as SENS11 may be 
unsurprising, despite the apparently radical changes to human norms that they 
advocate. She notes a tendency from mankind’s increasing ability to defeat 
existential threats using technology that it altered how we understand our relation 
to death and its (apparent) inevitability, and which: 
                                                          
10 http://www.cryonics.org/  
11 http://sens.org/  
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‘...has helped to push physicians, nurses and other medical professionals into a 
pugilistic tendency to combat death at any cost, and to define its occurrence as a 
personal and professional defeat.’ 
Mechanic (1973, p. 12) suggests that these distortions of the traditional ideal of 
medical practice continue to be driven by technological change, and hence that 
'modern societies are characterised by medical conceptions that are varied and in 
flux’. He goes on to claim that the rules and systems of control implemented to 
manage this change do not conform to any overall vision of what kinds of 
procedures ought or ought not to constitute a medicine of the future and have been 
created (Ibid. p. 13): 
'...on an ad hoc basis as we went along. For example, when transplant technology 
confronted us with the issue of obtaining viable organs, we began to reconsider the 
biological meaning of death and to ponder the legal questions of organ acquisition 
and disposal.' 
By contrast, however, arguments have been offered in support of the ad hoc nature 
of development and medical provision. Popper (1966, p. 213) argues that 
‘piecemeal’ change via responses to immediate challenges constitutes an important 
form of resistance to the ‘utopian’ technological engineering of societies according 
to a vision of the ‘ideal state’. In defence of such an approach to technological 
change he argues that: 
 ‘...The politician who adopts this method may not have a blueprint of society before 
his mind...but he will be aware that perfection, if at all attainable, is far distant, and 
that every man...have a claim to be given all possible help, if they suffer...It is the 
difference between a reasonable method of improving the lot of man, and a method 
which, if really tried, may easily lead to an intolerable increase in human suffering.’ 
It is in view of these various considerations of the future of medicine and what 
more we may be able to achieve that the idea of human enhancement comes into 
view. Enhancement is, as we will see, predicated on the acquisition and 
development of new functional norms, rather than the restoration of existing ones. 
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It is thus characterised as distinct from the traditional medical enterprise and its 
understanding of health and normality. We will now move on to examine theories 
of enhancement and how they relate to the conventionally therapeutic orientation 
of medical practice and research.  
2.5) Therapy Vs Enhancement 
Human biomedical enhancement is an emerging phenomenon, and as such much of 
the literature is speculative in nature. In this section we examine in more detail 
theories relating to the therapy / enhancement distinction, as well as actual 
technologies which exist and enhance human capacities in relevant ways. 
According to a typical reading, therapy is used to compensate for dysfunction by 
restoring functioning to a normal level, whereas procedures used to improve 
functioning above this normal level that go ‘beyond therapy’ (Kass, 2003) to make 
one ‘better than well’ (Elliott, 2004) are often described as 'enhancements'. 
Although this distinction appears clear, it reveals itself to be more complex under 
investigation because of a) the fundamental goal of improvement shared by 
therapy and enhancement and b) divergence between accounts of normality (Lin & 
Allhoff, 2008; Bostrom & Roache, 2008; Bostrom & Savulescu, 2009). 
Whether something is considered to be a therapy or an enhancement depends on 
where we draw the line between function and dysfunction, or between what is 
normal and abnormal, as defined by the limits of the 'normal range'. As we have 
seen, what is considered to be 'normal' or 'healthy' is subject to socio-cultural, 
economic, technological, and historical change. Consequently definitions of 
treatment and enhancement may change correspondingly (Daniels, 2000; Shickle, 
2000; Stempsey, 2006), as we saw earlier in Bess’s (2010, p. 647) account of 
enhancement as a ‘moving target’ by virtue of it being ‘pegged’ to the concept of 
health whose meaning is not static. 
Other writers have also addressed this issue (Ten Have, 1995; Wildes, 2001; Hill 
Curth, 2003; Creuss & Creuss, 2008; Serna, 2012). Indeed Serna reminds us that 
medical science and technology have developed means to protect entire societies 
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from large scale threats to health which affected less developed societies in the 
past. Infectious diseases such as smallpox (Barquet & Domingo, 1997) or bubonic 
plague (Hinnebusch, 1997), for example, have now been largely eradicated. We 
may now take their eradication for granted, since when eradication occurs it 
becomes normal not to consider these pathogens as threats, despite that on this 
view the eradication of disease or development of vaccines may legitimately be 
viewed as ‘enhancements’(Juengst, 1997; Lin & Allhoff, 2008). 
This is clearly desirable, and as Wildes (2001) contends, given the present rate of 
technological development it is likely that options for ‘medical intervention’ will 
increase in scope and range. Leach (1975), however, interprets this trajectory of 
development as one in which the primary aim of medicine will change from being 
predominantly curative or therapeutic, to emphasising health maintenance rather 
than repair as overall public health improves. 
A corollary of this is that, if successful, this change of focus may entail a diminution 
in the emergency or 'matter of life or death' role that medicine would have played 
in the past. Indeed Levine (1987) makes the related claim that increasingly 
effective treatment or management of disease and illness has engendered a 
growing emphasis on ‘quality of life’ as a goal of medical care, since many more 
chronic or existential challenges can be overcome. Returning briefly here to 
Hesslow’s theory of health, in the following passage (1993, p. 7) he underlines the 
goal of improvement that it shares with the apparently distinct phenomenon of 
enhancement is underlined: 
'...disease is so frequently associated with demand for treatment, usually because of 
suffering or potential suffering, that it is generally practical to use the disease label 
as a justification for medical intervention...but we must not let it mislead us into 
thinking that it is having a disease per se that is crucial rather than the potential 
benefits of treatment...’ 
The putative therapy / enhancement distinction can – apparently - be understood 
simply. The goals of healthcare seem unproblematic, since they aim to rectify 
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dysfunction. Enhancement appears distinct since it aims to boost from a state of 
normality. Indeed several technologies of interest are currently either only distant 
technological realities or significantly different from the kinds of core procedures 
carried out in medicine, such as the earlier examples of mind uploading (Kurzweil, 
2005; Rothblatt, 2012); and the indefinite extension of the lifespan (Harris, 2004; 
de Grey, 2005). 
There are, however, enhancements whose application bears a closer relation to 
standard medical practice. Cosmetic plastic surgery can be used as a form of 
enhancement (Sarwar & Crerand, 2003; Delinsky, 2005); Beta-blockers may 
prescribed in the absence of pathology or illness, for example to musicians for 
dealing with the pressure of live performances (Foddy & Clayton, 2004; Schneier, 
2006; Gorman & Gorman, 1987); and it has been argued that vaccinations can be 
reasonably characterised as enhancements (Juengst, 1997; Daniels, 2000; Holm & 
McNamee, 2010) insofar as they boost an already healthy immune system. 
What is obviated by these examples is similar to Juengst’s (1997) observation that 
therapy and enhancement may be inseparable to the extent that a goal of the 
former is served by the latter, for example in enhancing one’s health to protect 
against the occurrence of disease. As Scripko (2009, p. 296) notes, the aims of 
therapy and enhancement may be continuous in many cases since ‘enhancement 
technologies will often fulfil medicine’s goal of promoting health’ (Scripko, 2012, p. 
296). The clarity of the distinction is blurred further if we recall Harris’ argument 
(2009, p. 131) that, insofar as they improve functioning, all therapies ‘enhance’.  
Since ‘an enhancement is by definition an improvement on what went before’, he 
concludes that because the health of most individuals receiving medical treatment 
is enhanced by it, so ‘most of what passes for therapy is an enhancement’.  
Thus, a significant focus of the human enhancement literature is how this 
ambiguous and changeable distinction can be upheld when applied to specific 
instances in context. There is little disagreement within the literature about what 
the term ‘human enhancement’ is meant to designate. As Buchanan et al (2000, P. 
110) state, the distinction is posited because it ‘draws a line between...interventions 
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meant to cure...and interventions that improve a condition viewed as a normal 
function...’.What is disputed, however, is how normality can be identified correctly, 
and how we ought to respond to the possibility of enhancing the human. There is, 
therefore, at present some indeterminacy about what would constitute an ethically 
appropriate response. We will now turn to some of the moral issues raised by this 
indeterminacy. 
2.6) Ethical Issues in Enhancement 
Daniels (2000, p. 313) adopts a moderate ethical stance towards the benefits of 
human enhancement, and an epistemologically circumspect position in relation to 
the logical strength of its distinction from therapy. He claims that: 
'...no reasonable defense of the treatment-enhancement distinction is possible if we 
expect too much of it'.  
Daniels argues here that the main question when assessing the ethical viability of 
medical procedures is not 'is this a therapy or an enhancement?' but – in tacit 
agreement with Boorse's biostatic model of health - whether the procedure is 
compatible with ensuring that as many people as possible meet the natural 
'baseline' of human functional range. His reason for framing the argument in such a 
way is that his concern is not with the theoretical or metaphysical question of what 
a disease or a disability 'is', but rather a practical one of distributive justice. To this 
end, Daniels (Ibid, p. 318) argues that we should adopt the concept of 'normal 
functioning' as a heuristic because: 
'Despite many other sorts of comprehensive moral views, people may agree that 
maintaining normal functioning contributes in a reasonable and central way to 
protecting equality of opportunity.' 
Daniels claims that since enhancements may help to even out inequalities in 
statistically normal functioning, the relevance of a strict demarcation between 
them as 'treatments' or 'enhancements' is neutralised. Furthermore Powell & 
Buchanan (2011, p. 10)’s observation of what they call ‘the ubiquity of suboptimal 
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design’ reminds us that even ‘normal’ health may be defective relative to the 
achievement of certain goals. 
This observation has in turn been used by Savulescu (2006), Harris (2009), and 
Nam (2013) in arguments which purport to show that a still more pressing case 
can be made to show that there is a duty to enhance. They argue in different ways 
that if the means to improve health and well-being are available but forbidden, 
then those who forbid their use must bear the responsibility for favouring the 
status quo and its prohibition of these benefits to health. 
Endorsements of enhancement grounded in the need to provide a fair opportunity 
to all are advanced both by more radical pro-enhancement thinkers as well as 
those such as Daniels who emphasise the need for caution. Buchanan (2009), 
Harris (2009), Juth (2010), Temkin (2012); Sandberg & Savulescu (2011), Lin & 
Allhoff (2008), Bostrom & Roache (2008), Skripko (2010), Greely et al (2008) 
advance variations of this position. Such endorsements are grounded in the ethical 
legitimacy of equalising opportunity, reducing socio-biological inequalities, and 
increasing options for autonomous self-determination.  
These difficulties permeate the treatment / enhancement debate. In particular it is 
important to understand how this distinction can be made in view of the difference 
in perceived moral status between enhancements for therapy (the tools of 
healthcare), and enhancements for becoming 'better than well' (deemed to fall 
outside the remit of healthcare, perhaps for achieving 'positional' social 
advantage).  
The social context of enhancement has been raised as problematic, especially in 
relation to their use for gaining this kind of position advantage. Some believe that 
human enhancement technologies are likely to be corrosive to society, since if they 
are successful they are unlikely to be equally available to everybody, and if this is 
the case then they may exacerbate rather than reduce socio-economic disparities 
which already exist  (Fukuyama, 2002; Kass, 2003). 
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The literature indicates that enthusiasm for enhancement is found more commonly 
within philosophical writing on the subject than within the social sciences. This is 
perhaps understandable given the historical significance attached to the influence 
of power structures within the sociological canon (Coser, 1977; McLellan, 2000; 
Giddens et al, 2012), and the historical background of eugenics which is antecedent 
to contemporary debates about enhancement (Adams, 1990; Raz, 2009; Bauman, 
2010). 
An anomalous position, however, is offered by Serna (2012), who argues that it 
may be possible to use enhancements in ways that benefit societies. If 
interventions existed which could promote ‘love, care, belongingness, and 
solidarity’, then these kinds of enhancements could be allowed that are ‘congenial 
to communitarian sympathies’ (Ibid, p. 216). The invocation of these ethical 
concepts is significant. Since these are desirable features of human society, the 
suggestion that enhancements could be used to realise them underscores an 
important issue of contention within the debate. Advocates and critics of 
enhancement appeal to the moral significance of certain features of human life as 
reasons both for and against modifying what is given in nature. Ferrari (2008, p. 7) 
reminds us that: 
‘Both critics and supporters of NBIC  convergence and enhancement appeal to the 
same values...: for critics, respect for human dignity implies respect for the current 
given physical and mental state of the human being as provided by nature; for 
supporters of enhancement...the present state is only a step in evolution and is quite 
unsatisfactory.’ 
Social scientific critiques frequently highlight the potentially coercive nature of 
biotechnological power: if what is ‘given’ is no longer considered adequate, the 
threshold of what is considered normal - and thus in no need of rectification or 
improvement - will raise, and individuals may feel that they must adopt these 
technologies in order to remain ‘normal’, even if they do not wish to (Conrad & 
Gabe, 1999; Rose, 2007). A further, related, concern has been raised by Sandel 
(2004) in what may be summarised as the ‘arms race’ argument. Used also in 
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various forms by other enhancement sceptics, Sandel’s argument (Ibid, p. 4) deals 
with the possibility that access to enhancements would become increasingly 
competitive, leaving ‘those who couldn’t afford to buy their way up’ even more 
disadvantaged than they were before. 
Parens (1995) also criticises our rejection of given 'fragility' by biomedical means 
as an unattainable 'desire for paradise' which is damaging both to the individual 
and and to society. It is the concept of perfection implied here which troubles 
many opponents of enhancement. Of particular concern is the connection between 
enhancement and the eugenic ideology of the Nazi regime of the 1930s and 40s 
whose aim was the eradication of anything that it considered to be deviant 
(Reindal, 2000; Buchanan et al, 2000; Koch, 2010; Selgelid, 2013). 
Nazi eugenics, however, were state-directed, population-level, coercive efforts at 
social engineering. By contrast advocates of human enhancement characterise it as 
increasing choices for individual freedom and in this respect argue that they are 
not synonymous with each other. Agar (2008), for example, has responded to 
claims of eugenicism by accepting the label, but suggesting that enhancement 
ought to be understood as a ‘liberal eugenics’, framed in terms of individual choice, 
freedom, autonomy, and self-determination rather than the coercive ‘negative’ 
eugenics of the past. 
Pursuing the relevance of choice a little further, Kahane (2011) has responded to 
the worries of Sandel and Parens that genetic enhancement in particular will 
create a devaluation of the ‘given’ or ‘unbidden’. He is sceptical of the implication it 
is ethically corrosive for humans to direct or divert natural processes from the 
course that they might otherwise take, pointing out (Ibid, p. 361) that ‘birth control 
is a form of control’. Since parents ‘can control who they reproduce with and when’, 
he concludes that ‘natural reproduction is actually not so unpredictable’. 
This argument, however, relates specifically to reproductive choices about one’s 
non-existent offspring. A related argument is also put forward by Bradshaw & ter 
Meulen (2010, p. 673) concerning decisions about self-modification. They claim 
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that to allow individuals to modify themselves according to a personally held 
vision of themselves ‘as one who has his or her own ends in mind’ constitutes a 
defence against coercion, whether such coercion comes from others or from the 
limitations that nature imposes on us. They suggest only by respecting the 
legitimacy of such a vision does one ‘recognise and respect the person as they are as 
a morally whole person’. The authors (Ibid, p. 673) place significant emphasis on 
the importance of Isaiah Berlin’s ‘negative liberty rights’ (1969) for withstanding 
the kinds of undesirable eugenic scenarios envisaged by critics of enhancement: 
'Berlin is clear that no matter how obvious it might appear from the outside that 
certain people might do better, in some sense, if they were different, they are actually 
not other than they are. One has to start from the person as they present themselves. 
To do otherwise is to oppress.’ 
Advocates of human enhancement in the present day who adopt this position thus 
claim that their aims are laudable by distancing themselves from the antecedent 
background of coercive eugenics. Koch (2010, p. 696), however, argues that these 
aims are misguided, and that more equitable strategies for the allocation of 
resources could be adopted which give greater weight to accommodating 
biological diversity rather than the need to alter it. He suggests that if the true aim 
of the enhancement enthusiasts is to reduce suffering and improve potential: 
‘ ...they might endorse...those programs that improve the life of persons with 
cognitive, sensory, and physical differences. They do not promise readers for the blind 
or sign language translators for the deaf, however. They do not insist upon public 
access for those who travel in wheelchairs.’ 
Similarly Raz (2009, p. 14) argues that a distinction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
eugenics apparently grounded in autonomy is misleading, and that: 
‘...eugenics, viewed as dystopian and authoritarian in most of the 20th century, is in 
the process of being reinterpreted today as utopian and liberal.’ 
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Bauman’s (2010) critique of medical biotechnology is more general. He argues that 
eugenically-driven events such as the Holocaust are by-products not just of 
technological development, but of human ideology. He claims (Ibid, p. 113) that 
eugenic thinking is rooted in the Modernist assumption that man can and should 
exert control over nature wherever an obstacle or perceived threat presents itself: 
‘Modernity...is an age of artificial order and of grand societal designs, the era of 
planners, visionaries, and – more generally – “gardeners” who treat society as a 
virgin plot of land to be expertly designed and then cultivated and doctored to keep 
the desired form...’ 
Whether or not one favours human enhancement, the gravity of antecedent 
eugenic projects undoubtedly imbue the arguments for and against with ethical 
significance. Indeed Wasson (2011, p. 21) contends it is unlikely that profound 
ethical questions surrounding the use of new medical technologies will ever abate. 
She argues that they are 'here to stay', on the basis of 'the pace of scientific advances 
and the human desire to restore dysfunction and improve the human condition...'.  
Pellegrino (2004, p. 2) makes a similar claim, grounded in the kinds of freedoms 
prized in liberal societies which people are unlikely to relinquish: 
‘It is likely that outright rejection of enhancement would encounter strong resistance. 
Satisfaction of personal desires, freedom of choice, and "quality of life" have, for 
many, become entitlements in a democratic society. Few will want restrictions placed 
on their choice of enhancement.’ 
De Grazia (2005), Savulescu (2006), Greely et al (2008) and Harris (2009) have 
defended different forms of enhancement along these lines. Assuming a) the 
implementation of appropriate systems of access; and b) that the use of 
enhancements is chosen and not enforced distribution, they argue that that the 
lives of persons with cognitive, sensory, and physical differences could be changed 
in ways that would be beneficial to them. 
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Defending enhancement along these lines Sandberg & Savulescu (2011, p. 105) 
insist that ‘The best way to protect the disadvantaged...is not to prevent 
enhancement’, but rather that the benefits of enhancement should be harnessed in 
policy ‘to protect the least well off and to provide everyone with a fair go’. Similarly 
Allhoff (2005, p. 44) points out that it is not enhancements per se that could cause 
injustice, but rather that ‘there would have to be an unjust distributive scheme to 
enable the injustice to come about’. He concludes that assuming a just distributive 
scheme can be determined ‘enhancement, as a good or service, can be distributed 
according to the principles of that scheme.’ 
These responses, which locate the moral difficulty in the system of distribution and 
control rather than the enhancement itself lead to a further objection. This is the 
worry that the benefits of enhancement would accrue only to those who could 
afford them, thus exacerbating existing health inequalities. Allhoff et al (2009, p. 
21) note that only ‘the wealthy...can best afford such innovations’. On the basis that 
such a situation would risk ‘creating an even wider gap between the haves and the 
have-nots’ they thus acknowledge that within the enhancement debate ‘fairness is 
another value to consider’. 
Again, however, responses to this objection have been advanced which argue that, 
properly governed, enhancement could be used to reduce inequalities rather than 
inevitable exacerbating them (Cooke, 2003; Kamm, 2006; Powell & Buchanan, 
2011). Whilst the standard that such governance would have to meet is 
undoubtedly high, nevertheless it contributes to a fine balance in terms of the 
arguments for and against the moral acceptability of enhancement.  
Along these lines Brownsword (2012, p. 345) has outlined five conditions for the 
ethical use and distribution of access to enhancements which would cleave its 
beneficial aspects from those about which we ought to be concerned. Principles 1 
and 3 are as follows: 
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Principle 1: A should not use enhancers if this would cause harm to B (or others). 
Principle 3: B should not harm A by applying improper pressure (from coercion 
through to inducement) for A to use enhancers. 
The theoretical models of justice in access to enhancements are reasonable as far 
as they go. They assume, however, that the enhancements in question are safe and 
effective. To enhance ourselves safely, however, depends on first having properly 
understood the biological systems that we are attempting to modify. Despite their 
pro-enhancement stance, Bostrom & Sandberg (2009, p. 375) attest to the 
difficulties inherent to such a task in describing humans as already being ‘a marvel 
of evolved complexity’, in that: 
'Such systems can be difficult to enhance. When we manipulate complex evolved 
systems, which are poorly understood, our interventions often fail or backfire. It can 
appear as if there is a “wisdom of nature” which we ignore at our peril.' 
This is of particular relevance when considering genetic modifications, since these 
cannot be reversed and will create permanent downstream changes in the human 
genetic constitution (McGleenan, 1995; Shickle, 2000; Coady, 2009), the outcomes 
of which may be difficult to predict or control. Fukuyama (2002, p. 82) argues that 
genetic enhancement represents a significant danger because the possibility of 
unintended consequences occurring does not provide any guarantee that it will not 
be attempted: 
‘The history of technological development is littered with new technologies that 
produce long-term consequences that led to their modification or even 
abandonment...’ 
This argument is understandable because the negative consequences of misusing 
of powerful technologies such as genomics could be significant and far-reaching. 
However the opposing argument is always available. All technology, including 
genetic technology, carries a risk or ‘threat of harm that cannot be conclusively 
ruled out’ (Holm & Harris, 1999, p. 398). However if the presence of risk is adduced 
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as a reason not to engage in research then the precautionary principle at work 
here ‘will block the development of any technology if there is the slightest theoretical 
possibility of harm’ (Ibid. p. 398). 
If this principle were generally applied then although certain harms would be 
prevented it would also inhibit the reduction of others that follow from 
developments in medical science. Consequently such a principle is too blunt for 
making any more nuanced judgements between the balance of potential risks and 
benefits in individual technologies and products. 
Even if Fukuyama’s concerns are justified, Allhoff’s (2005) argument implies that 
this is not a legitimate objection to enhancement in principle because it is 
predicated on enhancement being carried out on the basis of faulty scientific 
understanding. Allhoff accepts that this constitutes a practical limitation on good 
reasons for engaging in enhancement but in posing the question ‘Once these 
developments are realized, what moral objections will remain?’ (Ibid, p. 44) rejects 
the implication that enhancement as such is ethically troublesome. 
Irrespective of whether this defence is applied to permanent or reversible forms of 
enhancement, however, moral complexities do remain.  Bostrom & Sandberg 
(2009, p. 381), for example, argue that we are now maladapted to deal with the 
challenges of the modern world. Although ‘Evolution has fine-tuned us for life’, since 
this occurred in the ‘ancestral environment...as a hunter-gatherer...roaming the 
African savannah’. They argue that although our environment has changed 
considerably, we have not evolved at a similar rate and therefore we may not be 
adequately adapted to deal with these changes: 
‘Life in contemporary society differs in many ways from life in the environment of 
evolutionary adaptedness. Modern conditions are too recent for our species to have 
fully adapted to them, which means that the tradeoffs evolution struck may no longer 
be optimal today.’ 
This appears to be a straightforward justification for why it would be acceptable to 
intervene in ways which alter ‘normal’ or ‘natural’ human functioning. Objections 
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grounded in the purported value of what is ‘given’ by nature made by Sandel 
(2004), Kass (2003), Parens (1995) and Fukuyama (2002) are relevant again here, 
however. Although these writers do not, as such, object to biotechnological 
interventions to improve health, each suggests that the more humankind beholds 
itself to an ideal of transcending the biological limitations that nature imposes, the 
less it will tolerate the ‘fragility’ that is distributed across the species. Parens (Ibid, 
p. 145) argues that: 
 ‘There is a point beyond which the reduction of our subjection to some sorts of 
change costs too much...I take it to be valuable for us to recognize and accept our 
nature, and neediness is a constituent of that nature.’ 
Crook (2007, p. 137) explains how this line of argument has been developed in 
order to characterise enhancement as an affront to nature: 
'To meddle with its stability and complexity is to invite disaster, to distort the 
inherent meaning of things. Some would see it as subverting the inherent moral order 
of things.' 
This is a difficult position to maintain, however, unless one can draw a clear and 
non-arbitrary line between the 'natural' and the 'artificial’, or circumscribe what 
would and would not count as 'meddling' in nature.  
2.7) ‘Natural’ Vs ‘Unnatural’ 
Barilan & Weintraub (2001, p. 137) argue that there is nothing self-evident about 
adopting a view of the world in which nature is benevolent such that to ‘interfere’ 
with it would constitute an unacceptable transgression: 
'The myth of Harmonia Mundi has deep roots in Western Culture and medicine as 
well as in many non-Western myths. However...It is also chaotic, arbitrary and not 
necessarily human-friendly.' 
Consistent with this claim, the view that ‘neediness’ causes unnecessary suffering 
to humans has been advanced. Loftis (2005, p. 72) points out that nature can be 
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‘damn cruel’. Similarly Savulescu (2006, p. 11) argues that since the natural and 
social distribution of abilities is uneven so it is reasonable to conclude that ‘nature 
allots capabilities with no eye to fairness’. Developing this line of argument, 
Warnock (2003) also acknowledges that the human race has limitations and 
frailties which can inhibit and cause suffering. She argues that on this basis it is 
acceptable to try to break these restrictions and alleviate suffering. It is not 
important, in her view, what kinds of technologies, procedures or artefacts we use 
to achieve these ends. Warnock's view (Ibid, p. 459) is that 'nature has an intrinsic 
value', but equally that: 
‘…any techne can be used for good or ill...we have to decide what is for good or ill by 
other criteria than that of Nature itself.' 
This view lends support to Chaterjee's (2007) contention that the enhancement of 
aspects of ourselves such as cognition will be difficult to prohibit because it is 
‘naturally’ highly valued throughout society. This is in turn consistent with 
Allhoff's (2005) view that enhancement is likely to be appealing because many of 
the characteristics considered as typical candidates for enhancement are Rawlsian 
‘primary goods’, i.e. goods that it would be rational for any human being to desire, 
given the degree of value and utility that they confer for most members of the 
species.  
Koch (2010, p. 687), however, believes that enhancement advocates espouse a 
dangerous agenda in the extent of their aims to alter what has been given in 
nature. In focusing an agenda of enhancement specifically on the activities of 
medicine, he argues that enhancement bioethicists identify states such as disease, 
disability and infirmity as social aberrations experienced by individuals who are to 
‘to be simply modified or discarded in favour of the whole’.  He also argues that the 
way in which pro-enhancements are made implies that its advocates ‘assume a 
mechanistic view of the individual as a machine whose elements can be manipulated’, 
thus doubting whether enhancement can succeed in the way that it is envisioned. 
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Although Koch’s argument is correct in underlining the practical and ethical 
obstacles to enhancing successfully, it may misrepresent the pro-enhancement 
case. This possible misrepresentation is also found in Baylis & Roberts’ claim 
(2004, p. 25) that enhancement is inevitable in spite of the attendant dangers 
because 'the essential characteristics of humanness are perfectibility and the 
biosocial drive to pursue perfection.' Proponents of enhancement argue that this 
misrepresents their case because typically they do not cite perfection of the 
imperfections of nature as the goal to which enhancement should aim. 
Even those who advocate very radical enhancement do not seek to ‘perfect’ nature, 
but rather to transcend the limitations that it currently imposes where possible, 
and where ethically permissible insofar as to do so would further the realisation of 
human goods (Bostrom & Roache, 2008; Harris, 2009;  ). One of the architects of 
the radically pro-enhancement transhumanist position is Max More (2013, p. 5), 
who does not couch his position in terms of a utopian ideal, but as ‘growing in 
healthy directions without bound’. He offers the following justification of why a 
radical transformation of natural norms of health and functioning is desirable: 
‘The individual element of this is expressed in the principle of self-transformation... 
Using technology – in the widest sense to seek physiological and neurological 
augmentation along with emotional and psychological refinement.” Both of these 
principles clearly express the implementation of transhumanism as being a continual 
process and not about seeking a state of perfection.’ 
Transhumanism is intrinsically connected to human enhancement. It is a doctrine 
according to which, as Bostrom (2005, p. 4) explains, current humanity is 
considered ‘a work in progress’ and ‘need not be the endpoint of evolution’. The end 
goal of the transhumanist project is ‘the posthuman, beings with vastly greater 
capacities than present human beings have’. The concept of posthumanity ranges 
across many aspects of human activity, one of which is the ‘application of 
medicine...to overcome some of our basic biological limits’. 
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2.8) Posthumanism 
The concept of the posthuman denotes the idea of radically transforming human 
nature by using technology to upgrade or transcend normal functional ability, and 
has numerous roots within the relevant literature. Stikkers (1996, p. 65) 
understands man’s technological drive as a response to challenges and threats that 
he finds in the world, and thus characterises technology as ‘...an ethic of suffering, a 
prescription for dealing with the primordial experience of resistance.’ Ferrarin 
(2000, p. 290) makes the related observation that mankind’s historical interest in 
and ability to ‘take charge of his destiny’ by the development of technologies is 
unique since unlike the limited cognitive capacities of animals ‘men are capable of 
rational design and thought out projects’. Moreover he is insistent that not only is 
this a unique capability of mankind, but one on which it ‘depends vitally’ in order to 
successfully develop protection ‘from the infinite stimuli, threats, and provocations 
of nature’. 
The rational ability to plan, anticipate the future, and innovate accordingly follows 
from human general intelligence. Intelligence is, in turn, a defining characteristic of 
homo sapiens as distinct from other species (Powell, 2012). Thus we find 
Aristotle’s account of man’s ‘essential’ nature as consisting in the capacity for 
rational thought (Nichomachean Ethics 1.7): 
‘Life evidently he has in common even with the plants...We must exclude, therefore, 
the life of mere nutrition and growth. Next to this comes the life of sense; but this too 
he plainly shares with horses and cattle...There remains then the life whereby he 
acts...we must be understood to mean thereby the life that consists in the exercise of 
the faculties; for this seems to be more properly entitled to the name.’ 
Congruent with this observation, Heidegger (1950) and Jonas (1978) argue that 
since man qua man is rational and has historically used his rationality to develop 
technologies which can enable him to persist in the world, so for human beings to 
be a technological species is for them to realise a part of their nature. Sheets-
Johnstone (2011, p. 348) make a similar claim grounded in the observation that 
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innovation is a product of what has been provided for humans by nature. She 
suggests that, rather than having transcended nature, humans have: 
' ...taken what is evolutionarily given and in untold instances shaped or reworked it 
culturally...’  
The author goes on to argue that our understanding of ourselves is hindered by a 
tendency to make binary distinctions between aspects of our existence which by 
themselves have some explanatory power in respect of revealing 'what we are'.  
The claims that health states, for example, cannot be understood in abstraction 
from their context, and that their definition is thus subject to changes in this 
context, are central assumptions of medical anthropology. These assumptions are 
so central according to certain views that Wolf-Meyer & Taussig (2010, p. 114) 
describe them as 'banal' and as 'an old story'. 
These authors argue it is an uncontroversial fact that innovation occurs on the 
margins of society and 'trickles down from technoscientific investment in the 
extremes' (Ibid, p. 116) towards the centre to become normalised as their uptake 
increases. On the basis of the claim that 'Medicine, by its very nature, is fixated on 
the human' (Ibid, p. 123) they contend that there is nothing essentially different 
about the kinds of interventions which are the focus of enhancement and 
posthumanist literature. Rather, they are simply the present day iterations of an 
ongoing process of innovation and normalisation which influence our 
categorisation and understanding of phenomena. 
Similar views are found elsewhere. Pyyhtinen & Tamminen (2011) characterise 
the relationship between innovation and the new norms that this creates as not 
entailing the emergence of a radically enhanced ‘posthuman’ as such. The 
posthuman model depends upon the improvement of human capabilities by new, 
'non-human' technological, chemical, and biological products which we 
incorporate into our lives and come to depend upon. However Pyyhtinen & 
Tamminen (Ibid, p. 139) argue that: 
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'...we are significantly dependent on the capabilities of various non-humans in our 
everyday existence...laptop computers, electricity, ancestors within the Indo-
European language group...and we need swarms of bacteria just to keep our skin 
sufficiently moist.'  
This account is one which is found widely across the medical anthropology and 
sociology of science literature when considering the role that technology and 
foreign artefacts play in creating who and what we are. It is a central theme within 
the work of writers such as Foucault (1977), Latour & Venn (2002), Haraway 
(1985), Rabinow & Rose (2006), and indeed Pyyhtinen & Tamminen (Ibid, p. 139) 
summarise Foucault's and Latour's position as follows: 
'...human subjects are defined not by some autonomous essence but by the specific 
networks in which they participate'. 
Following this characterisation, and invoking one of the antecedents to the now 
mainstream bioethical interest in human enhancement, Franklin (2006, p. 174) 
uses the ‘cyborg embryo’ created in assisted conception laboratories to describe 
the ‘co-evolution’ which characterises the relationship between humans and 
technology. She argues that since both the desire to have a child and the ‘high-tech 
procedures, such as ovulation induction and cryopreservation’ necessary for the 
realisation of this desire are constitutive of the life finally created, so the 
technological and biological aspects should be understood as ‘part of the same 
ecosystem’ . 
The implication here is that human life frequently incorporates 'non-human' 
elements, since to the extent that our limitations determine what we must do to 
overcome them, these limitations and our technological responses are 
determinants of our nature. Framed in posthumanist terms, it follows that our 
ability to transgress these boundaries would change what it is that we are.  
Similar  observations have been made and extrapolated in both futurist philosophy 
and science fiction to develop the doctrine that mankind should upgrade itself 
technologically in order to deal with the challenges of existence in the future 
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(Bostrom & Sandberg, 2009; More, 2013). Hauskeller (2012, p. 4) analyses the 
work of Pico della Mirandola and infers a prototypic version of this doctrine from 
his early characterisation of man’s relation to technology: 
 ‘For Pico humans were by nature free to invent themselves, and not confined by any 
natural boundaries...As humans we are naturally disposed to change and to progress 
to higher spheres. It is in our very essence to transgress boundaries, to go ever further 
on our way to perfection and godliness.’ 
Although the technological developments necessary for the emergence of the 
posthuman are very radical, the history of human technological innovation itself 
has been interpreted by some as itself intrinsically transformational. Ihde (1997, p. 
73) writes: 
‘...there is a very mundane sense in which every technology non-neutrally transforms 
both the project or object towards which the technology is directed, and reflexively, 
the human user of that technology.’ 
Whether to enhance is genuinely to transcend our biological limitations or just 
reduce them, a less ambiguous orientation toward human enhancement may be to 
adopt Bostrom’s (2009, p. 392) characterisation of what is given in nature as 
‘improvable through the use of applied science and other rational methods’. 
Furthermore As Zwart (2009, pp. 161-162) suggests, given that ‘since time 
immemorial human beings have been pushing performance boundaries’ an accurate 
apprehension would be to accept ourselves as already being an enhanced species: 
‘We have never been satisfied with ourselves, we have always kept working on 
ourselves, always interested in developing new tools for self-amelioration, and there 
is no reason to suppose that we will stop doing so in the future. The history of 
humankind is seen as a history of emerging practices of self improvement...’ 
Although the predictions of advocates of radical enhancement may one day realise 
the posthuman, if Zwart’s interpretation is correct and attempts to enhance are 
inevitable and ongoing then more immediate challenges will be found in cases 
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where a product and its ‘enhancement’ use lie closer to the presently accepted 
boundaries of therapy. With this in mind it will be useful to keep in mind Jones’ 
(2006, p. 81) observation that:  
'...practicing scientists are not governed by enticing prospects that may or may not 
materialise years hence. They deal with current problems that are solvable, and on 
which progress can be made one small step at a time.’ 
Pols & Houkes (2010) also discourage making judgements about the moral 
acceptability of enhancements that are too general, or grounded in sensationalist 
visions of posthumanity. Rather they recommend the consideration of different 
technologies on a case-by-case basis12, arguing that it is unhelpful to ask whether 
enhancement per se is morally acceptable because our lives are already 
technologically mediated in many ways, about which there is a plurality of opinion 
concerning the relative net benefits or deficits. 
Jones (Ibid, p. 81) is similarly critical that ‘What is lacking from so much debate in 
this area is a lack of consideration of what is or is not scientifically feasible’. He 
therefore recommends a more incremental approach to considering the merits of 
enhancements, suggesting that the debate should therefore focus not on 
hypothetical accounts of the posthuman which have ‘little relevance for the 
scientific work that is actually being undertaken’, but on the ethical challenges 
raised by individual increments of development which may or may not lead there:  
Related to this Wasson (2011, p. 22) argues that what is important – irrespective 
of whether something is a treatment or an enhancement – is that in assessing what 
can be done we continue to respect 'fundamental moral values, such as the benefit 
of the individual, justice and fairness' and retain these as a guide when making 
decisions about the ethical status of new medical technologies. Although there are 
differences between the two, both Jones and Wasson emphasise the need to 
                                                          
12 Given the variety of types of enhancement that fall under the umbrella term of 
'enhancements' (e.g. pharmacological, genetic, bionic, prosthetic etc), the procedures that 
are involved and the outcomes of each, they argue that it would be wrong simply to ask 
whether human enhancement is or is not morally acceptable. 
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respect the values of individual well-being and social justice if innovation is to be 
directed in a way that generates ethical outcomes.  
2.9) Contemporary Enhancements 
In recent years enhancement has grown sufficiently in significance that it is now 
being subjected to scrutiny in terms of potential law and policy 13. Coenen et al 
(2011, p. 521), for example, carried out a systematic study of human enhancement 
technologies on behalf of the European Parliament’s Science and Technology 
Options Assessment panel with a view to developing policy recommendations. The 
report was commissioned in view of the potentially wide ranging ethical 
implications of human enhancement: 
‘Though still rarely discussed outside expert circles, human enhancement issues are 
not merely academic: the technologies and trends involved give rise to new needs and 
social demands, provide opportunities for individuals and society, and present new 
risks. They also challenge crucial cultural notions, social concepts and views of the 
human condition, and may cause new forms of social pressure and social exclusion.’ 
The literature indicates that little data exists which investigates the acceptability of 
enhancement to the medical profession itself, however. Similarly little research has 
been carried out to understand how the therapy / enhancement distinction is 
understood from this perspective. To date only one major empirical study of this 
kind has been carried out (Hotze et al, 2011). The primary finding of the study was 
that, beyond the immediate concerns for the safety of their patients, the clinicians 
involved displayed considerable ambivalence towards a judgement of the moral 
status of enhancement per se.  
The study generated responses and further questions (Forlini & Racine, 2011; 
Wasson, 2011; Drabiak-Syed, 2011; Partridge et al, 2011). Despite this, however, 
empirically-grounded research remains limited when compared to the 
                                                          
13 http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/pcbe/reports/beyondtherapy/index.html / 
http://royalsociety.org/policy/projects/human-enhancement/workshop-report / 
http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/neurotechnology/neurotechnology-non-medical-uses-
enhancement-gaming-military  
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considerable theoretical literature which has now been produced concerning the 
ethics of human enhancement. Furthermore as I showed in chapter one, not only 
has little empirical work been carried out to elicit relevant views on these matters, 
the technological options currently available for effective enhancement are limited 
at present. We will now move on to review briefly some of these technologies.  
2.9.1) Aesthetic Enhancement: Cosmetic Plastic Surgery 
The most widespread case of appropriation of clinical medicine for enhancement is 
in ‘cosmetic’ or ‘aesthetic’ plastic surgery. Having first emerged in the late 18th 
Century (Rogers, 1976), this is a field in which elective procedures are available for 
the subjective enhancement of appearance ‘in the absence of disease or physical 
trauma’ (Grossbart & Sarwer, 1999, p. 101). It is a highly lucrative field of 
medicine, for example in the United States it is judged currently to be worth 
around $11 billion14. 
Several empirical studies of cosmetic surgery have been conducted investigating 
user perspectives (Pertschuk, 1998; Ishigooka et al, 1998; Gimlin, 2002; Sarwer & 
Crerand, 2004); professional perspectives (Dunkin et al, 2003; Kinnunen, 2010); 
public perceptions (Delinksy, 2005; Swami et al, 2008;); and its various relevant 
ethical ramifications (Davis, 2002; Davis, 2003; Atiyeh et al, 2008). These studies 
have not been typically carried out as studies of enhancement as such, however, 
relevant data exists concerning perceptions of these procedures and reasons for 
seeking them or providing them. 
2.9.2) Cognitive Enhancement: Modafinil 
A more recent product of interest within the ethical debate of enhancement is the 
drug Modafinil. This is a drug which promotes wakefulness, and enhances 
concentration and short term memory retention (Williams et al, 2008; Husain & 
Mehta, 2011). Initially developed for the clinical treatment of narcolepsy, there is 
evidence suggests that its use by students for enhancement purposes is a growing 
phenomenon (Williams et al, 2008; Greely et al, 2008; Tannenbaum, 2008; 
                                                          
14
 http://www.surgery.org/sites/default/files/ASAPS-2012-Stats.pdf  
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Coveney et al, 2008; Cakic, 2009). Some clinical research has also been carried out 
to determine Modafinil’s effectiveness as an enhancement in the healthy (Turner et 
al, 2003; Forlini & Racine, 2010; Aikins, 2011). Despite its relevance to the debate, 
however, the enhancement use of drugs such as this is a relatively recent 
phenomenon, and its relevant history of such use is limited.  
2.9.3) Physical Enhancement: Erythropoietin (EPO) 
Sport is a context in which medical performance enhancement has been highly 
controversial and visible. A longstanding and controversial instance of 
enhancement has been the use of recombinant human erythropoietin (EPO) by 
athletes for (illegally) gaining a competitive advantage in professional sport. 
The biological aim of EPO is to raise the haemoglobin content of the blood 
(Jelkman, 2006). In a clinical context this is done to achieve the therapeutic goal of 
restoring normal functioning, and in the context of enhancement it is to confer 
supra-normal normal functioning by boosting exercise capacity. One important 
determinant of what is considered to be a ‘normal’ level of haemoglobin relative to 
a population, however, is altitude. Since the oxygen content of the air decreases 
with altitude, endogenous EPO production by the body increases with altitude 
(Eckardt et al, 1989; Savourey et al, 1996; Gunga et al, 2007; Brookhart et al, 
2008). This is the reason why athletes train at altitude (legally) in order to gain a 
performance advantage, and it is also why the ‘normal’ haemoglobin content of the 
blood for someone living in the Andes is different from that of someone who lives 
in London (Gunga et al, 1996; Chapman et al, 2010).  
EPO has been at the centre of several high-profile ‘doping’ scandals over the past 
20 years (Mignon, 2003; Robinson et al, 2006; Schneider, 2007; Kayser etal, 2007; 
Sjoqvist, 2008;), including notable high profile cases such as those of David Millar 
15 and Lance Armstrong16. First person accounts attest to the ‘arms race’ that the 
                                                          
15 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/hardtalk/9571648.stm  
16 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-20026838  / 
http://www.oprah.com/own_tv/onc/lance-armstrong-one.html  
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presence of performance enhancing substances created. For example in his 
autobiography (2011, p. 80) Millar recounts the following conversation: 
‘”Hmmm.” He thought for a moment. “No, it’s not possible. Over three weeks you can’t 
compete against the guys on EPO...EPO allows you to go faster for longer. I mean, you 
still have to train and diet and do everything else, but with more oxygen you can stay 
at threshold for longer and recover faster...it’s just the way the sport has gone”...EPO 
changed everything.’ 
Given evidence such as this that coercion to enhance can occur, concerns raised in 
the literature which relate to this should be taken seriously. Despite the veracity of 
such concerns, however, Mignon’s (2003, p. 233) history of drug use within the 
Tour De France offers an alternative perspective. He cites an interview given by 
the Pélissier brothers during the 1924 Tour in which they confessed to extensive 
pharmaceutical performance enhancement. The demands of the contest are 
reported as so arduous that, prior to the characterisation of drug use as cheating or 
doping, such measures were justified by the severity of the contest: 
 ‘”You have no idea what the Tour de France is like”, said Henri. “It’s a Calvary. But 
Christ had only 14 stations of the cross. We have 15. We suffer from start to finish. Do 
you want to see what we run on? Look...That’s cocaine for the eyes,  that’s chloroform 
for the gums...a cream to warm up my knees... do you want to see the pills? Look, here 
are the pills...In short...we run on dynamite”. This scene...popularized the image 
of...the Tour de France riders seen as workers who have to use whatever is in their 
power to complete their task.’ 
The rapid appropriation and proliferation of EPO for enhancement attests to its 
success for these purposes (Gareau et al, 1996; Mayes, 2010; Fisher, 2010). It is 
also typically difficult to detect due to its similarity to endogenous erythropoietin, 
and hence had significant appeal for those seeking a clandestine performance 
advantage (Duntas & Popovic, 2012). The history of its enhancement use  over the 
past 25 years indicate that certain of the worries raised in relation to issues such 
as justice and fairness are relevant (Mignon, 2003; Schneider, 2007), and for this 
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reason it is a product with a valuable combination of historical and ethical 
relevance to the enhancement debate. 
2.10) Conclusion 
In this chapter I examined concepts of health; human enhancement and its 
difference from therapy; and the related concept of the posthuman, across the 
relevant philosophical and social scientific literature. Various theoretical 
approaches were put forward for understanding these concepts, and a range of 
relevant standpoints on the ethical challenges that human enhancement 
technologies may pose if they are to proliferate presented themselves. 
I showed that despite the abundance of theory within the field of enhancement, 
little empirical work exists which can ground and evaluate these theories within 
the context of contemporary western medicine. The identification of ‘normal 
health’ underpins the therapy / enhancement distinction, and yet the literature 
indicates that it is hard to identify with any degree of permanence. 
This observation raises issues concerning the delineation between therapy and 
enhancement, and how such categorisations can be made. To the extent that the 
therapy / enhancement distinction has a bearing on medical decision making, it 
has a corresponding bearing on the ethical status of those decisions. We saw 
evidence that treatment norms, norms of health, disease and illness classification 
can and do change. We also saw arguments which can be used to show that even 
normal states of health can be deficient relative to a different context or an 
alternative set of goals. 
It is important that the theoretical debate concerning the therapy / enhancement 
distinction is grounded empirically because of the present imbalance towards 
theory within the literature. Given that ambiguities emerge when we attempt a 
clear delineation between the concepts of therapy and enhancement, the ethical 
ramifications of these ambiguities require more detailed investigation that is 
contextually grounded. At present contextual information such as this is limited.  
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Since the purpose of the thesis is to understand the relationship between therapy 
and enhancement, any balanced and nuanced account of this relationship must 
discover how it is understood by the constituents of medical practice itself. At 
present relatively little is known about this, and the collection of more data 
reporting how the relationship is understood can contribute to improvements in 
practice and policy development if enhancement technologies continue to 
proliferate as has been predicted within the literature. 
The proliferation of theory within the enhancement debate, whilst useful, is so 
divergent that the relative accuracy of these various theories in terms of the ‘every 
day’ practices of medicine and medical research is unclear (at this stage). Medicine 
is a social practice, and as such it cannot be fully understood from a purely 
theoretical perspective – attempts at understanding must take account of the 
perceptions of relevant actors engaged in this social practice.  
2.11) Summary 
In this chapter I reviewed relevant literature concerning the therapy / 
enhancement distinction from a range of philosophical, ethical, and social scientific 
perspectives. Issues covered included the distinction itself, their relation to 
underlying conceptions of health, and the social context of medicine and 
technology. I carried out a brief review of the history of enhancement and its 
hypothetical ‘posthuman’ future, as well as some examples of contemporary 
enhancement technologies. 
The review showed that the theoretical literature is inconclusive with respect to 
how human enhancement should be understood and what constitutes an 
appropriate response to the ethical challenges that its proliferation would 
represent. Similarly the review indicated that the literature weighs heavily in 
favour of enhancement theory, and that little empirical research had been carried 
out which could provide insights into how enhancement is understood within its 
own context. 
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Having reviewed the literature and identified what must now be known in order to 
resolve the presently inconclusive theoretical debate and develop appropriate 
ethical responses, the need for a suitably interdisciplinary research methodology is 
clear. Methodological approaches will be considered in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Three: Philosophical Methodology 
3.1) Introduction 
In this chapter I will introduce Critical Realism (CR), which is the philosophical 
approach that I have chosen to combine the philosophical and social scientific 
components of the research. I will explain the relationship between philosophical 
theory and empirical data, and how CR can be used to integrate the two 
successfully towards the development of the conclusions and policy 
recommendations that will follow from this integration. I will provide arguments 
for making this methodological decision, and show how the use of critical realism 
in empirical bioethics improves on previous methodologies employed within the 
literature. 
3.2) What is Critical Realism? 
CR was developed primarily by the philosopher Roy Bhaskar in ‘A Realist Theory 
of Science’ (1975), and ‘The Possibility of Naturalism’ (1979). It was designed to 
‘underlabour’17 for social science (Archer, 1998; Bhaskar & Norrie, 1998; Sayer, 
1997; Sayer, 2000) by providing it with a philosophical underpinning that can 
respond effectively to empiricist, positivist, idealist, and postmodern critiques 
(Bhaskar, 1998; Wight, 2012). In its reconciliation of these approaches and the 
fields in which they emerge CR thus supplies a justification for interdisciplinarity 
(Sawa, 2005; Bhaskar & Danermark, 2006).  
3.2.1) World and Knowledge  
CR holds that there is an objectively existent domain of reality external to and 
independent of the mind, which ontologically transcends our sensory experiences 
(Viskovatoff, 2002; Dow, 2002). This domain is mediated by our senses and 
interpreted against a background of subjectively held beliefs and assumptions. CR 
                                                          
17 This term originates from John Locke (1690) and his conception of the role of philosophical 
thinking as: ‘underlabourer in clearing the ground a little, and removing some of the rubbish 
that lies in the way to knowledge’. 
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therefore argues that knowledge and reality are separate. In doing so it resists the 
reduction of ontology to epistemology, and thus provides conditions under which 
it is possible in principle for statements about the world to be non-relatively true 
or false, or more or less correct (Proctor, 1998; Patomaki & Wight, 2000).  
The separation of ontology and epistemology entails a system in which the 
external world is structured in a certain way irrespective of one’s view of it. One’s 
viewpoint on the world, however, always influences one’s knowledge of it. Since all 
viewpoints are spatio-temporally unique, knowledge claims based on the 
representations that these viewpoints provide are necessarily subjective and 
partial. It is this uniqueness which accounts for the diversity and fallibility of 
knowledge claims. The challenge, therefore, is to ascertain how human beings, 
jointly responsible for the social production of knowledge, in a state of 
epistemological flux, can arrive at a true apprehension of the external world that 
they seek to understand (Bhaskar, 1975, p. 21): 
‘Any adequate philosophy of science must find a way of grappling with this central 
paradox of science: that men in their social activity produce knowledge...which is no 
more independent of its production and the men who produce it than motor cars, 
armchairs or books...The other is that knowledge is 'of' things which are not 
produced by men at all: the specific gravity of mercury, the process of electrolysis, the 
mechanism of light propagation...If men ceased to exist sound would continue to 
travel and heavy bodies fall to the earth in exactly the same way, though ex-hypothesi 
there would be no-one to know it.’ 
3.2.2) Varieties of Realism 
CR is, by definition, a variety of realism. Many forms of realism exist, including 
naive; direct; indirect; semantic; metaphysical; scientific; structural; mathematical; 
moral; aesthetic, all of which pertain to different questions and analyses. What 
they share, however, is a commitment to the mind-independence of certain 
phenomena (Putnam, 1975; Dummett, 1982). All forms of realism hold that some 
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of the things to which we refer are really ‘there’ in the world, not merely 
constructed by one’s mind (Dummett, 1982, p. 55): 
‘The very minimum that realism can be held to involve is that statements in the given 
class relate to some reality that exists independently of our knowledge of it.’  
It is not possible to deal with all forms of realism here. However insofar as CR is a 
philosophy of and for the social sciences (Bhaskar, 1979; Archer, 1998; Sayer, 
2000), it is a methodology for understanding empirical phenomena, and must 
therefore give an account of scientific realism. Worrall (2009, p. 158) holds that 
scientific realism in general can be held as true on the basis of the ‘staggering 
empirical success’ of the predictions that science can make. In relation to CR more 
specifically Murphy (1990, p. 296) writes that realism’s legitimacy is underwritten 
by its explanatory power because ‘only realism can account for the success of 
science’.  
I anticipate the objection that the social sciences are not equivalent to physical 
sciences, since the former deals with ‘open’ systems that are more variable than 
the ‘closed’ and tightly limited experiments carried out in the latter. This is an 
understandable objection; however, that they are not equivalent does not mean 
that they share no significantly relevant characteristics. For example, Bhaskar 
(1975, 1989) argues that human systems are constrained by the same physical 
laws or ‘generative mechanisms’ as the rest of the physical contents of the universe. 
Given that the totality of physical things that exists emerged from the substratum 
of these laws, he concludes that we must share something ontologically 
fundamental with non-human aspects of the world (Bhaskar, 1975; Archer, 1998; 
Sayer, 2000).  
Although ‘closed’, non-human, systems do not have agency and cannot reflect on 
themselves or act autonomously, the empirical success of science implies that the 
deep structure of the world is rationally comprehensible. Given that we have 
ontological continuity with the non-sentient world at this level, it must be possible 
to acquire knowledge that pertains both to the open systems that constitute the 
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social world, as well as the closed ones that are constructed in experiments in the 
physical sciences (Bhaskar, 1975; Proctor, 1998; Easton, 2010).   
3.2.3) Empiricism and Idealism 
CR accepts scientific realism. It thus commits to the scrutability of the world via 
both inductive (empirical) and deductive (a priori) means, viewing both as 
methodologically valuable. In this respect it attempts to reconcile opposing 
viewpoints which claim that one is epistemically superior to the other. 
Methodological schisms following from these oppositions have emerged across 
philosophy and the social sciences, a salient example of which is the tension 
between strict forms of empiricism and idealism. Meyer (1906, p. 461) explains 
this tension: 
‘Radical scepticism flatly denies the fact that we can have a criterion of truth, yet the 
fundamental problem of all knowledge is this: Can we have such criteria?...On the 
other hand, if we deny the objective measure of value (criterion) of truth, science is 
no more. In its stead there will be nothing but opinion…’ 
CR argues that although radical forms of empiricism and idealism are incorrect, 
aspects of each are epistemologically useful. In order to carry out research which 
successfully harnesses the various benefits of both paradigms some 
methodological reconciliation of the dualism is therefore necessary. An example of 
why radical versions of these paradigms are inadequate is visible in the strong 
constructionist rejection of a priori justifications for the objective reality of the 
external world. 
According to the strong constructionist view the knowledge required for a priori 
justification is a) practically unattainable, and b) logically incoherent, since any 
hypothetical ‘comparison’ of the world with my representations of it would involve 
my having to perceive the world, and this could only be done subjectively via the 
mediation of my senses. Von Glasersfeld (1990, p. 12) argues that any account of a 
reality beyond my perceptions is meaningless, since such an account would 
89 
 
require verification in order to be judged as true and ‘to do this, we would need an 
access to such a world that does not involve our experiencing it’. 
This argument is problematic for two reasons, however. Firstly, it fails to give an 
account of what there might be in virtue of which perception could be possible. 
The reason why this is problematic is that the existence of a reality in which our 
existence is possible is a necessary pre-condition of our having the experiences 
that we do (Archer, 1998, p. 197): 
‘When we ask what needs to be the case for x to be possible, we predicate any 
realisation of x upon the prior materialisation of the conditions of its possibility.’ 
The second difficulty is that even if we are mistaken in believing that there is a 
reality external to us, we act as if there were. As social beings we assume that our 
existence is embedded in a ‘real’ world that would continue to exist even if we did 
not. Easton (2009, p. 119) characterises this assumption as ‘performative’, since 
‘we behave as if it was true’. He argues that it is a reasonable position to adopt 
because ‘in general this supposition works, especially for the physical world’. 
It is therefore possible to demur from committing to a realist account of the world, 
but the price to be paid for this in terms of plausibility is high, since to do so would 
threaten the possibility of carrying out social research that bears a sensible 
relation to anything beyond the representations of the researcher. It is in response 
to this that CR grounds its argument. All accounts of the world are undoubtedly 
subjective, partial, contextual, contingent, and of variable accuracy. Consequently 
these must be understood as revisable in light of new information. Nevertheless 
they are accounts of the world (Murphy, 1990, p. 296): 
‘...unlike the earlier 'naive' realists, 'critical' realists...see scientific models and 
theories not as literal pictures of reality but as partial, tentative representations of 
what there is.’ 
It follows from this that if we wish to carry out research in which both: a) 
epistemological claims are recognised as subjective, partial and fallible; and b) we 
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do not infer from the partiality of these the conclusion that there is nothing 
ontologically objective beyond experience to which epistemological claims refer, 
then methodological commitment to some form of transcendental realism is 
unavoidable. 
3.3) Critical Realism and Social Constructionism 
Social constructionism has antecedents in scepticism, idealism, empiricism, and 
anti-realism (Searle, 1995; Hacking, 1999; Wight, 2012). CR holds that there is one 
reality, which is objective, and includes all humans and their subjective 
representations of it (Bhaskar, 1975; Jeffries, 2011). This stands in contrast to 
strong constructionist theories which imply the existence of separate and discrete 
realities (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Von Glasersfeld, 1982). CR rejects this as 
theoretically incoherent and hence rejects strong social constructionism. Berger 
and Luckman’s (1966, p. 15) claim that each person’s experience constitutes a 
separate reality can be interrogated to understand why:  
‘...reality is socially constructed...Sociological interest in questions of “reality” and 
“knowledge” is thus initially justified by the fact of their social relativity. What is 
“real” to a Tibetan monk may not be “real” to an American businessman. The 
“knowledge” of the criminal differs from the “knowledge” of the criminologist. It 
follows that specific agglomerations of “reality” and “knowledge” pertain to specific 
societal contexts’ 
Note that here ‘reality’ is referred to with quotation marks. The implication is that 
reality itself is a construction. In a trivial sense this is true, since the label ‘reality’ 
depends on the prior existence of a mind or minds which can generate and use it. It 
does not follow, however, that there is nothing objectively existent to which the 
concept ‘reality’ refers simply because these conceptualisations are made and 
experienced subjectively (Barkin, 2003; Jackson & Nexon, 2004). 
The observation that the label ‘reality’ is part of a language, and language is a social 
phenomenon that is dependent on human minds, does not entail the conclusion 
that the label has no external referent beyond the subjective representations of it 
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that we communicate in discourse (Searle, 1995; Hacking, 1999; Bhaskar, 1998). In 
conflating knowledge with the world the constructionist thus commits an 
‘epistemic fallacy’ (Bhaskar, 1975) by casting reality as our representations of it. In 
committing this fallacy Berger & Luckmann (1966, p. 35) make the further claim 
that: 
 ‘My consciousness, then, is capable of moving through different spheres of reality. Put 
differently, I am conscious of the world as consisting of multiple realities.’ 
The problem for this position is that it does not explain how the discrete ‘realities’ 
can interact with each other in such a way that the individuals inhabiting them 
could communicate with each other. If we are communicating as we believe 
ourselves to be we must inhere within a spatio-temporal realm that is prior and 
common to both of us. If we are not fundamentally in the same world then 
communication between us would be impossible, or some account must at least be 
given of how it could be done. An ontological reality external to all people is a 
necessary pre-condition for the possibility of engaging in social scientific 
investigation, because it is only in virtue of such a common reality that such an 
investigation could be meaningfully carried out. Fopp (2005, p. 15) explains the 
difficulty of adopting the strong constructionist position: 
‘Social constructionism has a rather uncertain or ‘we cannot know for sure’ (Sahlin, 
2006, 179) attitude towards what we experience as objective reality. But what does 
an uncertain, ‘we cannot know for sure’ attitude mean regarding our experiences. 
Are we so unsure of what we experience?...How far does this agnosticism go?...If all 
socially regarded facts are relative to a time and place, then so is social 
constructionism.’ 
It is fair to note that Berger & Luckmann anticipate and accept the kind of criticism 
that I have just articulated. Despite this, however, the form of social 
constructionism that they defend is inadequate for interdisciplinary projects such 
as this (Ibid. p.1): 
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‘...the sense in which we use these terms in the context of sociology, and that we 
immediately disclaim any pretension to the effect that sociology has an answer to 
these ancient philosophical preoccupations.’ 
This disclaimer is acceptable where the aim of one’s work is purely sociological, 
since if the terms are used in a way that is internally consistent to the suppositions 
of the discipline then there is no problem of methodological inconsistency. As 
Niiniluoto (1991, p. 3) argues, however, under close analysis philosophical 
assumptions in need of substantiation cannot be disaggregated from the allegedly 
non-philosophical sociological standpoint: 
‘...the 'strong' programmes of the sociology of knowledge, in spite of often pretending 
to be non-philosophical or even anti-philosophical, are in fact heavily laden with 
philosophical assumptions - and also draw very strong philosophical conclusions...the 
often concealed philosophical prejudices of the sociologists of knowledge should be 
made explicit and put into scrutiny.’ 
Since in empirical bioethics we are attempting to combine philosophical and social 
scientific methods, central terms such as knowledge and reality cannot be 
bracketed because an understanding of their meaning must be shared by both 
disciplinary perspectives. The interdisciplinary nature of the research thus 
obviates the need for an ‘immanent critique’ (Lawson, 1998, p. 156) of the kind just 
carried out. An immanent critique of the concepts and arguments involved enables 
us to assess their mutual internal consistency, and arrive at a theoretical position 
that successfully negotiates and integrates the competing perspectives. 
The outcome of the preceding critique is that despite rejecting the claim that true 
knowledge of the external world is impossible, CR nevertheless accepts that all 
viewpoints are subjective, and it is therefore able to accommodate social 
constructionism on more moderate terms (Sayer, 2000; Hacking, 1999; Wight, 
2012; Fopp, 2007;). An attenuated version recognises that the objective and 
‘persistent’ reality of the world and its contents must be assumed in order for 
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intersubjective discussion about it to proceed (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). Sayer 
writes (1997, p. 466): 
‘Realists can happily accept weak social constructionism, while noting that the social 
character of knowledge does not mean that it cannot successfully identify real objects 
(including social constructions) which exist independently of the researcher. 
Knowledge, though situated, can, in some sense, be objective.’  
3.4) Ontological Stratification 
CR argues for a ‘stratified’ ontology (Bhaskar, 1975; Collier, 1998; Sayer, 2000) 
consisting of three distinct levels: the real, the actual, and the empirical. These 
exist in a hierarchy. The ‘intransitive’ domain of the real exists at the base; the first 
‘transitive’ domain of the actual supervenes on the real; and the second ‘transitive’ 
domain of the empirical supervenes on the actual.  
3.4.1) The Real 
Starting with the real, CR holds that there is a way that the world is, and that more 
or less accurate knowledge of it must be possible. It adduces the success of science 
as evidence for the truth of this postulation (Bhaskar, 1975; Greene, 1990), 
concluding that certain physical mechanisms must exist prior to our discovery of 
them (Archer, 1998; Soper, 2010). According to this view ‘the real is whatever 
exists...regardless of whether it is an empirical object for us’ (Sayer, 2000, p. 11).   
Reality is therefore the totality of things that exist, containing both observable 
phenomena and the non-observable physical mechanisms which permit their 
occurrence. The domain of the real thus provides the ‘generative mechanisms’ that 
allow human activity to occur (Bhaskar, 1975; Bhaskar, 1989). The changing 
contingencies of the social world are emergent from biology and chemistry, which 
are in turn emergent from the unchanging physical stratum beneath (Seiler, 2007; 
Easton, 2010). 
 
94 
 
3.4.2) The Actual 
The emergence of biology and chemistry from the physical substratum constitutes 
the second ontological level. Observable phenomena of this kind are defined as 
actualisations of the mechanisms which make their emergence possible. Hence this 
level is described as the ‘actual’, and it is at this level that scientific and social 
scientific investigation is possible (Bhaskar, 1975; Bhaskar, 1989). 
The difference between these two domains is that in being ontologically 
‘intransitive’, mechanisms at the level of the real cannot be changed, whereas 
events occurring at the level of the actual could have been otherwise and are 
influenced by the contingencies of their context. Bhaskar (1997, p. 145) argues that 
since it is determined by human actions and beliefs, ‘Social reality is...conceptually 
dependent’. Given that concepts can be misunderstood CR holds that events in the 
social world ‘can be falsely characterized – and falsely categorized’. Occurrences at 
the level of the actual are thus ‘dependent demi-realities’ which ‘refract’ the 
objective reality beneath, but due to the subjectivity of human experience this 
reality can be misapprehended. 
3.4.3) The Empirical 
This leads to the third level of ontology - the empirical. The empirical supervenes 
on the actual, and describes the products of controlled scientific or social scientific 
investigation of actual events (Sayer, 2000). Its difference from the other two can 
be stated as follows: just because I do not experience something that is actually 
happening does not mean that it is not actually happening. According to this realist 
view, a complete understanding of the world requires more than what is 
empirically available to me at a given spatio-temporal location. Consequently Sayer 
(Ibid, p. 11) concludes that ‘the world should not be conflated with our experience of 
it’, and hence that ‘critical realism should therefore not be confused with empirical 
realism...which identifies the real...with what we experience’. 
Guba & Lincoln (1994) describe CR as a postpositivist approach. Postpositivism is 
characterised by its opposition to the positivist assumption that only what is 
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offered in experience may be accepted as a reliable basis for knowledge. If some 
aspects of reality remain beyond my ability to perceive them, we cannot rely on 
empirical data alone for an optimally accurate description of it. As I noted earlier, 
the postulation of unobservable entities whose existence of which is inferred from 
a combination of other data and the rules of logical entailment, rather than by 
being seen, is central to the success of science (Santayana, 1983; Hacking, 1999). 
That this is possible thus supports the claim that knowledge must be possible of 
more than simply those things which I am able to verify empirically. 
Despite the limitations of empirical data, however, they perform a vitally 
important epistemic role, because they are nevertheless indications of the basic 
fundamental structures which permit their existence. Certainly empirical 
knowledge is far from useless, since I may have stronger reasons for believing that 
the relation between X and reality is Y if I have observed that it is the case. CR 
therefore accepts the epistemological significance of empirically derived 
information, and by extension the value of social science per se (Sayer, 2000; 
Easton, 2010). The combination of deductive and inductively derived knowledge 
seeks a best possible explanation for one’s results, or an analytic generalisation 
that is justified by them. This form of reasoning, which is characteristic of CR, is 
‘abductive’ and according to Jarvensivu & Toornross (2010, p. 102) is: 
‘…an approach to knowledge production that occupies the middle ground between 
induction and deduction…Unlike induction, abduction accepts existing theory, which 
might improve the theoretical strength of case analysis. Abduction also allows for a 
less theory-driven research process than deduction, thereby enabling data-driven 
theory generation.’ 
This combination of the empirical and the a priori can be applied to a specific 
instance of scientific discovery to understand the role that each plays.  For 
example, the discovery and increasingly accurate understanding of the biological 
mechanism of erythropoiesis has been an ‘abductive’ and ongoing combination of 
induction, deduction, postulation, and testing (Fisher, 2010; Jelkmann, 2007; 
Kurtz, 2011).  
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On the basis of the arguments laid out so far a further move is available, as this 
combination can also be applied to the development and justification of ethical 
claims. If CR is correct then this combination of methods will yield reliable and 
defensible conclusions in moral discourse as well as in scientific discovery, because 
to the extent that they are both constituents of the same reality, they are 
apprehendable by a combination of the same investigative methods (Bhaskar, 
1993; Bhaskar & Norrie, 1998). 
CR’s account of ontology shows that it cannot be reduced to epistemology: that 
reality is not identical with my representations of it, and that it must contain 
objective features which are mind-independent. One’s actual individual 
perceptions, beliefs, and assumptions may inform one that the world is a certain 
way, and these beliefs may be consistent or inconsistent with the prevailing beliefs 
of one’s actual socio-historical context. Reality, however, retains the ability to 
demonstrate when certain representations are fallible. In doing so it vindicates the 
presence of basic intransitive mechanisms that underpin the contingencies of a 
given social context, and inform the epistemological claims that are available to its 
members. As Easton observes (2010, p. 9): 
‘Reality kicks in at some point. We can socially construct a world in which we can fly 
but put it to the test and we find that we can’t’   
This observation highlights the need for the integrative approach found in CR. As 
self-reflective beings we mutually construct the structures which constitute the 
social world, our understanding of which is subjective and partial. Experiences of 
the social world give us substantive, valuable information about it. These changing, 
socially constructed phenomena, however, cannot escape the unchanging, mind-
independent, ontologically objective physical mechanisms from which they have 
emerged. 
Although the domain of the real lies beyond experience and its structure must be 
discovered abductively, the apparent success of science underlines the legitimacy 
of the model that CR advances. The vindication of combining inductive and 
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deductive approaches optimises the utility that we can derive from each, and 
enables us to shed light on reality. 
3.5) Empirical Bioethics 
Empirical bioethics is an interdisciplinary approach to the resolution of practical 
ethical issues within the biological and life sciences that integrates social scientific, 
empirical data with traditional philosophical analysis. It aims to achieve a balanced 
form of ethical deliberation that is both logically rigorous and sensitive to context 
(Molewijk et al, 2004; Ives & Dunn, 2010). The aim of such an approach is that it 
will be more able to generate normative conclusions that are tractable with the 
context in which the problem, challenge, or dilemma emerges. 
Given that empirical bioethics incorporates both philosophical analysis and social 
scientific data, it is a field that is consistent with the use of CR as a research 
methodology. In this section I will therefore outline empirical bioethics and why it 
is useful. I will demonstrate CR’s suitability for such projects; and provide an 
example of how CR can be employed in ethical analysis which involves both 
philosophical reasoning and social scientific data. 
3.5.1) A (Very) Brief History of Bioethics 
The first instances of what could be described as ‘bioethical’ scholarship were 
typically philosophical (Muller, 1994) or theological (Emmerich, 2011). This 
theoretical rather than empirical leaning is understandable, since insofar as it is a 
sub-field of ethics, bioethics is to some degree irreducibly philosophical. In the 
present, however, bioethics has grown and diversified into a varied 
interdisciplinary field which includes the social sciences; law; medicine; and policy 
studies (De Vries et al, 2006). This diversification has raised methodological 
challenges regarding the successful integration of these various disciplines.  
Bioethics in its present form is a relatively modern phenomenon. Despite the 
perennial nature of the ethical questions that it seeks to answer the label 
‘bioethics’ was not used until the second half of the 20th Century. As Wilson (2011) 
98 
 
and Martensen (2001) report, it first emerged into ethics discourse in 1970. The 
widespread interest now displayed in bioethics over this relatively short time span 
attests to the breadth of its relevance. This is visible in Reich’s (1995, p. 29) 
analysis of the etymology of the term ‘bioethics’ itself: 
‘Noting that the word "bioethics" is a composite derived from two Greek words - bios 
(life; hence life sciences) and ethike (ethics), it established a broad scope for the field’ 
A significant factor in an increasingly explicit focus on the ethical treatment of 
patients - and hence of bioethics in a clinical context - were the eugenics 
movements of the early 20th Century (Lappe, 1991; Agar, 2008) and the 
subsequent atrocities carried out during WWII (Buchanan et al, 2000; Fleischhauer 
& Hermeren, 2006). Agreements such as the Declaration of Helsinki18 (1964) by 
the World Medical Association and the Council of Europe’s Convention on Human 
Rights and Biomedicine19 (1997), have also brought the explicit consideration of 
bioethical issues into focus. Against this background, and in the face of the rapid 
advance of medical science technology in the post-war period, bioethics has 
become of mainstream relevance not only for scholars, but for society as a whole. 
3.5.2) The Empirical Turn 
Following the colonisation of bioethics by new disciplines from outside philosophy, 
and due to the socially embedded institutional nature of medical practice, bioethics 
underwent a transformation to become a diverse multidisciplinary field. Its further 
development into being a truly integrated, interdisciplinary, field which 
successfully combines these different perspectives has been complex, however. 
De Wachter (1982, p. 276) writes that whilst efforts have been made towards 
interdisciplinarity, these have frequently fallen short of true integration, 
‘producing at best a ‘dialogue between sciences’ without achieving a genuine 
reconciliation of the reasons underpinning their opposition. Consequently 
bioethics has been ‘a field which is more likely defined de facto in terms of its issues 
                                                          
18
 http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/b3/  
19
 http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/164.htm  
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than by any shared essence or scientific perspective’. He is thus uncertain whether 
bioethicists have given sufficiently detailed thought to ‘defining the ways and 
methods of doing bioethics as (an) interdiscipline’. 
The impact of these antecedents and critiques is that bioethics has undergone an 
‘empirical turn’ (Borry et al, 2005; Frith, 2010; Hurst, 2010). The aim of this is to 
produce a means by which to produce balanced, philosophically robust but 
contextually informed conclusions that can be applied for the resolution of 
practical ethical problems. 
As appealing and rational as such an aim is, however, the disciplinary schism 
between the tenets of (prescriptive) moral philosophical and (descriptive) social 
scientific analysis has caused antipathies across the field (Alvarez, 2001; Turner, 
2009). These have occurred from the social sciences towards philosophy 
(Hedgecoe, 2004; Kleinman, 1999; Marshall, 1992); and vice versa (Herrera, 2008; 
Harris, 2012; Brassington, 2013). Borry et al (2005, p. 50) write: 
‘The field of bioethics did not attract the collaboration of many social scientists. Their 
methods of gathering data were unfamiliar to ethicists, and the methods of ethicists 
were seldom known to social scientists...there was no ‘easy and consistent flow of 
empirical data into ethics’, and bioethics had a ‘simultaneously aloof and strained 
relationship’ with the social sciences.’ 
Moreover, the perennial philosophical challenge of Hume’s is / ought problem 
(1739) which holds that one cannot derive the latter (values) from the former 
(facts), has proved resilient within bioethics (Ives & Draper, 2009; Parker, 2009). 
Williams (1985, p. 237) highlights the ‘genuine ethical, and ultimately metaphysical, 
concerns’ behind the persistent fact / value distinction and therefore the potential 
threat to the possibility of an ‘empirical ethics’ that this may pose: 
‘At the heart of them is an idea that our values are not “in the world”...This set of 
conceptions does constitute a belief in a distinction, some distinction, between fact 
and value.’ 
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If the is / ought problem is correct it leaves open the possibility that the very idea 
of an ‘empirical bioethics’ may be oxymoronic, since if ethics refers categorically to 
how things should be rather than how they are, then the label is internally 
contradictory. It is therefore necessary to provide an effective counter-argument to 
this objection. Several attempts at doing so have been made within the literature 
and a range of approaches have emerged as potential appropriate methodologies 
for ‘doing’ bioethics more generally (Ashcroft, 2004; Pellegrino, 1999). 
3.5.3) Previous Methodologies 
Hurst (2010) argues that any philosophical scepticism concerning the value of 
empirical data for deriving normative conclusions is misplaced because states of 
affairs in the world are always taken into account in moral reasoning. Similarly 
Alvarez (2001) argues that the notion of doing bioethics, i.e. applied moral 
philosophy within the biological sciences, would be incoherent if we were to 
abstract the moral reasoning from the empirical context. Frith (2010) conceives 
ethical dilemmas as inherently ‘naturalistic’ since they arise from experience and 
are therefore not purely conceptual problems. 
Haimes (2002) points out that since social science is interested in social change, 
and the conceptual object of ethical analysis, namely moral progress, is predicated 
on the possibility of change, the two are connected intrinsically to the extent that 
ethics seeks to promote social goods. Hoffmaster & Hooker (2009) argue that a 
greater emphasis on ‘constructivist accounts of reason’ will result in richer 
normative conclusions. De Vries (2010), Nichols (2012), and Ives & Draper (2009) 
ground their responses in the earlier work of Rawls’ reflective equilibrium and its 
account of moral action (at least with respect to justice) as a balance between 
moral theory and empirical facts.  
Widdershoven et al (2009) advocate a hermeneutic, ‘dialogical’ approach between 
the ethics researcher and participants. Leget et al (2009) recommend a ‘critical 
applied ethics’ and similarly Molewijk et al (2004) have developed a specific 
methodology entitled ‘integrated empirical ethics’, all of which attempt to validate 
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such research by allocating equal weight to ethical theory and empirical data in the 
resolution of moral dilemmas. 
Undoubtedly these attempts make progress in terms of offering procedures for 
doing empirical bioethics, and showing why it is valuable. What they lack, 
however, is an account of reality which makes explicit the connection between the 
validity of a priori reasoning in moral discourse, and the actual social phenomena 
in the world to which we are applying this reasoning. It is in its capacity to do this 
that CR represents an improvement on previous methods.  
3.6) Critical Realism as a Methodology for Empirical Bioethics 
The application of CR represents an original and valuable philosophical 
contribution to the field of empirical bioethics itself, and also to the wider debate 
concerning the validity of empirical methods in ethical analysis. I will give 
examples of previous applications of CR in other fields before showing in detail 
how it can be applied in empirical bioethics. I will demonstrate how its account of 
ontology and epistemology vindicates the combination of philosophical and social 
scientific approaches in the successful resolution of practical moral issues, and 
how it can produce defensibly non-relative ethical conclusions. 
CR has been used in a wide variety of social research fields unrelated or only 
indirectly related to health, such as geography (Proctor, 1998); international 
studies (Wight, 2012); management studies (Easton, 2009); education research 
(Scott, 2005); and information systems research (Dobson, 2001). It has also been 
used in health-related fields including disability studies (Bhaskar & Danermark, 
2006); social work (Longhofer & Floersch, 2012); family therapy (Speed, 1991); 
nursing (McEvoy & Richards, 2003); and pharmacy (Oltmann & Boughey, 2012). 
The diversity of these fields indicates CR’s widespread applicability and 
explanatory power. 
CR has only been applied explicitly as a ‘lens’ for bioethics on one occasion, in 
which it was used to overcome obstacles in combining lay and professional 
conceptions of health (Owens & Cribb, 2011). The authors use the theoretical 
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insights of CR to show how human life is a composite of objectively real, mind-
independent ontological features, and subjective, socially constructed 
epistemological interpretations of these features. The explicit realism of the model 
maintains the connection between the logically scrutable objective structure of 
reality beyond our perceptions and the contingent and changing viewpoints which 
co-produce knowledge in the social world.  
If CR’s defence of a transcendentally real ontology is correct, we are entitled to 
conclude that a priori reasoning is self-evidently compelling in the way that it 
appears to be. In CR the researcher is understood as a subjectively experiencing 
being enmeshed within and emergent from an objectively real and rationally 
apprehendable ontology. If this characterisation is correct then neither objective 
nor subjective considerations can be dispensed with if we wish to carry out 
applied ethics in a way that is tractable with the world, since both are aspects of it. 
The account that Owens & Cribb (2011, p. 10) give of health in terms of CR is 
illustrative: 
‘Ill-health...cannot be adequately explained purely in either biomedical or socially 
constructed, ‘first hand’ ways...ill-health ought to be understood as having a complex, 
stratified nature, existing both in the mind-independent bio-physical structures which 
are ‘‘out there in the world’’, as well as in the psychological activities of agents and 
politico-economic and socio-cultural roles, relationships and practices.’ 
Although the authors here give an account of health in terms of CR rather than 
using CR as an interdisciplinary methodology, the account of ontology and 
epistemology outlined earlier establishes the connection between the two. In the 
quote above health is understood as having both mind-dependent and mind-
independent components, and is thus constituted by a combination of objective 
and subjective elements. 
As I have explained, in empirical bioethics we seek to produce arguments to defend 
conclusions that are tractable with the world. If this aim is achievable it implies 
that there is a world to which such conclusions can be applied. In recognition of the 
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relativity of different viewpoints, however, it also accepts that this world must be 
subjectively understood and can be influenced by the actions and decisions that 
individuals make on the basis of these viewpoints. It is therefore clear that the 
account given by CR of the relationship between ourselves and the rest of the 
world is reflected in the suppositions and aims of empirical bioethics. Given this 
correspondence CR is ideally suited to being applied in empirical bioethics 
research.  
3.7) Critical Realism and Moral Reasoning 
The key aim of applied moral philosophy is to produce practical conclusions which 
have normative force. This is to say that the conclusions advanced must give 
compelling reasons for why they should be believed or followed, given a particular 
set of circumstances, and why such conclusions go beyond simple conjecture. CR’s 
approach to resolving practical ethical dilemmas is predicated on the possibility of 
rationally discerning between morally acceptable and unacceptable courses of 
action (Bhaskar, 1989, p. 103): 
‘...the human sciences may be used, like any other sciences, to achieve (more or less 
consciously formulated and justified) ends, which may of course be equally adjudged 
good or bad.’ 
Given scepticism concerning the validity of allegedly non-relative ethical claims, it 
is incumbent on any philosophical methodology for applied ethics to provide a 
satisfactory answer to this scepticism.  The demands of moral reasoning in applied 
ethics differ subtly from those of theoretical ethics, since applied ethics must - by 
definition - take explicit account of particular, discrete moral dilemmas in the 
world and attempt to formulate implementable solutions. 
The moral analysis in these cases is therefore not concerned solely with the truth 
function of arguments constructed in predicate logic and abstracted from 
context20. Rather, it seeks to strike a balance between rational argument and the 
                                                          
20
 This is not a criticism of the usefulness or insights available from tools such as predicate logic or 
propositional calculus. Rather my point is that there are regions of philosophical or moral analysis 
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contingencies of a situation which may preclude the realisation of the kind of 
‘ideal’ solutions available in abstraction. This is expressed in CR’s view of itself as a 
‘unity of theory and practice’ (Bhaskar & Norrie, 1998) which enables an ‘enhanced 
reflexivity’ (Archer, 1998) between the two. 
The implication of the model outlined here is that whatever arguments are given 
must be rational not only in the sense that they provide good reasons for accepting 
the conclusions to which they lead, but rational also in the sense that it would be 
possible to implement them in practice. As Southwood (2008, p. 13) writes, 
‘normative claims are or involve claims about reasons’. If they are successful it is 
therefore because they have identified the best available course of action given the 
circumstances. He states that (Ibid. p. 13): 
‘ ...vindicating the normativity of rationality should involve trying to identify reasons 
for being rational...the canonical mode of defending normative claims that are in 
doubt is, of course, precisely to adduce independent reasons for complying with 
them.’ 
Implicit in this is the claim that morality has some existence which is not 
dependent on one’s mind alone. If a realist ontology which vindicates the validity 
of deductive reasoning is defensible, it can be used as an ‘anchor’ for deriving 
normative conclusions that are rationally compelling. The reason why these 
conclusions must be rationally compelling is that the aim of applied ethics is moral 
progress. Progress is only possible if one has some static base according to which 
one’s movement can be measured, however. If it is true that apparent instances of 
moral progress really are instances of progress, this can only be because of the 
existence of some independent standard according to which this progression can 
be judged.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
where they are more usefully employed. Since applied work such as this seeks a negotiation between 
theory and data, and aims (broadly) at policy, empirical bioethics is unable to enjoy the rarified and 
exclusively a priori approach in which projects without such practical goals can engage. Given the 
necessarily ‘political’ nature of policy, no practical solution will be perfect, since the formation of 
policy recommendations involves negotiation and compromise between practical constraints and the 
conflicting interests of the different moral agents involved.  
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3.7.1) A Stepwise Illustration of Critical Realist Ethical Analysis 
Sayer (1997) shows how CR provides an explicit rationalisation of the importance 
of empirical data for deriving normative conclusions that can enable moral 
progress. This rationalisation demonstrates in a stepwise fashion the connection 
between the two: 
i) Identification of a problem, e.g.: unmet needs, suffering etc. 
ii) Identification of the source or cause of the unmet needs, suffering etc. 
iii) Passing to a negative judgement of the sources or causes of the problem. 
iv) Favouring (ceteris paribus) actions which remove those sources. 
Sayer goes on (Ibid, p. 475) to offer a full explanation of how this process can 
circumvent the is / ought problem: 
‘Bhaskar argues that transitions from (ii) to (iii) to (iv) are necessary, thus breaking 
“Hume’s Law” – that ought cannot be derived from is. If a belief is known to be false, 
then, other things being equal, it makes no sense to deny that people ought not to 
believe it. Even if, in the case of the needs-based critique, we take the view that it does 
not logically follow that because a person is starving they ought to have food, it at 
least does not make sense, ceteris paribus, to deny that they ought to have it. The 
ceteris paribus clause in (iv) is intended to cover situations where there is a 
conflicting and overriding need which makes it unwise to remove the initial problem 
and its sources.’ 
If, following the is / ought problem, the objection to the use of empirical data in 
making normative claims is that the facts about a situation will not, on their own, 
provide any guidance about what the appropriate course of action would be, CR 
can provide a response. For example, if one is committed to the view that (all other 
things being equal) it is bad to be in certain states of need, one rejects a strict 
delineation between fact and value. The claim that certain needs have the property 
of ‘being bad’ implies that an ontological feature of this need is that it is something 
which should be otherwise. If this is correct, then in this instance a person’s state 
of being is not value-neutral.  
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I anticipate the objection here that my judgement of someone’s need or suffering 
as bad may be a relative matter, since if – for example – I were a sadist, I may 
derive pleasure from a person’s suffering and be moved to prolong rather than 
stop it. One could infer from this the relativist conclusion that since normative 
assessments in this respect differ (i.e. I think the suffering should continue, 
whereas you think it should be stopped) that there is no fact of the matter about 
whether suffering is bad. Indeed from a detached ‘Archimedean’ position it may be 
true that suffering is a matter of indifference to the non-sentient universe.  
Despite this criticism it does not change anything or help in any way once suffering 
is occurring, however. If, on reflection of my own experiences, I conclude that 
insofar as they are suffering the person in question is experiencing something 
intrinsically bad, I may act in order to stop it or perceive a duty to do so in view of 
my negative judgement of suffering. This response does not solve all fundamental 
problems concerning the truth of moral realism in the absence of humans or other 
moral agents. It does, however, provide the basis of an intersubjective justification 
and starting point for constructing the kind of applicable, policy-orientated 
heuristic conclusions sought in empirical bioethics. 
If the wellbeing and views of all individuals to whom a medical decision pertains 
are intrinsically morally significant and should be respected, then these will 
inevitably have some bearing on the moral status of whatever course of action one 
recommends. Appeals to the naturalistic fallacy are only effective to the extent that 
fact and value can be shown to be properly distinct; however if it can be shown 
that fact and value are not entirely distinct in relevant cases, the collection and 
integration of empirical data within ethical analysis can be justified. 
The dual benefit offered by adopting this position is that a) it helps to neutralise 
worries voiced over the high level of abstraction and detachment from context 
which characterise a ‘pure’ philosophical approach; whilst also b) providing a 
sufficiently logical defence of the central importance of  empirical information to 
philosophically acceptable (i.e. explicitly rational) ethical analysis and decision-
making. 
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3.8) Critical Realism and the Single Case Study 
The empirical research method being used within this project is the single case 
study method. As we have seen, CR a) rejects the positivist claim that Humean 
constant empirical conjunctions necessarily provide the most reliable basis for 
claiming knowledge; b) shows that our collection of constant conjunctions in 
support of a hypothesis could never be exhaustive; and c) vindicates the crucial 
(although partial) and valid role that deduction has to play in epistemic 
justification. Consequently, CR enables us to maximise the explanatory power of 
interdisciplinary research involving limited data. 
In giving an account of the significance of both a priori and inductive methods for 
moral reasoning, CR provides a means for extracting the best available account of a 
general phenomenon from a single instance of it. It is therefore a powerful 
methodology for maximising the epistemic value of tightly constrained 
interdisciplinary ethics research involving a single case study, and for developing 
tentative theoretical conclusions which may be taken forward and tested in future 
larger scale projects. CR can justify the analytic generalisability of results from a 
single case study if it has been correctly identified as a ‘critical case’ (Yin, 1989) of 
the phenomenon under investigation.  
3.9) Conclusion 
In upholding the equal importance of both philosophical reflection and empirical 
data CR vindicates the interdisciplinary aims of empirical bioethics. Previous 
methodologies have defended these aims; however CR gives a more thorough and 
explicit account of the ontological connection between data and theory, and thus a 
stronger justification for the possibility and value of combining them. It is 
therefore better equipped than previous methodologies to resist mutual criticisms 
between philosophers and social scientists concerning the relative validity of their 
methods within bioethics. 
Mutual scepticism of philosophical and social scientific approaches to bioethics has 
been evident in the field since the ‘empirical turn’ of the 1990s when it became 
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multidisciplinary and expanded beyond its initially exclusively philosophical 
outlook. Social scientific critiques of philosophy have, for example, doubted the 
veracity of the truth claims generated by a priori argumentation, or defended a 
radically sceptical social constructionist position with respect to the possibility of 
apprehending objective truths. Similarly philosophers have been critical of the 
relevance of descriptive social scientific data for an enterprise such as ethics which 
is irreducibly philosophical and thus theoretical in nature. 
CR effectively negotiates these, demonstrating both the incoherence of the strong 
social constructionist position, as well as giving an explicitly rational and 
philosophically acceptable account of the significance of empirical information for 
effective moral reasoning.  We can conclude that in being able to successfully 
refute the various disciplinary criticisms that have beset empirical bioethics, CR 
can be successfully taken forward in this project for integrating empirical data 
with philosophical reasoning.   
3.10) Summary 
In this chapter I have introduced critical realism as the philosophical approach that 
I will use to combine the philosophical and social scientific components of the 
thesis. I have given an account of the metaphysical orientation of critical realism 
with respect to knowledge and the world. I have demonstrated critical realism’s 
suitability for interdisciplinary ethics research and shown how it is able to 
negotiate a range of theoretical critiques from within both philosophy and the 
social sciences. In particular I have given an account of its refutation of strong 
social constructionism in order to provide a non-relative ontological basis for the 
data analysis that will be carried out in chapter six. 
I have briefly introduced the history of bioethics in general and empirical bioethics 
in particular. Following this I explained how critical realism can be used as a tool 
for integrating philosophical and social scientific approaches to ethics in 
interdisciplinary research. I outlined the advantages that critical realism has over 
previous methodological attempts within the field. I gave an example of how 
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critical realist ethical analysis can successfully negotiates the is / ought challenge 
and thus how the approach can make a useful contribution in empirical ethics 
research. Finally I mentioned briefly critical realism’s utility for single case study 
research, a fuller explanation and justification of which I will carry out in the 
following chapter. 
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Chapter Four: Empirical Research Methods 
4.1) Introduction 
In this chapter I will explain and justify the methods that I used in constructing and 
carrying out the empirical component of the project. I conceive this empirical 
study as being ‘instrumental’ (Yin, 1989; Baxter & Jack, 2008) in its aims. Its 
purpose is to provide insight into how the therapy / enhancement distinction is 
understood within the chosen context, in order to assess the degree of congruence 
between these accounts and the theories found in the literature.  
I have selected a single case study as a method because it is consistent with the 
overall aim of the project, which is to collect empirical data that will enable a 
deeper and clearer conceptual understanding of a larger issue. I will use a 
qualitative approach within the case study, as this is consistent both with the aims 
of the project as a whole and the philosophical methodology of critical realism that 
I am using to frame it. 
Qualitative research seeks insights into subjective understanding, rather than the 
collection of ‘objective’ statistical data, and the interview form is more appropriate 
for the achievement of this than surveys or other quantitative approaches. Firstly 
in this chapter therefore I will explain why I have chosen a single case study 
method. I will then explain why I have chosen EPO as a case study. Following this I 
will report how the empirical study was carried out. Having done this we will be 
ready to understand the study findings in the next chapter. 
4.2) The Single Case Study 
I chose a single case study for the empirical component according to the wider 
aims of the project as a whole. The aim is to discover what kinds of distinctions, 
personal and professional views, motives, and justifications are involved in 
understanding the therapy / enhancement distinction from within a medical 
context. The study is intended primarily to contribute to conceptual depth, and 
focusing on one example provides a way of maximally prioritising this aim. 
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Also given attendant time and space constraints within the project the most 
effective method was to pursue one case study which could be analysed in depth, 
rather than several in which the analysis would have been more superficial. I 
judged that the aims of the project would be best delivered by selecting one 
‘critical case’ on which a detailed analysis could be carried out. (Barzeley, 1993; 
Flyvbjerg, 2006) 
4.3) EPO as a ‘Critical Case’ 
I selected EPO as it constitutes what Yin (1989, p. 47) has described as a ‘critical 
case’ for the phenomenon of human enhancement. Yin’s criteria for the critical case 
are as follows: 
‘When the case represents a critical test of a significant or well-formulated theory. 
Where such a theory exists there may be a single case that meets the conditions for 
testing the theory, according to its claims and propositions. This ‘critical case’ can 
then be used to determine whether these claims and propositions are correct, or 
whether an alternative explanation may be more accurate. Thus a critical case can 
be used to confirm, challenge, or extend a theory, and may help to refocus future 
investigations within the field.’ 
EPO represents a critical case for the phenomenon of biomedical enhancement 
because it is a medical product with a significant history of enhancement use. 
Furthermore the clinical criteria which determine ‘acceptable’ and ‘unacceptable’ 
uses of it are informed by the distinctions which underpin the biomedical model of 
health that is prevalent in western medicine. 
The single case study method can be contentious (Stake, 1978; Yin, 1989; Stake, 
2005). In particular this is because of scepticism over the extent to which any data 
derived from a single case study is reliable or valid in the sense of being 
representative of the phenomenon under investigation (Darke et al, 1998;), as it 
cannot be compared to data about other instances of the same phenomenon.  Since 
the data were used as a counterpoint to theory in order that the latter may be 
conceptually or analytically refined, however, it was not incumbent on the choice 
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of method that it would yield statistical generalisability (Yin, 1989; Johansson, 
2003).  
My decision was informed in part by the fact that few products exist with a 
significant and relevant history of enhancement use, according to the parameters 
of the investigation. Although the broad idea of enhancing human capabilities is 
not new, when looking specifically at the context of biomedical enhancement on 
which much of the present debate focuses, relatively few case studies are available. 
Relatively few products exist with a significant history of appropriation for clear 
enhancement purposes beyond the clinical applications for which they were 
developed.  
I explained in the literature review that cosmetic plastic surgery may be 
understood as an enhancement, since it is provided ‘in the absence of disease or 
physical trauma’ (Grossbart & Sarwer, 1999, p. 101). I have excluded it, however, 
because studies have already been carried out to investigate perceptions of 
cosmetic plastic surgery from within the medical profession (Dunkin et al, 2003; 
Kinnunen, 2010). Moreover the categorisation of cosmetic plastic surgery as 
‘therapy’ is contested and uncertain and thus cannot by itself provide a case with 
(apparently) clearly distinguishable therapeutic and enhancing applications. 
Similarly Modafinil, Ritalin, and Adderall are products that are relevant to 
enhancement and have been the subject of qualitative studies of professional, user, 
and public perceptions (Forlini & Racine, 2010; Aikins, 2011; Bell et al, 2013; 
Vrecko, 2013; Fitz et al, 2013). Whilst a source of much contemporary interest due 
to their off-label use by students for the enhancement of concentration, however, 
they have only begun to be appropriated for this purpose relatively recently 
(Williams et al, 2008; Greely et al, 2008; Tannenbaum, 2008; Coveney et al, 2008; 
Cakic, 2009). Consequently the extent to which significant social and ethical 
implications are discernible and reliable is limited. 
Other advanced medical products exist which may at some point have applications 
for enhancement purposes, but which remain therapeutic at present. One visible 
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example of this is the high-tech prosthetic technology used by paralympians such 
as Oscar Pistorius (Swartz & Watermeyer, 2008; Norman & Moola, 2011). These 
products may or may not confer a better than species-typical advantage over 
natural human legs at this stage of technological development, although if the 
technology continues to progress then this advantage may become less equivocal 
in future (Bruggeman et al, 2007; Jones & Wilson, 2009; Weyand et al, 2009; Kram 
et al, 2010; Burkett et al, 2011; Chockalingam et al, 2011). 
The prospect of engineering ‘better-than-natural’ artificial limbs has attracted 
interest in the concept of transhuman or cyborg sport (Butryn & Masucci, 2009; 
Jonsson, 2010; Miah, 2010). At this point, however, there is no evidence that 
athletes are electing to have limbs removed and replaced by prosthetics in order to 
enhance their performance above the level that is already available to them via 
their normal physiology. 
I therefore excluded advanced prosthetic limbs as a potential case study on the 
basis that we have not yet reached a stage where the elective replacement of 
regular human limbs by prostheses for enhancement purposes is a phenomenon 
that can be investigated. For similar reasons I also excluded the controversial issue 
of gene ‘doping’ for enhancement in sport (Unal & Unal, 2004; Rosoff, 2012; Duntas 
& Popovis, 2012; Fischetto & Bermon, 2013), since this is presently potential and 
experimental, rather than a technology whose impacts can be measured 
qualitatively. 
EPO, by contrast, clearly exemplifies both types of relevant use, since it is a drug 
developed for therapeutic purposes which in recent decades has been used for 
enhancement purposes by professional athletes (Schneider, 2007). EPO is a copy of 
an endogenous hormone which maintains oxygen supply to the muscles and is a 
highly effective intervention for the treatment of the symptoms of renal anaemia 
(MacDougall et al, 1990; Fisher, 2010). It is also effective at increasing oxygen 
supply to the muscles of healthy individuals and hence enhancing exercise capacity 
from normal (Breymann et al, 1996; Gareau et al, 1996). It has been implicated in 
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several high profile ‘doping’ scandals (Mayes, 2010), for example those involving 
David Millar 21 and Lance Armstrong22.  
The drug thus has over 20 years of relevant clinical and enhancement use which 
can be drawn on within a qualitative study. Moreover, the high public visibility of 
its use as an enhancement within sport provides a recognisable point of departure 
grounded in the real world which can be used as a route into the complex and 
more abstract ethical and philosophical issues at stake. 
Finally, though enhancement via EPO (and indeed, sports enhancement in general) 
have been the subject of qualitative studies seeking the views of junior athletes 
(McNamee & Bloodworth, 2009; Bloodworth et al, 2012), it has not been the 
subject of qualitative studies which seek to elicit relevant medical professional 
opinion, despite its relevance for such a project. 
I eliminated potential case studies which either a) were lacking in sufficient 
historical use; or b) had already been the subject of empirical studies related to or 
within the field of enhancement. Consequently I selected EPO as the single case 
study to be investigated, since this also satisfies the criteria for being understood 
as a ‘critical case’ for the subject under investigation. 
4.4) Sampling 
I sought information pertaining specifically to the clinical and off-label use of EPO 
via the experiences and knowledge of relevant medical professionals. I sought the 
views of professionals rather than users for two reasons. 
Firstly, since the enhancement use of EPO is typically engaged in by athletes in a 
clandestine way, it is likely that gaining access to users would be prohibitively 
difficult. Secondly, because my aim is to gain insight into how the medical 
professional perceives itself and its responsibilities, and their connection to 
                                                          
21 http://autobus.cyclingnews.com/news.php?id=news/2004/aug04/aug04news3 
22 http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/0/cycling/20672758 
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enhancement, lay or patient perspectives on these issues will not yield useful or 
relevant information. 
I judged that a project which collected professional perspectives on enhancement 
would produce more data that is relevant to understanding the phenomenon 
within a medical context. The construction of the specific empirical study should 
be guided by the aims of the issue investigated by the project as a whole (Gerring, 
2004; Cresswell et al, 2007). Consequently I decided that these aims would be best 
served by orientating the empirical study towards obtaining a sample of 
professional opinion. 
I chose ‘purposive’ sampling rather than random sampling for selecting the 
interview participants. This method is suitable for studies in which the researcher 
seeks to explore a specific issue with a group (or groups) of people who have 
access to key experiences and knowledge that are relevant to the topic being 
studied (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Robson, 2002; Corbin & Strauss, 1990). As 
Shaw (1999, p. 63) explains: 
‘While the logic of probabilistic sampling lies in “selecting” a truly random and 
representative sample which will permit confident generalisations from the sample 
to a larger population” (Patton, 1987, p. 51), the logic of purposive sampling is suited 
to research with different aims. Its power lies in the selection of cases “rich” in 
information about the substantive research problem.’ 
This choice of method was informed by the need to collect answers to three 
questions which were determined by the aims of the project: 
1. How do participants conceptualise the difference between therapy and 
enhancement? 
 
2. What are the participants’ views on the use of biomedical technologies for 
human enhancement? 
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3. How do participants understand the limits of legitimate medical practice in 
relation to enhancement? 
I identified two groups of relevant participants whose knowledge and experience 
were likely to bear relevance to the research topic and yield answers to these three 
broad questions. These are identified in the table below. 
Clinical Nephrologists  This group could give the perspective of 
medical professional dealing on a daily 
basis with renal anaemia patients who 
require EPO therapy. Participants will 
therefore be able to describe and 
explain the clinical use of EPO and 
comment on the differences between 
patients and healthy individuals using 
EPO, in relation to standard medical 
practice. 
Renal Scientists  This group could provide information 
about EPO’s past, present, and future 
development. Participants may be able 
to offer more thorough scientific 
explanations of the biological 
mechanisms at work, and thus may 
offer a different perspective from the 
clinicians, i.e. one further removed or 
detached from immediate 
circumstances of medical use. 
 
I chose my sampling method not in order to achieve a statistically representative 
set of medical professionals, but to elicit a range of responses and generate a 
‘snapshot’ of the variety of views and perspectives that medical practitioners and 
scientists may hold in relation to the case of EPO in particular, and the concept of 
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human enhancement in general. This is consistent with the rationale provided by 
Miles & Huberman (1994, p. 29): 
‘Choices of informants, episodes, and interactions are being driven by a conceptual 
question, not by a concern for “representativeness”.’  
I selected two groups of participants because of their ability to speak from 
different professional perspectives within the context of the same case. By 
collecting data from these different perspectives and investigating their 
similarities and differences, I constructed a less partial view of the case that is 
more ‘grounded’ in reality (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). 
I developed an increasingly comprehensive view by collecting new data according 
to what I had discovered and what information I still required. I did this by 
identifying which new participants would be most likely to possess the 
information needed. I used the ‘constant comparison’ method in order to 
determine these choices. This follows the guidance of Robson, 2002, and Corbin & 
Holt, 2005. Boeije (2002, p. 393) emphasises the importance of this process for 
carrying out qualitative research: 
‘Constant comparison goes hand in hand with theoretical sampling. This principle 
implies that the researcher decides what data will be gathered next and where to find 
them on the basis of provisionary theoretical ideas. In this way it is possible to answer 
questions that have arisen from the analysis of and reflection on previous data.’ 
In using this method I was able to compare data from new interviews across the 
two groups and analyse them for similarities and differences with data previously 
collected (Miles & Huberman, 1984; Robson, 2002; Silverman, 2005; Vogrinc, 
2008). I fed emerging themes and categories into subsequent interviews, and the 
coding process which followed. 
4.5) Interview Method 
I selected one-to-one, semi-structured interviews as the appropriate method of 
data collection, rather than focus groups. Interviews allow time for depth to 
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emerge within the data in a way that focus groups may not, since the researcher 
and participant are engaged in a private conversation wherein just one participant 
is the focus of the discussion. As DiCiccio-Bloom & Crabtree (2006, p. 40) state: 
‘The individual in-depth interview allows the interviewer to delve deeply into social 
and personal matters, whereas the group interview allows interviewers to get a 
wider range of experience but, because of the public nature of the process, prevents 
delving as deeply into the individual.’ 
Within the interviews my aim was to collect data that was valid and non-arbitrary, 
trustworthy, credible, and relevant to my research question. This is consistent with 
the aims of qualitative social science research outlined by Guba & Lincoln (1981), 
Creswell & Miller (2000), and Whittemore et al (2001).  
The one-to-one interview format allows for greater privacy than focus groups, 
which was important in this study. Since the use of EPO for ‘enhancement’ 
purposes is illegal it therefore has the potential to be a sensitive subject about 
which medical professionals may be less willing to speak frankly and openly if 
being interviewed alongside their peers. Finding out the participants’ views on off-
label uses of EPO was central to this study, and thus I selected the interview format 
as it was likely to yield more useful data than if I had asked the equivalent 
questions in a focus group (Morgan, 1996).  
4.6) Recruitment 
Having established my target groups I identified professional bodies with likely 
access to relevant potential participants. These were the Renal Association (RA), 
British Renal Society (BRS), Royal College of Physicians (RCP), Association of Renal 
Technologists (ART), and EPO manufacturers Roche. I recruited 25 participants in 
total. The first four of these comprised the pilot study, and the remaining 21 
constituted the main study. My aim was for a sample size of between 25 and 30 
participants, ideally split equally between the clinician and scientist groups.  
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I applied to the University of Bristol Faculty for Medicine and Dentistry Committee 
for Ethics (FMDCE) for approval for a pilot study of four participants, which was 
granted. Following successful completion of the pilot study I re-applied to the 
FMDCE for approval for my full study. My applications to the FMDCE also included 
the topic guides outlining the questions to be asked in the interviews. Copies of 
these can be found in Appendices E and F. 
No external ethics approval was required for this study by the University of Bristol 
in either case, since no patients, vulnerable people, or people under the age of 16 
were to be included in the study. All the participants were to be qualified medical 
professionals, and were to be interviewed in their independent capacity as experts 
in the field of renal medicine or research, rather than as employees of the NHS. I 
contacted administrative departments at RA, BRS, RCP, ART and Roche via email 
with an invitation to participate in the study, and a letter attached outlining the 
project as a whole. In the email I requested that the invitation and letter be 
circulated amongst relevant members of the organisations.  
Once the invitation had been circulated, potential participants contacted me 
directly. RCP, ART and Roche did not agree to participate, and consequently 
recruitment took place via RA and BRS. All of the organisations contacted 
represent professionals working in the private sector as well as the NHS, however 
only NHS employees responded to my invitation. Consequently all the participants 
were drawn from the NHS. 
I responded to volunteers with the full project information sheet, asked them to 
read it and if they were interested in participating to suggest a time and location 
convenient to them where we could carry out the interview. Having arranged the 
interview I sent them the study consent form and asked them to read it in advance 
of the interview. I informed them that I would bring along a printed paper copy 
with me on the day for them to sign. 
Across the 25 interviews carried out, 22 participants were male and three were 
female. Of these three females two were from the clinician group and one was from 
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the scientist group. One anomalous interviewee was conducted with a renal 
pharmacist. 19 interviews were carried out face-to-face at the interviewees’ place 
of work, and six were carried out remotely by telephone or Skype. A breakdown of 
the professional demographic characteristics of the participants can be found in 
Appendix D. 
4.7) Pilot Study 
The pilot study group was comprised of two renal scientists, one consultant 
nephrologist, and one renal pharmacist who had responded to the email 
invitations. The renal pharmacist was the only anomaly across the two groups, 
being in neither the clinician nor the scientist group. I decided to carry out this 
interview in any case, since the participant was keen to take part in an interview, 
and informed me that he could provide useful information on commercial aspects 
of EPO procurement and usage. 
I discovered during the pilot study that the first section of the interview structure 
proposed in the topic guide was too long, relative to the approximate total 
interview length of one hour. It became clear that I spent too much time pursuing 
interesting but only peripherally relevant ‘scene-setting’ discussions such as how 
EPO is administered, how it is manufactured, distributed, and stored. In order to 
maximise the discussion of the most relevant issues later in the interview I 
shortened the introductory section of the guide when refining the topic guides for 
the full study. 
4.8) Full Study 
Having undertaken the pilot I re-applied to the FMDCE for permission to carry out 
the remaining interviews. Since the pilot study was successful and generated a 
large amount of data, no changes to the main application were required. Once 
permission was granted I began recruitment. I used the same methods of 
recruitment as for the pilot study, sending invitations to RA and BRS. RA also 
placed an advertisement for participants in their newsletter. In addition I used 
names given to me by pilot study participants to ‘snowball’ for more potential 
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interviewees (Noy, 2008; Bryman, 2012). These two methods yielded quick 
results, and I was able to organise regular interviews.  
Response to my initial invitation slowed, and I therefore began several rounds of 
recruitment in quick succession. I contacted RA and BRS again, although at this 
stage recruitment was more frequently secured via ‘snowballing’. Due to the 
shortfall in interviews I targeted recruitment at regions further away from London 
or Bristol. By this point I was familiar with the interview format and in view of 
financial constraints I conducted several of these interviews via telephone or 
Skype.  
The most challenging aspects of recruitment related to the renal scientist group.  It 
was more difficult to recruit renal scientists, since many renal scientists work for 
EPO manufacturers, and my attempts to interview scientists employed by these 
manufacturers were unsuccessful. Secondly, many renal scientists involved in EPO 
research are also qualified nephrologists, and it was therefore difficult to achieve 
complete separation between members of the two groups, as several of the 
participants stated that they were able to respond in either a clinical or research 
capacity. 
Given the crossover within clinical practice amongst the renal scientist group it 
was, ultimately, not possible to separate the two groups completely. In order to 
mitigate the effects of this as far as possible and ensure as much separation as 
possible I made it clear to the renal scientist participants throughout the process 
from recruitment onwards that I was interviewing them specifically in their 
research capacity. I requested them to keep this in mind when considering their 
answers to my questions and to provide responses that were informed specifically 
by their perspective as a scientist rather than as a clinician.   
4.9) Interview Topic Guides 
I developed two topic guides, one tailored towards each of the two groups. Some of 
the questions on each were the same, and some were unique to each, depending on 
the information being sought. For example, when discussing the details of the work 
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of each group I asked the scientists about the nature of their research in relation to 
EPO; whereas I asked the clinicians about aspects of EPO in relation to medical 
practice.  
Where relevant, however, I also asked several of the same questions to both 
groups in order to compare their responses and identify similarities and 
differences. For example, I asked participants in both groups to explain EPO’s 
biological action, and this question tended to produce a marked difference in 
responses. Participants within the scientist group tended to offer more complex, 
technical explanations than clinicians, who in general offered simpler accounts. 
During the second half of the interviews conversation moved away from details of 
professional practice and became more conceptual, focusing strongly on 
enhancement. I therefore asked the same questions to each group more frequently 
so that accounts could be compared. Questions such as this focused on views about 
the nature of enhancement and therapy; the use of enhancements in different 
contexts; issues of justice in relation to access to medical resources; and 
comparisons between EPO and other kinds of technological enhancements. 
4.10) Interview Structure and Facilitation 
The interview commenced once I had received the signed consent form from the 
participant. For face-to-face interviews this was facilitated by asking them to give 
their signed consent form to me on the day, and for Skype interviews I ensured 
that each participant had returned an electronic copy of the consent form to me – 
this was in the form of either a scanned signed copy, or a digital copy with an e-
signature. 
Prior to starting recording I also checked that the participant had read and 
understood the information sheet sent in advance. At face-to-face interviews I 
provided the participants with a printed copy in case they had been able to read 
them in advance. Where this was not possible in the case of telephone interviews, I 
asked the participants if they had been able to read the document in advance and if 
they had not I sent a new copy via email whilst online. 
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All of the interviews were recorded on an Olympus VN-711PC 2GB Digital Voice 
Recorder. After each interview the recording was transferred onto an encrypted 
USB key via a University of Bristol computer, and deleted from the recording 
device. From here the recording was uploaded onto the University of Bristol’s 
secure server, and backed up on an encrypted re-recordable DVD. Both the 
encrypted USB key and DVD were then stored in a locked drawer in Oakfield 
House, University of Bristol.  Signed consent forms were also stored here securely. 
This procedure was carried out in accordance with University of Bristol data 
security regulations and the stipulations of the FMDCE. 
Across both the pilot study and the main study the interviews ranged from 
between around 40 and 75 minutes. The shorter interviews tended to be those 
which had been carried out via telephone or Skype.  
4.11) Coding  
I coded the interview transcripts in order to systematically organise and manage 
the data. A wealth of information was generated, which I categorised in a way that 
represented an accurate conceptual representation of the research participants’ 
views and their relative importance. As Basit (2003, p. 144) explains:  
‘Creating categories triggers the construction of a conceptual scheme that suits the 
data. This scheme helps the researcher to ask questions, to compare across data, to 
change or drop categories and to make a hierarchical order of them.’ 
I repeated the whole coding process several times, and made it an ongoing process 
throughout the study. The process involved both initial coding of new transcripts, 
and re-coding of earlier ones. The coding became decreasingly descriptive and 
increasingly conceptual as the process was repeated, and as the size of the data set 
grew. The method of coding I employed followed that recommended by Charmaz 
(2006, p. 42): 
‘Qualitative coding, the process of defining what the data are about, is our first 
analytic step. Coding means naming segments of data with a label that 
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simultaneously categorizes, summarizes, and accounts for each piece of data. Coding 
is the first step in moving beyond concrete statements in the data to making analytic 
interpretations. We aim to make an interpretative rendering that begins with coding 
and illuminates studied life.’ 
Following this method, firstly I carried out an initial coding of the whole transcript, 
attaching codes to the data to describe what was said. This first stage generated a 
large number of codes. The pilot study interviews each generated between 100 and 
150 codes. The pilot study yielded so many codes partly because these were the 
first interviews that I carried out. At this stage I was unfamiliar with what might be 
said by the participants and had no prior frame of reference for this. 
I carried out the initial analysis in such a way that the data was segmented as far as 
possible, and coded and represented neutrally, so as to resist as far as possible the 
influence of any judgements or biases arising from theories of human 
enhancement with which I was already familiar. This approach is consistent with 
the recommendation of Corbin & Strauss (1990, p. 13) who state that coding in this 
way: 
‘...enables investigators to break through subjectivity and bias. Fracturing the data 
forces preconceived notions and ideas to be examined against the data themselves. A 
researcher may inadvertently place data in a category where they do not analytically 
belong, but by means of systematic comparisons, the errors will eventually be located 
and the data and concepts arranged in appropriate classifications.’ 
After carrying out the initial coding of the pilot study data I compared the four 
separate lists of codes across the four transcripts. I did this in order to assess 
whether different participants had made similar claims or expressed similar ideas. 
Where this occurred I was able to amalgamate codes so that the overall number 
could be reduced. At this stage I also provided my supervisors with a subsample of 
transcripts for coding in order to compare their interpretation of the data with my 
own. This ‘auditing’ (Seale, 1999, p. 468) of the data was ‘an exercise in reflexivity’ 
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which enabled me to critically re-assess my own interpretation, question other 
possible interpretations, and enrich my understanding of the information. 
Whereas in the initial coding the aim was to atomise the data as far as possible, 
during subsequent rounds of coding my goal was to reduce the number of codes 
used into a smaller, higher-order conceptual schema which accurately represented 
the categories at work in the participants’ accounts, and moreover one which 
remained stable in the face of new data arising from subsequent interviews. This 
approach of ‘data reduction’ is recommended by Miles & Huberman (1983, p. 285), 
who explain its importance in qualitative research: 
‘Reduction not only allows analysis, it is analysis, in that clusters and partitions will 
necessarily follow the analyst's evolving sense of how the data come together and 
how they address the research questions s/he wishes to answer.’ 
The data generated grew as the main study progressed. Consequently the coding 
process became increasingly demanding. As the process developed in coding new 
interviews and re-coding earlier ones I discarded some initial codes, and grouped 
together certain sections of text from different interviews under newly generated 
codes where there was parity of meaning between them. This process enabled me 
to develop an attitude of ‘reflexivity’ towards to the data, wherein I re-examined a 
previous interpretation of one section of data in light of my interpretation of 
another. 
Macbeth (2001, p.36) writes that the word ‘reflexivity’ has its ‘etymological roots in 
self-reflection and critical self-reflection’, and can be understood as the process of 
research ‘turning back on itself’. Adopting this method enabled me to think about 
the data in more detail, and what the nature of conceptual connections or 
differences across them might be. This was crucial for maximising my open-
mindedness towards the meaning of the data, and limiting the extent to which I 
imposed any meaning upon it. Macbeth (2001, p.37) continues: 
‘...reflexivity is recommended as a principal method for excavating new (anti)-
foundations for the analytic and representational exercise...reflexivity begins with a 
126 
 
scepticism toward how indeed we have been doing these things all along. Reflexivity 
recommends an inquiry into the very possibilities of our unreflective knowledge and 
practices...’ 
The amount of data yielded from the pilot study onwards was considerable. The 
process of refinement from a large number of neutral codes to a smaller, more 
refined and more focused set of codes that applied across the set provided 
increasingly clear insight into what information was most relevant to the study 
participants with respect to the central issues being investigated. 
The process became more complex as the study progressed, since I was dealing 
with an increasingly large data set. In addition the unpredictable frequency of 
interviews as the study progressed meant that different transcripts were 
undergoing initial, secondary, tertiary, and quaternary analysis simultaneously. 
This resulted in periods during which there was an inconsistency in the depth of 
analysis across the data. By the end of the study I had developed a stable coding 
scheme and a firm conceptual grasp of the typical concerns and viewpoints of the 
participants. 
4.12) Saturation 
As I approached 25 interviews I felt that I was achieving saturation within the data, 
since the amount of new, anomalous, or novel information being generated had 
reduced significantly. Glaser & Strauss (1967, p. 65) define saturation as the point 
at which: 
‘...no additional data are being found whereby the (researcher) can develop 
properties of the category. As he sees similar instances over and over again, the 
researcher becomes empirically confident that a category is saturated...when one 
category is saturated, nothing remains but to go on to new groups for data on other 
categories, and attempt to saturate these categories also.’ 
By the time I carried out the final interviews I was familiar with standard positions 
adopted by the participants and tested my hypotheses about their views by asking 
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questions which had been refined and focused by previous interviews. Although 
participants spoke from their own personal perspectives such that there was some 
degree of variation in terms of normative standpoints or philosophical views about 
the issues at stake, the range of likely viewpoints expressed had become clear. The 
constant comparison method outlined earlier enabled me in achieving ‘saturation’, 
wherein no new data was generated by subsequent interviews. The final four 
interviews generated additional data but yielded no new insights. Following 
Bowen (2008) I therefore concluded at this point that I could be reasonably sure of 
saturation.  
The final four interviews were important, particularly in view of the fact that there 
was an imbalance between the clinician and scientist groups prior to these 
interviews due to difficulties in recruiting renal scientists. For the final four 
interviews I therefore sought scientists in order to redress this balance and test 
whether my more limited hypotheses about this group’s views were correct.  
4.13) Data Analysis 
In the same way that the sampling of interview participants was purposive, so I 
conducted the data analysis in a similarly purpose–driven way. After completing 
the interviews and arriving at a stable coding scheme I moved on to the next stage 
of data analysis. 
The process I employed in analysing the data had three stages: firstly to identify 
meaningful data within the transcripts according to whether it ‘spoke’ to the 
research question; secondly to code these data; and then to interpret within this 
content what underlying claims or positions were being defended by the interview 
participants. This process allowed themes to emerge, which were then fed into 
both subsequent interviews and tested against the sets of data which they produce. 
The method of interpretation I used in analysing the data is known as ‘analytic 
induction’, and is described by Robinson (1951, pp. 813) as follows: 
‘...the method of analytic induction begins with an explanatory hypothesis and a 
provisional definition of something to be explained. The hypothesis is then compared 
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with facts, and modifications are made in two ways: (1) The hypothesis itself is 
modified so that the new facts will fall under it, and/or (2) the phenomenon to be 
explained is re-defined to exclude the cases which defy explanation by the hypothesis.’ 
I chose this method because it ‘gives conceptual and methodological scope for those 
engaging in qualitative research’ (Miller, 1982, p.285). As the researcher in this 
project I am driven by a philosophical interest in the therapy / enhancement 
distinction. As somebody who is neither a clinician nor a scientist my assumptions, 
presuppositions, educational background, knowledge and attitudes are therefore 
likely to differ significantly from the research participants. 
I attempted to interpret the participants’ reasoning in order to determine what 
rational or normative claims were being made. My goal was to inductively draw 
out the beliefs and assumptions were at work in informing and constructing their 
normative positions. If done correctly the interpretation of the testimonies of the 
research participants would yield explicit claims, beliefs, and assumptions that 
were previously hidden or unclear. Once these claims, beliefs, and assumptions 
were made explicit I used them as a basis for testing my interpretation of the data 
from one interview against the data from others. 
As well as employing this iterative process within the analysis of the data from 
each study group, I also used it to compare the views of the clinicians and scientists 
across the two groups in order to seek out what differences in perspective there 
might be between them as a result of their different professional roles. As this 
process continued I was able to test, refine, improve, or reject hypotheses 
according to their accuracy when applied to different transcripts. This iterative 
process enabled me to gradually establish a firm overall conceptual interpretation 
of the data.  
I allied this process to a procedure of ‘theoretical triangulation’ (Robson, 2002; 
Seale, 1999). Triangulation is analogous to the method of navigation used to 
determine one’s position at sea or on a map, wherein two known points are used to 
locate the position of an unknown third point (Turner & Turner, 2009). Theoretical 
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triangulation is a method in which multiple theoretical schemas are used as 
different ‘lenses’ through which to view the information collected. In view of the 
various competing and currently empirically inconclusive theories as to the nature 
of the therapy / enhancement distinction, theoretical triangulation was the most 
appropriate for the purposes of this study.  
Triangulation is achieved by identifying the different ways in which information 
might be explained, and interpreting the information accordingly (Cho & Trent, 
2006). Theories that did not explain the data were discarded, and I continued the 
research according to these refinements such that the salient remaining issues 
could be pursued in greater depth in subsequent interviews (Draucker et al, 2007). 
I continued this process iteratively until the coding structure developed remained 
stable in the face of additional data collected and no new insights were being 
generated.  
4.14) Conclusion 
Given the wealth of speculative theoretical work on human enhancement 
compared to the scarcity of empirical research, I argue that the focus on a single or 
critical case with a history of enhancement as well as therapeutic use is the best 
way to achieve insights into professional perceptions and values from both clinical 
and research perspectives. Having investigated and assessed possible case studies 
according to the aims of the project and the philosophical methodology to be 
employed I conclude that EPO provides such a case study. Now that I have 
described the methods used in the empirical study, in the next chapter I will report 
the main findings which emerged from it. 
4.15) Summary 
In this chapter I explained the empirical study methods that were used. I explained 
that I chose a qualitative approach. I justified this approach according to its 
suitability for providing insight where conceptual clarification is being sought, as is 
the research aim in this case. I justified the use of the single case study method and 
also the choice of EPO as the case to be investigated. I explained how the single 
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case study method was used in conjunction with the philosophical approach of 
critical realism. 
I reported the processes of recruitment and interview facilitation. I described how 
I gathered my data by way of in-depth interviews. I showed how the study 
methods and design represent the best way to elicit the motivations and 
distinctions that underpin professional decision-making amongst the study 
participants. I then explained the analytic processes of coding and data reduction 
used in identifying the key findings of relevance which are described in the 
following chapter. 
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Chapter Five: Main Findings 
5.1) Introduction 
This chapter introduces the main findings of relevance that emerged from the 
empirical study.  These findings are presented thematically according to the coding 
and data analysis described in chapter four. The findings report information about 
the participants’ work in renal medicine and research; appropriate boundaries of 
practice; clinical and research perspectives on the standard and ‘off-label’ use of 
EPO; ethical opinions of the use of other substances for enhancement purposes; 
concepts of naturalness and artificiality; and conceptualisations of the relationship 
between therapy and enhancement. 
5.2) Therapy, Enhancement, and Normality 
The predominant view held amongst the participants was that enhancement is a 
distinct phenomenon from therapy. In their accounts the distinction was grounded 
in the existence of real, non-trivial, statistical and qualitative differences between 
‘normal’ health and illness or disease. 
A typical expression of this view, from S3, was that ‘you can very clearly distinguish 
between being ill and being normal...health is just being not ill.’ The difference in the 
case of renal anaemia patients was that prior to receiving EPO they suffered from 
symptoms such as ‘lethargy, fatigue...breathlessness on exertion, angina...’(C3). 
When probed for a definition of ‘normal’ health, however, a widespread view was 
that a clear definition is elusive, given physio-biological variations between 
individuals and the relative demands of their lives. S2 gave the following example: 
‘... if you're an eighty year old in a nursing home who sits in a bath chair all day 
watching afternoon television it actually doesn't matter so much that you're 
haemoglobin's low and you probably won't really notice that much difference if you 
correct it, but if you're a twenty two year old who wants to play football, well, it'll 
have a massive difference, and anything in between those two extremes.’  
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The variation between entire social populations was adduced by C2 as a reason 
why ‘the normal patient’ eludes definition: 
‘...different societies - and it differs with different communities and what their 
expectations are - you know, what could be normal in one community may not be 
normal in another...there’s this curve, and there’s always going to be this two or two 
and a half percent outside...’  
According to the prevailing conception of normality among my informants the 
needs of the ill were expressed as being greater than those of the normally healthy, 
such that ‘being ill gives you a need but being well and just wanting to be more than 
well doesn’t give you a need.’ This participant, S3, went on to state that ‘getting 
better than normal isn’t necessary or needed, whereas getting better from being ill 
is’, and by implication that good reasons to enhance were minimal, since on this 
view normal health is sufficient and biomedical augmentation is not required in 
such a state. This characterisation was expressed by the majority of the two 
groups, but particularly explicitly by 15 participants. 
Participants who expressed commitment to a belief in the reality of a difference 
between normal and ill-health tended to perceive a correspondingly real 
distinction between therapy and enhancement. This was grounded in the existence 
of relevant medical criteria, for example in C4’s statement that patients ‘have an 
indication for it and therefore it’s therapy...if you’re an athlete there’s no indication 
so it’s not a therapy, so it can only be an enhancement.’  
As previous quotes indicate, participants typically described their professional role 
and the boundaries of medical work as clearly circumscribed by the need to 
restore ‘normality’, rather than to extend functioning beyond it. This was the least 
equivocal finding across the study; however ambiguity was evident on several 
occasions. C13, for example, cited the legal prescription of beta-blockers to 
musicians for reducing anxiety and preventing shaking during live performances. 
The justification for this is that ‘it’s not really a medical condition but it helps them 
133 
 
perform their jobs’. On probing this justification of engaging in what appears to be 
‘enhancement’ medicine, the participant responded that: 
‘The problem here is definitions isn’t it, which is what you term as a medical 
condition or not. So for a person a bit of anxiety or performance nerves is completely 
normal, and it’s probably normal for most people, so on the basis that it’s a normal 
reaction to a particular situation I think it’d be wrong to call it a medical condition – 
it’s not a disease, it’s not lack of health in any way, and it is performance enhancing 
in some way’.  
Although normal functioning was the guide used by the participants as a target for 
their work, in relation to EPO they explained that differences between individual 
patients posed problems for achieving this, since appropriate dosing was unique to 
each individual patient. The participants typically used aggregate judgements for 
defining normality as ‘the normal patient’ could not be identified. S3 explained: 
‘I remember when I went to medical school and we had a conversation about what 
health is on some course, and they kept banging on about what health was, and 
health was defined – even I think in the WHO – not only as the absence of illness but a 
whole bunch of other stuff as well, I don’t agree with any of that...no-one’s ever gonna 
be healthy by those criteria! Not only have you gotta have no illness, but you’ve gotta 
be in full control, and fully spiritually and physically and mentally on tip top form – 
it’s amazing!’  
Eleven participants made reference to the physiology of people who live at high 
altitudes and who therefore naturally have a higher than average haemoglobin 
level. S4 suggested that individuals who live at high altitudes – whether patients, 
healthy people, or athletes - derive an advantage from the naturally high 
haemoglobin count caused by these environmental conditions:  
‘...if you asked them to go and exercise in Ethiopia or somewhere where hypoxia level 
is much higher, they can reach these target haemoglobin much easier. And there is 
one interesting study which shows that patients who are on dialysis who are living on 
high altitude, their EPO requirement is lower, because it stimulates their own EPO, 
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you see? And somebody looked at the survival of these patients and it was clear that 
the survival was better.’  
Nine participants expressed concern over difficulties in normalising absolutely for 
equal ability, given human biological variation. S2 stated that normal genetic and 
physiological variation is so marked that ‘we are not fundamentally equal’, and that 
some unfairness in the distribution of ability is therefore unavoidable: 
‘What do you do about the 20 stone rugby forward versus the 15 stone rugby 
forward? What do I do about the fact that I need glasses to read anything?...there are 
all sorts of things like this that just aren't equal and at what point do you say “we'll 
normalise these ones, but we can't normalise those ones”?’  
There was an indication from one participant, C2, that he perceived difficulties in 
clearly distinguishing between therapeutic and enhancement uses of technology 
on the basis that ‘what could be normal in one community may not be normal in 
another’. It was not clear precisely what size or type of grouping was meant by the 
word ‘community’ here; however, relative to the socio-cultural norms that prevail 
in such a grouping, he stated that ‘I don’t think you can define what normal 
physiology is, and I don’t think you can define what enhancement is either.’ 
C2’s outlook was anomalous insofar as he went into detail explaining how norms 
change, and how this informs moral decision making. He suggested that humans 
are still evolving and that ‘in the last 30 years probably we’ve evolved even quicker, 
mainly because of the technology’. He stated that change is constant, and 
consequently perpetual re-adaption is necessary, asserting that ‘we will evolve even 
more – we have to survive’.  
He made reference to the difference in moral norms between his father, himself, 
and his children, claiming that ‘for progress you need enhancements’. He concluded 
by identifying any technology which positively augments normal functioning as an 
enhancement, stating directly that ‘there will be enhancements’. He offered a 
condition for their moral acceptability, however, stating that ‘we should do it in a 
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way which is responsible and which doesn’t have any adverse effects on that 
individual or to the society.’  
In spite of various difficulties associated with the clear identification of normality it 
was clear that in a clinical context EPO has been dramatically successful in helping 
renal anaemia patients to live what is understood as ‘normal’ life in both objective 
and subjective terms. This was an outcome attested to unanimously. For example 
C1 described the development of EPO as ‘an extraordinary achievement’.  C9 
claimed that EPO’s clinical success is ‘spectacular...just obvious...out on a limb’, and 
is a rarity in that it has ‘felt like a proper cure in medicine’. This participant felt that 
the therapeutic benefits of EPO have been so marked that it should be considered 
as significant as ’syringing ears, correcting cataracts, surgically removing a cancer 
before it's spread, and insulin for diabetics' . 
5.3) The Moral Context of Enhancement 
The predominant finding concerning views on the ethical status of enhancement 
was that its moral status was perceived to be strongly context-dependent, and 
variable according to contingent facts supervening on different scenarios. In 
particular what appeared to split morally acceptable uses from unacceptable ones 
was whether use of an enhancement would constitute an advantage that was 
unfair. 
Where an enhancement would confer an advantage on the user that would also be 
denied to others its use was considered morally unacceptable, and characterised as 
cheating, whereas no strong moral objection was voiced in instances where the 
influence of the enhancement went no further than the user. This was a unanimous 
finding, with all participants at some point in the interview adducing ‘fairness’ as a 
principle for restricting access to enhancement. Consequently in relation to EPO a 
line of prima facie acceptability was drawn between its use in sport, and its 
hypothetical use for ‘lifestyle’ purposes. In the former a clear advantage would 
accrue to the user over the non-user, whereas in the second an enhancement user 
would not necessarily be exploiting non-users. This led to the typical view that: 
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‘...whilst I’ve got no problem with people using a performance enhancer, I have got a 
problem with people cheating’ (S3) 
This appeared to be a distinction that was relatively straightforward to justify. 
Several reasons were put forward in support of the view that sports enhancement 
is unethical, whereas few moral objections were advanced against individual 
enhancing themselves in non-competitive contexts. 
Objections to sports enhancement can be further divided into objections as a 
matter of principle alone, and those which are also pragmatic in nature. The 
former included appeals to the distortion of the level playing field (e.g. P1, P10), 
and the presence of regulative rules explicitly forbidding EPO use (C7, S2). The 
latter cited the irrationality of widespread enhancement use in cancelling out the 
net advantage to individual users (C2, S11), and unacceptable safety risks that 
enhancement use of EPO carries which would be legitimised if it were allowed (C6, 
C12). A modification of the safety objection was also advanced (S4, S7), which 
suggested that one way to reduce the problems related to sports enhancement 
would be to ensure that use is not forbidden, but properly monitored and 
supervised.  
In the context of the ‘lifestyle’ use of enhancements such as EPO the only objection 
shared with those against sports use was driven by concerns for safety and the 
ethical responsibility incumbent on medical professionals to prevent unnecessary 
harm. Participant C12 felt that it would be ‘foolish’, rather than immoral, to use 
EPO for enhancement, but in view of the dangers would not sanction its 
prescription. S5 stated forcefully that ‘it’s not going to be an over the counter 
medication...that would never be allowed to happen, it would be very dangerous.’  
This issue of the professional responsibilities of the medical profession featured in 
every account of the moral status of enhancement, in relation to both sports and 
lifestyle use. An apparent tension existed between a commitment to individual 
liberty and self-determination which would include the freedom to enhance, and 
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the role that medical professionals should play in endorsing restrictions on this 
according to the risks of assisting with this. 
A common view was that, in general, ‘I don’t think you can come up with a blanket 
principle about how [people] should and shouldn’t use drugs’ (S11), however as 
medical professionals they nevertheless felt that beyond a certain threshold of risk 
it would be morally unacceptable for them to endorse the legal right to enhance. 
Relevant risks included personal health risks to the individual (C7, S5); risks to the 
integrity of the medical profession by engaging in controversial activities such as 
prescribing enhancements, evident for example in C7’s statement that ‘if all doctors 
were ethical people there wouldn't be very much doping’; and in the case of sport, 
worries about the public message that would be conveyed if biomedical 
enhancement were to be seen as institutionally endorsed. S10 felt that the 
prevention of performance enhancement in sport is ‘very important for whole 
society healthcare, really, and the message it sends out.’ 
One common conceptualisation of the use of EPO for enhancement purposes was 
as being analogous with recreational use of other legal or illegal drugs. S6 
established this connection as follows: 
‘So you’re asking about the rights of the individual to do as he or she pleases....drug 
taking, basically’ 
Following this he grounded objection to the enhancement use of EPO in the 
statement that ‘EPO has the potential to harm in supra-normal conditions’. He 
argued that to the extent that illegal drugs are regulated according to safety, the 
same criterion is appropriate in the case of EPO. Similarly C5 defended the legal 
prohibition of EPO for enhancement as ‘pragmatic’. Although all participants had 
safety concerns over the use of medical products for enhancement, intrinsic moral 
objection to enhancement by medical products per se were negligible. To this 
extent S6’s view was typical of the participants. 
 S3 did not typically regard the use of drugs for realising perceived subjective 
benefits as inherently morally problematic, and drew parallels with other 
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products, pointing out that ‘in normal life it’s not a problem...we all use drugs and 
different things at certain times’. This was a surprising outcome and indicated that I 
had held an erroneous preconception as to participants’ views on this matter. S9 
expressed the view particularly clearly: 
‘It’s a perfectly understandable aspect of human nature that if there’s something 
about your body or your ability that you don’t like and there’s an opportunity to 
change it you might seek to do so – I don’t think there’s anything wrong with that’  
The view expressed here was that it is relatively normal to use substances to 
improve or modulate performance, and was explained and justified in different 
ways by other participants.  C11 claimed that the acceptability of the use of 
different interventions to alter performance is historically conditioned. In terms of 
comparisons to legal drugs she contrasted the legality of caffeine with the illegality 
of unsupervised EPO use. She suggested that the legal status of drugs is to some 
extent a historical accident, rather than one which is isomorphic with intrinsic 
moral acceptability or unacceptability: 
‘Look at caffeine, for example, it’s a relatively new drug – it’s only been around for 
three or four hundred years, but because it’s been around before we started 
regulating everything there’s no rules about being allowed to drink two or three cups 
of coffee before you go into an exam’  
This participant also drew an equivalence between drinking wine for relaxation 
and using EPO to boost performance, claiming that it is reasonable to allow people 
to use potentially dangerous products because ‘we can’t live in a nanny state’. 
Again, however, she claimed that the legality of alcohol use relative to the illegality 
of EPO for enhancement has been socio-historically determined, rather than 
determined morally a priori: 
‘...it’s historic isn’t it – wine has been around for ages, it’s part of our natural psyche 
and culture, and erythropoietin is very new’  
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There were, however, a range of views about the acceptability of recreational drug 
use. C12 stated that ‘recreational drugs are objectionable because of the crime 
associated with the supply chain’. He was also concerned about the health risks to 
the user, but went on to say that ‘I don’t have an intrinsic moral objection to 
someone taking a drug in and of itself’. Also in relation to recreational drug use S6 
cited damage to society as grounds for objection: 
‘I’ve often heard the argument that the reason that drug taking is illegal in this 
country is because it affects society, that there is a societal implication...the reason 
why heroin is outlawed in this country is because of the problems you get for society’  
References to illegal drugs frequently cited particularly dangerous substances such 
as heroin and cocaine as ones which there are good reasons to prohibit on grounds 
of individual safety and potential damage to society. In instances of products 
where risks are lower, however, there was again a reluctance to make 
generalisations about what people ought and ought not to be allowed to do in their 
private lives. 
Once more the dangers of particular substances appeared to inform the thresholds 
of acceptability beyond which a legal curtailment of autonomy should be endorsed. 
As long as there is no risk to society, and as long as users understand the personal 
risks to their own health, a typical view, expressed by S6, was that ‘it should be ok 
in that context for someone to do what they like’.  S11 made a similar claim, justified 
by the need to protect individual freedom where possible, stating that ‘there is a 
degree of autonomy that people need to be allowed to make those choices.’  
5.4) Risks and Benefits 
In spite of EPO’s overall therapeutic success, participants were reluctant to make 
general statements about its net benefits, and the same was true of their views 
about the use of EPO for enhancement. The prevailing view was that whether EPO 
use does or does not in fact genuinely ‘enhance’ is ‘multi-factorial’ (C6), since there 
may be many countervailing factors which could affect the net outcome.  
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Ambivalence was frequently displayed towards the desire to enhance, although 
conditions of safety and risk were expressed as factors which might reasonably be 
used in prohibiting access to ‘off-label’ enhancement. The ambivalence was 
grounded in a reluctance to dictate absolutely what people may and may not 
privately do with their bodies. The choice of whether to accept certain risks was 
understood to be a personal matter, irrespective of any value judgement of these 
decisions. In the following example from S6 the use of the words ‘hubris’ and 
‘vanity’ imply criticism of certain decisions, but the quote suggests he does not 
believe that criticism alone is a strong enough reason to justify the curtailment of 
liberties: 
‘There’s no medical need, it’s for the aesthetic pleasure of the individual or whatever 
you want to call it – their hubris or their vanity. It has no societal impact, it gives 
income to someone, someone’s willing to pay for it and the individual has to weigh up 
the risk and benefit. So as long as they can pay for it privately and it’s not on the NHS 
then, you know, no one seems to have a problem with it’  
Correspondingly, where safe ‘off-label’ use could be ensured, S3 argued that there 
would be little reason to object. He indicated a connection between public demand 
and the safety of medical products, wherein new trajectories of use for medical 
products may occur where use can safely be extended for non-medical purposes:  
‘...we have some medicines that are on sale to the public...you can go along and buy 
Piriton, that does sometimes have non-medical usage as if you give it to kids they 
sleep well, they get a good night’s sleep, and I’m sure some people use it in non-
medical ways, but it doesn’t do a great deal of harm so that’s a medicine that we 
don’t regulate’  
Three participants anticipated a further question concerning the balance between 
the need to protect the public from unnecessary health risks whilst also protecting 
individual liberty. C1 identified a recent historical change according to which 
medicine has undergone a degree of institutional re-orientation such that greater 
autonomy in decision making is transferred to the patient, wherein ‘people have 
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much more of a say, are kind of stakeholders in medicine and responsible for their 
own health’ such that ‘people make their own decisions’. This point was also noted 
by ten other participants. 
The consensus in these cases, expressed clearly by C1, was that it is ‘clearly for the 
better’ that this attitude prevails and that the profession has ‘moved away from a 
sort of patriarchal “doctor knows best” kind of thing’. In spite of favouring this 
transferral of autonomy, however, these participants were happy, on balance, to 
weigh in favour of current regulation of EPO in view of the risks associated with its 
use. A typical justification for this related to the ‘shared decision making’ model 
defended by C12. According to this model equal weight is given to patient 
autonomy and professional judgement in order to arrive at a decision that balances 
a respect for self-determination with the obligation of medical professionals to 
prevent harm. 
All participants noted that individual goals and values differ, and that some people 
may therefore be motivated to take EPO in the achievement of those goals. They 
explained that judgements about benefits relative to risks must take a range of 
subjective factors into account, including the patient’s own health and personal 
experience of the disease, their age, goals, lifestyle, and typical range of activities. 
Members of the clinician group in particular, however, viewed themselves as 
gatekeepers to medical technologies, and since EPO is a medicine with potentially 
dangerous side-effects, they viewed it as too risky to use without guidance. They 
claimed that whether or not an individual has a medical need for EPO, a physician 
has a responsibility to ensure that those who receive medical assistance are not 
exposed to unnecessary risks, as C2 indicates: 
 ‘I can tell my patient “you’re anaemic and we should try and get your haemoglobin a 
bit better because it improves your concentration, your exercise capacity, you reduce 
the cardiovascular risk” - it shouldn’t be too high, it shouldn’t be too low. But how 
would I advise an 18 year old boy who would like to compete, saying “you should take 
EPO, the benefit might be that you might win the race, but there’s a 10% chance that 
you could have a stroke”’ 
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Implicit in this statement is the view mentioned earlier that there is no need for 
the healthy to take EPO. This was expressed by seven participants, all of whom 
suggested that enhancement use of EPO is simply irrational, rather than morally 
wrong. In view of the net lifestyle benefits for already healthy individuals, C7, for 
example, stated that simply being able ‘to get to work two minutes quicker’ was 
‘pointless’ and not a reasonable claim on EPO for enhancement purposes, when 
balanced against the risks of doing so. 
This participant in particular was reluctant to identify the enhancement use of EPO 
as generating a simple net benefit just because it improves exercise capacity and 
endurance.  For example, he claimed that there is a difference between altitude 
training and using EPO, since exercise at altitude both increases actual fitness and 
raises haemoglobin. On the other hand he asked ‘can you then get the same effect by 
simply putting your haemoglobin up with EPO and not training at altitude? Probably 
not’. 
Divergence from this view by other participants, however, indicated how 
professionals working within the same field can conceptualise enhancement 
differently.  For example, although C10 considered the question of whether 
enhancements should be legally accessible as being ‘a grey area’, she took a 
relatively straightforward line in respect of whether benefits to performance 
should count as enhancements: 
‘...how far do you go to say people need this and your life will be better or your life 
will be really improved by having this done to you?...it’s not gonna completely make 
someone an amazing athlete just having EPO, but having that extra stamina meaning 
that someone can train longer and train harder...’  
The commitment of the participants to generating beneficial outcomes and 
increasingly effective iterations of EPO motivated discussions about 
pharmaceutical research and development; legal and illegal markets in 
pharmaceuticals; the commercial pressures which come to bear on access to EPO; 
and issues of justice relating to appropriate regulations controlling access. 
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5.5) EPO and Other Enhancements 
Bearing a similarity to views about the ambiguous moral status of EPO use for 
different purposes, the majority of participants expressed a belief that the moral 
and philosophical status of different technologies is also influenced by contingent 
social facts.  
Consistent with the widespread finding that the participants tended to perceive 
real differences between therapy and enhancement, they also tended to commit to 
differences between EPO and other technologies for enhancing abilities.  S1 stated, 
however, that ‘to actually articulate that is rather more difficult’, in spite of the fact 
that ‘...one feels subjectively that there is something profoundly differently between 
giving yourself a recombinant hormone to perform better than buying the latest 
crampons to go and climb Mount Snowdon’.  
Although all participants identified difficulties in making a priori logical 
distinctions, they rationally grounded distinctions between EPO and other 
technologies which produce the same physiological effect qualitatively and 
empirically, and included socio-cultural influences on how differences might be 
understood. For example S1 pointed out that ‘using telephones is regarded as fairly 
unavoidable...whereas EPO, there is an element of dishonesty associated with it’. 
Given the element of dishonesty present in sports use, he stated clearly that ‘one 
difference is simply just how socially acceptable it is’. 
The question of honesty arose whenever the issue of EPO’s illegality was discussed, 
and S6 in particular took a trenchant view about the difference between hypoxic 
training and EPO use, suggesting that methods of raising haemoglobin such as the 
former that are not prohibited should be understood as ‘legal cheating.’ 
A further justification of a difference between the use of EPO and other products 
was grounded in the contingencies associated with being a medical professional 
and the values that one is expected to uphold in this role. C5, for example, 
suggested that there was some degree of similarity since all successful methods of 
enhancement will provide supra-normal capabilities, but nevertheless upheld a 
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distinction between them on the basis that, ‘it’s not part of medicine’s remit to do 
that, so we just sort of duck out of that one...we’ve got to operate within boundaries’. 
Similarly C7 claimed that the difference between therapeutic and enhancing 
applications of medical products was informed by the taxonomy of classification 
used: 
‘...there is a sort of nomenclature for this which is that there are quite a few 
substances which are naturally occurring substances and you can either take them in 
replacement doses which mimic what you should have naturally, or you can take 
them in pharmaceutical doses, which are doses that then have effect over and beyond 
just replacement’  
On six occasions cosmetic plastic surgery was discussed in the context of 
enhancement and compared with EPO, and it may represent a boundary case 
dividing views on the ontological and ethical status of human enhancement more 
generally. Opinion diverged in several respects. For example, participant C8 felt 
that the two were analogous and was critical of cosmetic plastic surgery, 
particularly towards those medical professionals who engage in it. His opinion was 
that ‘a lot of plastic surgeons are preying on weak and vulnerable people’. 
He adopted the same stance in relation to the hypothetical legal availability of EPO 
for enhancement on grounds of justice, stating that ‘I philosophically don’t like the 
idea of there being better access to any sort of healthcare dependent on ability to 
pay’. Conversely, S6 viewed EPO and cosmetic surgery as analogous, but displayed 
ambivalence towards the desire to enhance oneself. He asserted a difference 
between very clear medical abnormalities which require treatment, and more 
subjective ‘nuanced abnormalities’ which may not require treatment but for which 
it would be legitimate to alter in principle if desired. He thus foregrounded 
autonomy over one’s body as the primary factor of moral relevance, assuming that 
other conditions of safety and justice could be satisfied. 
In instances such as these the difference in legality between cosmetic surgery and 
EPO for enhancement was viewed as a historical accident. S6, for example, stated 
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that he did not know why one is legal and the other is not. The fact that these two 
cases were on several occasions viewed as analogous, however, did not appear to 
represent a good enough reason for sanctioning the enhancement use of EPO, and 
thus eliminated the importance of any legal inconsistency between them. 
Participant S9 offered an alternative perspective, and whilst not endorsing EPO use 
for enhancement because of the attendant risks, took a broadly positive stance on 
cosmetic surgery, grounded in the legitimacy of the desire to alter one’s body if one 
is not satisfied with it: 
‘...my wife is an orthodontist and some of her patients have teeth that they don’t like, 
they’re transformed by having orthodontic treatment, it changes their whole 
approach to life, it changes their whole character and undoubtedly improves their 
quality of life, so that’s a cosmetic practice for which there are real and genuine 
physical and mental health gains’ 
The findings on views of cosmetic plastic surgery were relevant in terms of 
enhancement, since it is a field of medicine which is accessible in the absence of 
illness or pathology, or rather, in the absence of the kind of diagnosis which would 
ordinarily legitimate treatment in other cases. For this reason it may, alongside its 
standard therapeutic purposes in facial reconstruction and the treatment of burns 
and so forth, be construed as a field of medicine which is legally available for both 
therapeutic and enhancement purposes. The divergence of views on both its moral 
status and the extent to which it is analogous to EPO revealed the ethical and 
ontological complexity of human enhancement as it relates to the institution of 
medicine.  
5.6) Justice in Access 
Ensuring justice in access to EPO relative to need was a key concern across all of 
the participants. The unanimous view was that access should be determined and 
dictated by medical need. Correspondingly, whilst principled objections to the use 
of EPO or other products for enhancement per se were limited, it was clear that 
ensuring the supply of drugs to the healthy simply because they may be desired 
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was not a motivating factor in their work. This reinforced the emergent prevailing 
view of medicine as institutionally owing a duty to the sick that it does not bear to 
the healthy. 
Of greatest concern was ensuring that those suffering from illness have access to 
treatments, and that legal mechanisms are put in place to ensure their just 
distribution on this basis. In relation to the mechanism by which this is achieved in 
the UK, C4 offered unambiguous support of NICE as the appropriate arbiter of 
regulation: 
‘I support the general idea behind NICE that any drug that wants to be able to 
market itself needs to have evidence to support it, so I think that should be done at a 
national level to avoid postcode lotteries and it should be done on the basis of 
evidence and not pressure from interested parties’  
The corollary of this was that they viewed it as unjust to fail to provide resources 
when a medical need is present. C7 referred to severe EPO rationing in the early 
1990s that caused situations in which ‘10 people got EPO and if you were the 
eleventh you had to wait for someone to be transplanted or die before you could 
have it’. He described this as ‘tangibly an unfair situation’.  
On discussing this issue further the participants expressed views on justice 
relating to the permission or denial of access to EPO or other products medicines 
for enhancement by the healthy. There was little disagreement between opinions 
on the goals of medicine and whether non-clinical, off-label uses of medical 
products can be described as consistent with them. 
In expressing a view about this that was typical across the study, C2 interrogated 
the purpose of enhancement, given that medicine typically aims to rectify 
statistically abnormal functioning in individuals who ‘fall outside the norm’ when 
compared to ‘95% of the population’. Statistically normal functioning was not 
considered to generate a need, and hence C2 claimed that instances of EPO use by 
the healthy raised the question ‘what’s the goal you’re trying to achieve?’  
147 
 
The prevailing view was that the achievement of justice in medicine is coupled to 
the allocation of resources according to need, rather than the desires of the healthy 
to improve themselves. The participants discussed the difficulties of ensuring 
distributive justice in terms of the appropriate channelling of benefits to patients, 
when balanced against economic factors which come to bear on securing 
pharmaceutical products at the lowest price. Participant C6 believed that financial 
resources are being wasted by buying too much EPO, relative to the symptomatic 
benefit that this represents: 
‘If we quickly aligned our targets to the evidence base so we use less we would spend 
a lot less...in order to feel 80% better we only need to give you a haemoglobin of nine 
and that costs the state £1,000.  Now if we want to give you a haemoglobin of 11 
you'll feel a bit better, but that costs you as an individual £2,000’  
Two participants offered trenchant views relating to the importance of prioritising 
the interest of patients at all times, and resisting the preferences of the market as 
far as possible. For example C7 claimed that medicine derives a moral value from 
treating the sick, and that this moral value is best realised via the state provision of 
healthcare, as this kind of provision helps to limit any deleterious effects of market 
pressures affecting patients: 
‘I get paid exactly the same as if I spend five grand investigating them and 10 grand 
treating them... people are always subject to conflicts of interest.  Being a salaried 
doctor I still have lots of conflicts of interest, but whenever I'm seeing a patient the 
effect on my income is not a conflict of interest’  
5.7) Commerce and Research 
The commercial aspect of pharmaceutical production was widely perceived to 
have an impact on the moral status of outcomes relating to the use of medical 
products for standard and ‘off-label’ purposes. In particular the profit motive 
inherent to pharmaceutical trade and manufacture was viewed as capable of 
exerting a pernicious influence on the scale of use of medical products. When allied 
to the prevailing view of the healthy as having ‘no need’ to enhance themselves, the 
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widespread opinion was that unnecessary enhancement should not be encouraged, 
since this may increase the profits for manufacturers by selling products to people 
who are capable of living healthy lives without them. 
This view was summarised by C7, who claimed that off-label access to products 
such as EPO is unjustifiable as its safety cannot be ensured because ‘unscrupulous 
drug companies won't be too bothered about who they sell it to’. He expressed 
concern over the existence of a large unregulated market in EPO, since such 
markets are by definition hard to control:  
‘You can go to China and you can just buy it straight from the factory or you can get 
it off the internet.  There'd be people working at the factory that could have a pallet 
of it or people on the delivery lorries. There'd be all sorts of ways of doing it’   
Three participants gave personal insights to this, citing examples of where kidney 
patients have been suspected of or discovered to be selling EPO as a performance 
enhancer on the black market after it became clear that, as C3 observed, ‘some of 
them are ordering much more often than they should be if they’re using the drugs at 
the prescribed rate’ . C3 also posed the question ‘where is the EPO coming from?’.  
On the basis of an incident involving a Chinese patient he said that ‘it just struck me 
that one of them was a Chinese chap who’s frequently heading back to China, and 
what’s to say he’s not selling half of his drugs on the internet or back in China?’  
The possibility of coercion by the market in EPO for enhancement was thus 
considered to be a serious risk with the potential to distort just outcomes in its use 
and distribution. Nine participants were concerned that loosening regulations and 
widening legal access privately or over-the-counter would inevitably increase the 
marketing options available to the manufacturers, and could cause political 
difficulties in ensuring distributive justice according to need. C8’s statement was 
representative of this: 
‘...if you ended up with a situation where it was considered acceptable for there to be 
a cohort of drugs that are prescribed on an as needed basis as they are now, but 
149 
 
there’s lots of supplementary drugs that people could buy, I guess the temptation for 
the exchequer would be to move more medicines into pot B and have fewer in pot A’  
C8 was also concerned about increases in the scale of risks resulting from 
medically unnecessary use, since these would ‘allow for more vulnerable people to 
be preyed upon by marketers’. The concern was that whilst ‘in a medicines 
framework there’s really strict regulations’ such that he ‘couldn’t prescribe 
something for you without a good reason’, that this would be absent in deregulation. 
His objection was that ‘with this more loose concept of enhancement that isn’t there, 
so I’d worry about protection that’s available to people’ . 
Concern over the impact of increasingly easy availability of EPO was expressed in 
different ways. Two participants implied that EPO is already sometimes clinically 
used ‘beyond therapy’ as a function of market pressures. In the case of the UK, P1 
suspected some over-prescription of EPO which goes beyond medical need 
because ‘now it's more freely available and it's cheaper’. He asked ‘can we ethically 
push the boundaries out for patients to enable them to do more active things?’, and 
reported worries that patients are being over-treated in suggesting that ‘we're 
getting to the point now perhaps where because it's so cheap we are using it a bit too 
freely in some areas’. In addition it appeared that EPO’s controversial 
enhancements uses necessitate extra caution in prescribing ‘because EPO is a drug 
that’s abused’. 
C7 cited evidence from the USA in which EPO is prescribed under a model of 
private healthcare, and where a more immediate financial incentive is present for 
doctors. He suggested that EPO is already being clinically over-used as there are 
financial incentives for clinicians to prescribe it, since under a healthcare 
insurance system ‘the more EPO you prescribe the more money you make, so 
unscrupulous doctors gave people EPO that didn't need it’. By contrast as an NHS 
employee receiving a centrally controlled salary, he pointed out that ‘there's no 
financial incentive for me to give people things they don't need’. C5 summarised the 
prevailing view outlined here more succinctly, claiming simply that ‘no-one’s clean 
in this business’. 
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Following this, several references were made to the fact that pharmaceutical 
manufacturers will only invest in research and development of a product if profit 
margins are sufficiently large. EPO is highly cost effective because so many people 
are affected by kidney disease, and consequently continued EPO research was 
claimed to be inevitable. Forthcoming non-injectable preparations will, as a result 
of being cheaper to produce and store, generate a larger profit margin, as well as 
potentially constituting an improvement on its present therapeutic application by 
being less invasive. Opinion was divided as to whether EPO specifically is a product 
whose enhancement or lifestyle use might increase once cheaper, pill, patch, or 
spray- based preparations come to market. C3, for example, believed that 
enhancement use would grow: 
‘I could see it in America very easily, the advertisements on the television – “are you 
thirty something, have you got young children, are you exhausted, would you like 
more energy? Ask your doctor about such and such”’ 
Whereas others, such as C6, were more sceptical:  
‘For some people very, very small margins are important.  For most people it's the big 
stuff that's important - can I get out of bed in the morning?  Can I get the kids ready 
for school?  Can I go to work?  Simply being able to complete their tasks at work a 
minute quicker over the course of an eight hour day isn't really that relevant’  
Given what is still not understood about how EPO works and the risks entailed by 
these gaps in knowledge, all participants believed that more research is necessary, 
even though the drug is safe when properly administered. The depth of the current 
gap in understanding appeared to be considerable, as in relation to the 
mechanisms by which it works as a sports enhancer S1 stated that he stated that 
‘I've asked some world experts on EPO physiology and they've not really been able to 
explain it’.  
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5.8) Differences Between Clinicians and Scientists 
There were some discernible differences between the attitudes of the clinicians 
and the researchers, although they were subtle and the differences were not 
dramatic. As the study progressed it became clear that the views held across the 
two groups were more homogenous than I had anticipated when I began. This was 
particularly true of their ethical views, where little divergence was evident across 
the study. Where differences were noticeable these related to technical biological 
and scientific knowledge, rather than moral viewpoints. 
Clinical nephrology has a long and well established basic science research 
tradition. Many clinical nephrologists carry out scientific research as well as their 
clinical work, or have done so at some point in their career. All of the renal 
scientists that I interviewed and who have worked in EPO research are also 
qualified doctors. Although I interviewed them in their scientific research capacity 
rather than their clinical capacity, it may be that it is difficult for them to separate 
the two roles entirely, and similarly difficult for me as the researcher to 
disaggregate the two groups completely. 
Nevertheless one distinctly noticeable difference between the groups was in their 
explanations of the biological functioning of EPO. Clinicians tend to offer relatively 
simple explanations, whereas scientists’ explanations were much more complex. 
Participant C3 in fact prefixed his account by saying it was a ‘perhaps simple 
understanding of it’, and on being asked whether he could explain EPO’s biological 
action, C8 answered as follows: 
‘Well, not in great detail! But it works in the bone marrow and basically stimulates 
the production of red blood cells’  
By contrast participants in the scientist group offered more detailed accounts. S1, 
for example, explained how the amino acid chain which constitutes the EPO 
molecule must be folded. He also outlined the mechanism by which the molecule 
itself becomes active, and used precise biological terms such as ‘endoplasmic 
reticulum’. He described the modification of the ‘alpha chain of the transcription 
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factor’, along with an explanation of ‘a so-called activated protein called B3000 or a 
CPP’ and its impact on the ‘downstream gene’. Description at this level of detail did 
not feature in the clinicians’ accounts.  
The second noticeable difference was that the scientists expressed greater 
certainty that new derivatives and iterations of EPO would come to market. S1 
claimed ‘it’s inevitable’ that new derivations of EPO will be developed, and S4 
indicated it was highly likely that new forms of EPO will appear given its current 
research trajectory: 
‘...it has been actually the trajectory for research for a long time, because people 
actually use it and extrapolate that into other directions’ 
Although some differences were discernible across the clinician and scientist 
groups, it is hard to generalise about any clear divergence of opinion with respect 
to therapy and enhancement, how they can be distinguished, and what should be 
done about the use of medicine for enhancement purposes. There was evidence 
that participants in both groups were equally engaged in the questions, and 
equally perceptive about the issues at stake. S3, for example, voluntarily extended 
the discussion to thinking about the potential role of EPO within work or leisure: 
‘...supposing you did a very hard job, a very tough physical job, and you had no choice 
but to do that job, and EPO would make you better at doing that job, make your daily 
grind a bit more tolerable, then I don’t see why you wouldn’t use it’  
S2 also voluntarily broadened out the conversation beyond standard clinical 
medicine. He explained his view on enhancement by drawing an analogy with the 
use of antibiotics.  Antibiotics for treating disease in humans are also employed as 
growth enhancers in agriculture. They enhance growth by destroying bacteria 
living in ostensibly healthy farm animals. This, he claims: 
‘...implies that there's something about the microbial flora in an apparently healthy 
farm animal that is slightly deleterious to it, and that by giving a drug that we would 
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use as a treatment in medicine you can actually get an advantage even when you 
haven't got the illness there’ 
He concluded by explaining how this might be analogous to the use of EPO for 
enhancement, arguing that:  
‘if the erythropoietin allows people to do things they couldn't do without it then that 
may be an advantage if it's really important that they do those things'  
It should be noted that the caveat imposed by S2 here concerning the importance 
of enhancing oneself provided the criterion according to which assistance is 
justifiable. Despite not registering any objection to enhancement as such, he 
defended a ‘titration’ of resources relative to need on the basis that ‘...we're in a 
cash limited system, so we can't provide everything that might be of tangible 
theoretical benefit’. 
These broader views were not exclusively offered only by the scientists. In one 
case C2, a clinician who does not carry out any scientific research, pre-empted a 
question about the continuity between EPO as a means of enhancement, and every 
day technologies which could be said to ‘enhance’ in some way, such as telephones. 
In anticipating a later question he suggested that anything which positively 
augments normal human functioning can be considered as an enhancement: 
‘I can’t remember everything, so I put lots of things on my smartphone to remind that 
at 9 o’clock I should ring Mr. Andrews, at 10 o’clock I should be in this meeting, 3 
o’clock I’ve got an appointment with you...so this is an enhancement isn’t it?’  
This claim in particular led to a discussion about the concepts of natural and 
artificial, and the relationship between evolution and technology, about which 
other participants also expressed views. 
5.9) Naturalness and Artificiality 
The concept of the ‘natural’ was revealed to be ambiguous. Discussion on this 
matter was raised by a question relating to the difference between using EPO to 
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raise haemoglobin for performance enhancement, and undergoing hypoxic 
training to do so. The lack of correspondence between optimum haemoglobin 
replacement levels via EPO use, and the species-typical or ‘normal’ haemoglobin 
content of the blood prior to the onset of anaemia was also relevant in motivating 
conversations about the moral value of the natural and the non-natural. 
A view held by 12 participants, or around half of the group, was that hypoxic 
training is ‘more natural’ in some way than EPO use, since EPO is ‘a manufactured 
product, it’s a pharmaceutical’, whereas ‘going up to altitude is just something that 
humans do’. The distinction appeared to be grounded in what is ‘achievable in 
nature’. This participant, C4, made some acknowledgement that the distinction 
may be arbitrary, however, on reflecting that ‘I suppose I’m drawing an artificial 
line in the sand somewhere’. Nevertheless, he adhered to his distinction overall: 
‘... sure enough you might need to get a plane somewhere, but it’s pretty much 
achievable in nature to go up to altitude and train there, whereas giving yourself 
Aranesp for one month, bought from a dodgy doctor, is not achievable in nature’ 
Contrastingly, the other half of the participants judged the two methods as 
relevantly similar, since the outcome of both EPO use and altitude training is the 
same, namely a higher haemoglobin content. 
There were similarities here with views concerning the difference between 
therapy and enhancement. Differences between the natural and the unnatural 
were apparent to the participants, but these categories were informed empirically 
rather than logically a priori. Participant C12, for example, began an explanation 
with an appeal to human nature and its technological alteration, but concluded 
that this line of argument was not ultimately successful: 
‘There’s something about changing nature as well here isn’t there, there’s something 
about what is the intrinsic nature of people, and you might argue that the difference 
is that using external means of assistance like a drug , a car, a CD player or whatever 
it might be is not about changing yourself physically, whereas using EPO is. But then 
155 
 
we exercise in order to look different as well as to maintain fitness...it’s difficult to see 
why there should be a specific moral objection to enhancement in that sense’ 
S9 identified the consideration of these concepts as something which goes on 
within medical practice, stating that ‘we have this philosophical argument in 
medicine...there are people who think that we shouldn’t reinvent nature, so doctors 
get accused of playing God or somehow interfering with natural processes’. He went 
on to explain that this accusation is problematic, since all medical interventions 
can be construed as artificially interfering in natural processes. 
He characterised therapy and enhancement as ‘different aspects of the same thing’, 
and pointed out that the logical end of an argument against medicine on the basis 
that it interferes with nature would be never to treat, that ‘you wouldn’t take 
someone’s appendix out, you’d let them die, and that’s not good healthcare practice’. 
C9 suggested that it was not the ‘artificiality’ of an intervention which constitutes 
its moral status, nor its classification as a therapy or an enhancement. According to 
this view, ‘artificiality’ as such was not considered to be a centrally relevant moral 
concept.    
Of key relevance to the therapy / enhancement distinction and its moral 
implications, however, was the issue of what constitutes an optimum level of 
haemoglobin, and thus how much exogenous, ‘artificial’, EPO should be used to 
treat patients. Therapeutic benefit was defined primarily in terms of the extent to 
which it ‘makes people symptomatically better’ and restores normal functioning, 
irrespective of whether this corresponded to a statistically normal level of 
haemoglobin, since the former can be achieved without the latter.  
A haemoglobin replacement level slightly below the bottom of the normal range is 
typically sufficient for this, and is also associated with a lower risk of stroke than 
when haemoglobin is within the normal range. Hence a typical response, expressed 
by S1, was that ‘we don't replace haemoglobin to the level that you or I might have a 
haemoglobin in health but we bring it up to the 10 to 12 grams per decilitre range’. 
Importantly S1 pointed out that despite the replacement level being beneath the 
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level of statistical normality, this was sufficient for achieving the therapeutic goal 
since ‘the reality is we will have stopped them becoming ill’. 
In all interviews there were discussions about optimum haemoglobin replacement 
targets and how these relate both to species-typical levels and the supra-normal 
levels sought by athletes using EPO. There is currently no entirely settled view on 
why the optimum replacement target is below the ‘natural’, species-typical level. 
An hypothesis put forward by S2 was that it may be due to modern humans having 
a haemoglobin level that was ‘set by evolutionary pressure’ at a much higher level 
than is now required, given dramatic changes in human living conditions since the 
emergence of homo sapiens which mean that ‘we're now living in a time of plenty’. 
S2 went on to suggest that because of the absence of prior evolutionary pressures 
we may be now maladapted with respect to the species-typical level of 
haemoglobin ‘because now very few people in our society are encountering sabre-
tooth tigers that maul them, cause them to lose a pint and a half of blood but then 
still leave them with enough energy to run away’. He also offered a second possible 
explanation, in pointing out that women now die only relatively infrequently 
through blood loss during childbirth, whereas in the past this otherwise ‘would be 
a heavy evolutionary pressure without any resuscitation available, at least in the 
western world’.  
Whatever the reason for the species-atypicality of optimum haemoglobin 
replacement, the prevalent view across the participants was that it is only 
peripherally relevant to their work. Similarly the epistemic gap concerning the 
mismatch between species-typical and optimal replacement haemoglobin levels 
had little bearing on how the participants understood the appropriate limits of 
clinical practice. 
5.10) Semantic Vagueness and the Boundaries of Medicine 
Study participants often recognised philosophical grey areas resulting from the 
semantic vagueness involved in attempting to articulate the difference between 
therapy and enhancement, and by extension the boundaries of medicine. On two 
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occasions participants directed these complexities back towards me, the 
researcher, suggesting that it is my role as a philosopher, rather than theirs as a 
clinician or scientist, to think about what the differences might be: 
‘Is there an answer to these questions?!’ (S1) 
‘It’s not easy...otherwise you wouldn’t be doing a PhD on it!’ (C3) 
Participant S6 went into greater detail in interrogating the basis on which 
conclusions are arrived at and decisions are made in philosophical analysis: 
‘You see, philosophy I understand as using logic and reason to try and dissect a 
problem to get to an answer – I don’t know, does philosophy allow for one’s instinct 
to play a role in decision-making?’ 
I inferred from comments such as these that whilst the participants recognised the 
presence of philosophical ambiguities and complexities, they viewed them as only 
tangentially rather than directly relevant to their work. This suggests that although 
they are aware of potentially unresolved questions concerning the boundaries of 
medicine, it does not prevent them from understanding the central aspects of their 
work and obligations in a straightforward and robust way, grounded in socio-
cultural expectations of what it is that medicine and healthcare ought to do. C9 
claimed that these expectations are in flux, however, and that ‘society evolves a 
choice’. This state of flux may in turn be responsible for C1’s statement that: 
‘...there is an arbitrary component to it – I mean I'd say that medicine operates within 
society and so to a substantial degree what we do as doctors or healthcare 
professionals is influenced by what society deems to be acceptable and appropriate, 
and the way that doctors have behaved has changed in the past few decades.’  
S11 made a different but related point, suggesting that what is and is not 
considered legitimately ‘medical’ by the medical profession itself is to some degree 
ad hoc. In relation to guidelines and indications for EPO use he stated that ‘I don’t 
think there’s any overriding principle being applied’, but rather that the conditions 
for legitimate use are ‘to do with professional perceptions of the indications for 
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particular drugs’, and that pragmatically it would be risky to prescribe outside 
whatever the guidelines happen to be since ‘they’d be leaving themselves open to a 
charge of professional misconduct.’  
When discussing enhancement’s relation to medicine he stated that ‘none of these 
things are based on a set of overriding principles’. He too claimed that ‘the whole 
thing has evolved’, suggesting that ‘it’s all historical’ on being asked why the 
boundaries of ‘legitimate’ medical practice are as they are.  
C12 made a similar point relating to historical changes in definitions of illness and 
disease. Offering a ‘common sense’ interpretation of therapy and enhancement he 
stated that ‘the cut off in most people’s minds would be that if you are not treating a 
pathology then you’re talking about enhancement’. He went on, however, to point 
out that the concepts of illness and disease are not fixed, stating that the standard 
therapy / enhancement distinction ‘doesn’t take account of the fact that the idea of 
what is and is not pathological is very fluid’. 
S6, whilst not offering a condemnation of biomedical enhancement, offered a 
tentative solution, suggesting that decisions about who can access medicine ‘off-
label’ is one which should be made by a different set of trained professionals than 
doctors, since a doctor’s aim is to heal the sick: 
‘Your question of enhancement in the normal population or in someone that wants to 
do it for the fun of it, that really shouldn’t be up to us because we’re doctors, we’re 
physicians, we treat people that are ill, so that’s our concern. People who are well, 
maybe there should be another group of people who deal with those, because 
ethically we’re not trained for that’  
5.11) Closing Remarks in Interviews 
Although the question of enhancement was often one which was of only peripheral 
interest or relevance to the work of the participants, they were invariably 
interested in the issues and happy to discuss them at length. Towards the end of 
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the interviews participants offered closing comments such as these from C6, S2, 
and S11: 
‘...it's not what I expected.  I expected really to be talking about just renal patients, 
the literature.  So to get on to the ethics of things has been really quite an interesting 
conversation... to start talking about use in non-renal patients, misuse etc, the ethics 
of doing things for enhancement, has been more interesting’  
‘I think it's been thought provoking and interesting and it's probably apparent from 
my more hesitant answers to the later questions that you've raised issues I've only 
partially thought through, whereas the straight facts on erythropoietin don't require 
fresh thought’  
‘It’s been an interesting reflection on autonomy and choice in a way that I hadn’t 
perceived before we started the conversation, and EPO has just been the centre of 
that discussion’  
These remarks were in themselves instructive. In showing me that the issues we 
discussed are not ones that they think about it in detail from day to day it was clear 
that the complex conceptual and ethical questions at stake, while intellectually 
diverting and ethically problematic, are not ones about which they are required to 
be concerned professionally. For example, towards the end of one interview, when 
asked her view about how decisions should be made concerning the balance 
between medical products provided by the state and within the private sector, and 
what uses should and should be licensed for, S8 exclaimed simply: 
‘I don’t really have an answer to that to be honest – it’s not my job to decide!’  
Although in several cases participants identified problematic challenges – for 
example in relation to justice issues such as the balance between ‘paternalistic’ 
regulation of medicine for the benefit of the public against the need to also protect 
individual liberty – they tended to see these as existing only on the fringes of their 
actual work. The majority of people for whom the participants provide a service 
are ill, where the term ‘illness’ denotes dysfunction that is objectively and 
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subjectively real. Any philosophical and moral difficulties about medical dilemmas 
that exist outside of these boundaries tended to be thought of as being ones to 
which they do not need to provide answers. 
5.12) Conclusion 
It became clear during the study that the kinds of reasoning engaged in by me as a 
philosopher, and by these medical professionals as research participants, were 
frequently different. What we share, however, is an interest in what constitutes 
moral behaviour in medicine. From the study it was evident that there is some 
convergence in our aims, despite our differences in perspective and approach. 
What is different about these approaches is that a pure philosophical analysis of 
ethical questions is relatively detached, tightly defined, and logically abstract, 
whereas as professionals the research participants must think more widely about 
what constitutes ethical decision making in practice.  
In engaging with the subject matter of enhancement within the interviews, these 
medical professionals found themselves having to make reconciliations. On one 
hand there was a relative normative clarity both to their motivations and the 
professional expectation that they help the sick.  On the other hand, they often 
appreciated the logical and ethical ambiguities which emerge from a philosophical 
analysis of the therapy / enhancement distinction. They were keen to discuss these 
issues and the reasons why they challenge the premises of their professional 
motivations and expectations.  
On several occasions participants referred to renal medicine as a particularly 
‘cerebral’ or ‘intellectual’ field, and that this characteristic was one of the factors 
which attracted them to it. This is not to suggest that professionals in other fields 
of medicine would not necessarily be interested in the philosophical aspects of 
medicine, however an inclination towards intellectualising medical practice may 
be one of the reasons why they were prepared to consider these philosophical 
difficulties in depth. 
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Ultimately the participants were able to leave worries about enhancement to one 
side by virtue of the pressing need to help the sick, however their reflections 
regularly indicated that they understand the source of a philosophical interest in 
the therapy / enhancement distinction, namely the identification of the boundaries 
of medicine as ones whose precise location may be reasonably called into question.  
During the study I formed the view that the high profile and well-documented 
nature of EPO use for off-label purposes helped in opening up the discussion of the 
potentially more abstract conceptual aspects of human enhancement in general, 
and making the broader discussion of this comprehensible. The history of EPO use 
was clearly of interest to many of the participants since it is a product which is 
central to both clinical and research aspects of renal medicine. On several 
occasions participants said that for this reason they had followed high profile cases 
of EPO use such as Lance Armstrong and David Millar. 
These kinds of high profile cases can be understood as very distant from the 
normal concerns of day-to-day clinical and research practice, since professional 
sport is a marginal activity in which most people are unable to engage, whereas 
renal anaemia affects many thousands of people and compromises their ability to 
achieve even the basic tasks of daily living. The use of EPO is explicitly forbidden 
by the World Anti-Doping Agency in order to protect the ‘level playing field’ central 
to the ethos of sport, and hence it is easy to appeal to this rule as a reason why 
athletes should not use it in competition. Thus sports enhancement use and 
standard clinical use represent two poles which are understood as respectively 
ethically problematic and unproblematic.  
Many of the insights which emerged from the study arose from discussions of the 
more ethically ambiguous region between these two poles, for example the 
hypothetical use of EPO for enhancement but not in overtly competitive 
environments. These more ambiguous reasons call into play a different balance of 
ethical priorities, since if the competitive element is removed, for example, then 
issues of justice and fairness can be less easily adduced as reasons why people 
ought not to engage in EPO use for off-label purposes. Consequently it was the 
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discussion between the two poles which indicated most clearly the priorities of the 
research participants in relation to enhancement. 
As gatekeepers to potentially dangerous medical products, the endorsement of any 
liberalisation of access to these products was clearly dependent on whether safety 
could be reasonably ensured. In respect of enhancement the need to protect the 
public from health risks and injustice was the cardinal ethical principle 
underpinning the dominant position towards the moral acceptability of 
enhancement. If safety and justice could be reasonably ensured, however, then a 
countervailing commitment to respecting personal autonomy and self-
determination became a key determinant of their decision-making. 
This detailed negotiation between personal ethical commitments and the 
expectations of responsible medical practice that emerged from the data gave an 
important insight. This insight shows how balanced ethical decisions can be made 
and justified in relation to a contentious ethical question, such as enhancement, 
which challenges the already ambiguous boundaries of acceptable and 
unacceptable professional practice.  
5.13) Summary 
In this chapter I outlined the main findings which emerged from the empirical 
study. The data showed what was of ethical importance to the study participants in 
terms of the acceptability of human enhancement; the data also provided insight 
into how the participants conceptualise enhancement and the nature of its 
difference from therapy; finally it also highlighted the different approaches to 
rationality employed by them as medical professionals, and me as a researcher 
approaching from a predominantly philosophical standpoint. 
The research participants tended to adopt an ambivalent position in relation to the 
liberty to enhance per se, with other contingent considerations supervening on 
biomedical enhancement being those which informed how they constructed a 
defence of ‘acceptable’ or ‘unacceptable’ use. The key normative considerations in 
assessing acceptability of access to medical products, for therapeutic or 
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enhancement purposes, were safety, fairness, and justice. Principled objections to 
enhancement beyond this were limited.  
The predominantly held view was that enhancement is connected to medicine but 
in a peripheral, rather than central, way. As such, in clear-cut cases such as sports 
enhancement it was perceived to be non-trivially different from therapy. The 
deductive reasoning employed in interrogating the therapy / enhancement 
distinction from a philosophical perspective revealed itself as a different approach 
to the resolution of dilemmas from the empirically informed reasoning used by 
clinicians and scientists in their work. Whilst both forms of reasoning were 
mutually comprehensible, conceptions of the distinction were informed from 
different starting points and assumptions. 
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Chapter Six: Philosophical Analysis 
6.1) Introduction 
In this chapter I will analyse the study data in terms of relevant theories 
concerning the relationship between therapy and enhancement. I will therefore 
bring together the conclusions from chapter five and the literature reviewed in 
chapter two. I will compare the issues of relevance within the data with 
corresponding theories and aspects thereof, and carry out a philosophical analysis 
of these in order to improve our understanding of the therapy / enhancement 
distinction. 
The steps to be taken in this chapter are as follows. Firstly, I will re-state the initial 
problem and summarise what needs to be known in order to resolve it. Secondly, I 
will give an overview of the study data. Thirdly I will address the conclusions 
arrived at in the previous chapter concerning the data that can help to clarify the 
therapy / enhancement distinction and shed light on the main issues of ethical 
concern to the study participants. I will provide an example of theory / data 
integration and analysis, and subsequently apply the same procedure throughout 
all of the data being analysed. The data will be compared with theory in order to 
illuminate those areas which are presently ambiguous. Finally, I will draw 
conclusions from these analyses which will be summarised to be taken forward 
into chapter seven. 
Consistent with the philosophical approach of this project, the analysis that I will 
carry out in this chapter will be done from a critical realist perspective. In the 
analysis I will proceed on the basis that critical realism has given an accurate 
account of knowledge and the world, the nature of their difference and their 
relationship to each other. The postulations of an objective ontology combined 
with a subjective epistemology, and the ability of both empirical data and a priori 
reasoning to yield partial truths about reality will be the assumed basis for 
analysis. This follows the reason and justification for accepting these postulations 
explained in chapter three. 
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6.2) Stating the Problem  
The literature review showed that there is disagreement and epistemological 
uncertainty with respect to the correct interpretation of the contested therapy / 
enhancement distinction. It is not obvious whose reasoning we should follow: is it 
that deductive philosophical arguments which highlight the logical weakness of the 
distinction have identified inconsistencies within the institutional status quo and 
its nominal exclusion of enhancement? Or despite the claimed significance of the 
logical continuity between therapy and enhancement, should we favour the status 
quo and its current orientation? As changeable and historically contingent as it 
may be, perhaps we should follow the medical professional view in order to ensure 
that assistance remains prioritised for the sick rather than the healthy.  Do the 
empirical data compromise the theoretical integrity of the pro-enhancement 
arguments made within the enhancement literature? Or do these theories indicate 
that the study participants have erred with respect to the normative judgements of 
enhancement that they offer? 
Given this challenge my aim is twofold. Firstly, to show that philosophical theory 
requires social scientific data to impose important normative limits on the 
counter-intuitive conclusions at which it can arrive. Secondly, to show that medical 
practice requires philosophical analysis to make it clear where errors in reasoning 
have been made, and to attempt to weigh conflicting arguments as objectively and 
non-relatively as possible.  
6.3) Overview of Data 
My central observation of the data is that there was no absolute congruence 
between the empirical data as a whole, and any single theoretical account of 
enhancement. Certain views partially echoed positions found within the literature, 
although the data pointed in several different directions. Although some views 
validated some theoretical accounts to some extent, the data did not 
comprehensively refute the various deficiencies inherent to the conflicting 
accounts found across the literature.  
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To the extent that the data do not resolve all the theoretical complexities of the 
therapy / enhancement distinction, the distinction remains ambiguous. Since my 
aim is to improve on previous theoretical accounts and clarify what would be, 
overall, the best application of theory in practice, a net balance between the two 
must be negotiated.  
Fortunately, despite the theoretical ambiguities still present, certain themes of 
ethical importance were discernible within the data in terms of the relationship 
between enhancement and medicine. These areas of consensus and agreement will 
therefore be used as the basis for developing conclusions and recommendations 
that are presented in the final chapter of the thesis. 
6.4) Health as ‘Adaptedness’ 
Areas of partial congruence between theory and data are evident. I will therefore 
examine one instance of partial congruence between theory and data and analyse 
the implications that follow from this relationship. For this example we will use 
Pörn’s (1993) theoretical characterisation of health as a state of ‘adaptedness’ 
relative to one’s goals. This is relevant because a corresponding view was voiced 
several times within the study, in particular by S2 and C6. S2, for example, 
compared the needs and ‘adaptedness’ of patients and sportsmen using EPO in the 
attainment of their goals: 
‘...if you're an eighty year old in a nursing home who sits in a bath chair all day 
watching afternoon television it actually doesn't matter so much that you're 
haemoglobin's low and you probably won't really notice that much difference if you 
correct it, but if you're a twenty two year old who wants to play football, well, it'll 
have a massive difference, and anything in between those two extremes’ 
EPO has a dramatically positive impact upon anaemia patients’ ability to meet the 
demands of everyday life (MacDougall et al, 1990; MacDougall, 2001). For athletes 
the margin of performance enhancement available is smaller, since they are 
already at or close to peak physical fitness. In elite sport, however, these small 
margins are valuable since they may make the difference between winning and 
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losing (Holm & McNamee, 2010; Savulescu & Foddy, 2010). In the case of EPO for 
enhancement by the averagely healthy person, however, C6 stated that the 
performance margins offered are unimportant, since: 
‘...simply being able to complete their tasks at work a minute quicker over the course 
of an eight hour day isn't really that relevant’ 
Consistent with Pörn’s account and in view of the above, one could argue that 
health should be cast as an agreement between capabilities and goals. Given that 
EPO use would make little difference to most healthy people’s ability to achieve 
their everyday goals,  ‘health’ could reasonably be understood as being naturally 
‘adapted’ sufficiently well relative to those goals. Importantly, however, the 
comments of S2 and C6 also underline deficiencies in Pörn’s account, as well as 
endorsing it in other respects.  
A professional cyclist will be in a state of exceptional physical fitness and 
(probably23) exceptionally good health even if, for example, he is unable to win the 
Tour de France without the use of performance enhancing drugs.  Yet Pörn’s 
theory implies that the natural inability to reach this goal means that we should 
identify the cyclist’s health as deficient, because his unassisted physical condition 
precludes him from meeting it: he is not sufficiently well ‘adapted’ to the task 
without assistance. Similarly, just because there is an ‘agreement’ between the 80 
year old person’s low haemoglobin count and limited physical goals, it does not 
mean we should conclude that this individual is healthy. 
If health is reduced simply to adaptedness in this way, the therapy / enhancement 
distinction dissolves. Any state may be considered ‘deficient’, depending on the 
correspondence between the person’s physical health and their goals. The example 
thus reveals a tension. We can infer from this that the ‘adaptedness’ account has 
some degree of utility in explaining the relationship between therapy and 
enhancement. However, insofar as it also produces inconsistencies when 
                                                          
23 Leaving aside for the time being that high level sport can in some cases be deleterious to health in 
the long run, for example if we bear in mind potential long-term damage to the body through 
exceptional exertion in the first half of life, and the threats to immunity that can be caused by constant 
exertion at the margins of human ability. 
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compared to views expressed within the data, it does not fully capture the therapy 
/ enhancement distinction as perceived from within the context of medical 
practice. 
I conclude that Pörn’s theory has weaknesses in view of the fact that it is not able 
to fully explain enhancement when considered in context. Therefore, any 
contextually successful account of enhancement should utilise those aspects of the 
‘adaptedness’ theory which have explanatory power, and reject those which limit 
it. Doing this will point towards what else is required in constructing a full account, 
and thus help to identify what features of this account are still missing. 
Having seen an example of how theory and data can be mutually analysed I will 
apply the same process to the other relevant data from the study. To begin forming 
the basis for some consensus or resolution of conflicting views and theories of the 
relationship between therapy and enhancement I will examine issues of moral 
relevance about which there was widespread agreement across the data.  
Irrespective of divergence in views concerning the logical coherence of the therapy 
/ enhancement distinction, the empirical study indicated three salient issues of 
ethical importance to all participants: Professionalism and Safety; Risks and 
Benefits; and Justice. In addition the data yielded a range of views concerning the 
reality and integrity of the philosophical distinction. An issue of importance to both 
the philosophical and ethical aspects of the debate which also arose in the study 
related to the concepts of naturalness and artificiality.  
Even though aspects of the therapy / enhancement distinction remain unclear, the 
three issues of moral relevance mentioned indicate what was of primary ethical 
importance to the participants from a clinical and research perspective. This is 
important because what they consider important may be different from what 
seems significant from a detached philosophical view. Taking into account what is 
ethically relevant for these professionals will help to frame preliminary 
hypotheses as to what conditions (if any) would have to obtain for enhancement to 
be an acceptable use of medical resources from their point of view.   
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6.5) Safety and Professionalism 
The two interconnected issues of safety and professionalism relate to norms of 
practice, since the socio-cultural norms and technological possibilities that prevail 
influence what is or is not expected of the medical profession within a given 
context (Benedict, 1934; Fabrega, 1991; Kleinman, 1997; Stempsey, 2006; 
Franklin, 2006). These norms are not static, and hence the content of one’s 
expectations of medical assistance may change over time according to the actual 
procedures available. As Fleischauer & Hermeren (2006, p. 10) explain, however, 
the contents will be expected to correspond to more fundamental goals that are 
broader and less transitive: 
‘Caring, curing, helping, and preventing...constitute the ends or internal goals of 
medicine...Under each of these overarching classical goals numerous specific 
operational goals can be discerned. These more specific goals are dependent on the 
state of scientific knowledge, technical achievements, and experience as well as on 
changing philosophical views and ideologies which in the course of history have 
resulted in different conceptions of disease.’ 
Arguments can be made both for and against enhancement in terms of how it may 
or may not serve these ‘classical’ goals. Strong pro-enhancement positions were 
not evident within the study. Irrespective of a spread of views being advanced 
concerning the logical coherence of the therapy / enhancement distinction, the 
need for a safe and beneficial balancing of concerns imposed a strong moral 
condition on appropriate accessibility in all cases. This condition was also adopted 
in pro-enhancement arguments within the literature (Allhoff, 2005; Greely et al, 
2008; Harris, 2009; Sandberg & Savulescu, 2011). Despite that in all of these cases 
the writers endorse the use of enhancements, they do so only on the condition that 
the risks associated with doing so are outweighed by the benefits. 
A conception of the responsibilities of the medical profession based in the four 
goals outlined was reflected widely within the data. EPO does not reverse renal 
anaemia, and in this respect it is not a cure for the condition itself. However, it does 
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safely ‘cure’ the symptoms of the illness when used carefully and results in 
dramatic improvements to life. For example S1 and C9 offered an account of the 
clinical use of EPO which show that it clearly assists in the realisation of the 
classical goals outlined: 
‘...they were disabled by their anaemia – they were tired, breathless, low exercise 
tolerance, unable to do normal things...you give them EPO all of a sudden all of those 
physical symptoms are alleviated...it is amazing really...It's an extraordinary 
achievement’ 
‘...the effects on quality of life were considered just obvious – if you saw people 
walking around with a haemoglobin of six and then had a haemoglobin of nine to 10 
the effects were dramatic...And there were lots of studies done...that showed that 
moving people from six or eight or whatever it was to nearer to 10 was associated 
with a major advantage’ 
If the kind of balance between safety and benefit outlined here are properly 
representative of key normative features of therapeutic medical practice, we may 
ask whether the same balance could be applied to instances of enhancement as 
well. The balance between the commitments to safety and beneficence in terms of 
the conditions of acceptability that they would impose on access to enhancements 
was summarised by C10: 
‘It’s a grey area - if you look at plastic surgery and things, it’s not something people 
need, so if there was a market for doctors to help people with performance enhancing 
drugs in a safe way then maybe there could be an area where you could be prescribed 
EPO. There are other things in medicine that are done for purely superficial reasons’ 
Beyond a certain threshold of risk it was unanimously deemed unacceptable for 
the medical profession to allow access to certain interventions, irrespective of 
whether the interventions would be understood as therapeutic or enhancing. This 
is congruent with the Hippocratic Oath’s insistence that a doctor must not harm his 
or her patients (Markel, 2004; Antoniou et al, 2010). Basic intransitive moral 
commitments of this kind are also canonical within scholarly work on the 
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principles of medical ethics (Beauchamp & Childress, 1976; Gillon, 1994; Gillon, 
2003; Pellegrino, 2005). 
Four articulations of this view were particularly relevant. C2 stated that the 10% 
risk of a stroke to a healthy 18 year old using EPO for performance enhancement 
was too high to permit access; C8 offered an analogy of non-medical EPO use with 
cosmetic plastic surgery, claiming that individuals seeking enhancement would be 
‘preyed upon’ by a sector of the profession for the financial gains available. S5 
claimed that EPO is simply too dangerous to de-regulate. S3 made used the 
example of Piriton – a hayfever medication sometimes used ‘off-label’ to enable 
children to sleep more easily – as an instance of a drug which is safe enough to de-
regulate for such purposes. He then contrasted it with EPO and made a justification 
for the difference in legal status of the two: 
‘I don’t have a moral objection to anybody using a medical product for a non-medical 
purpose, I think there’s a very clear philosophical and mental distinction in my mind 
between the two acts...but I can see there’s also a need to regulate medicines...some  
medicines that are on sale to the public...you can go along and buy Piriton, that does 
sometimes have non-medical usage as if you give it to kids they sleep well... it doesn’t 
do a great deal of harm so that’s a medicine that we don’t regulate, other medicines 
we do regulate for fairly good reasons because they’re dangerous or because they’re 
addictive, because they have more potential to do harm than good, because we don’t 
want them sold directly to the public, we don’t want a market created in them, and 
what EPO should fall into is probably that category’ 
In each case an important factor in determining the boundaries of ethical practice 
was the level of risk conferred by the different relevant factors that come to bear 
on the situation. This is a separate theoretical issue from whether or not it is in 
principle morally acceptable to use medicine for enhancement purposes. Positions 
such as this were advanced in the literature. Allhoff (2005), Cakic (2009), Bostrom 
& Sandberg (2009), Sandberg & Savulescu (2011) all argue that safety is a rational 
guiding principle for decisions about accessibility to medical interventions, 
whatever those interventions might be.  
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A corollary of this is that access to enhancements ought to be less ethically 
problematic if conditions of safety can be satisfied. Cakic (2009) also notes, 
however, that the foregrounding of safety can be construed as excessively 
paternalistic. He argues that whether or not a decision is considered to be 
excessively paternalistic depends on the threshold of personal risk about which 
the medical profession deems it acceptable for patients to make a judgement.  
6.5.1) Autonomy Vs Paternalism 
The tension here is one that has been institutionally visible in recent decades. The 
medical system – at least in places such as the UK (Stevenson & Scambler, 2005) 
and the USA (Kon, 2010) – has attempted to become less paternalistic, and to 
strike a balance of ‘shared decision making’ between professional advice and 
patient autonomy.  This reorientation was echoed in C1’s statement that currently 
‘people have much more of a say, are kind of stakeholders in medicine’. 
The driving ethical principle here is the autonomy of the patient. Assuming that we 
live in a liberal society wherein the protection of personal freedom is considered to 
have intrinsic ethical importance, it is a principle which should also be upheld 
within healthcare (Cohen, 2000). Juth (2010) claims that the degree of weight 
awarded to patient autonomy within medicine is proportionate to the value placed 
on it more generally within society. Since personal autonomy is highly valued in 
liberal societies (Gauthier, 1993; Etzioni, 2011; Juth, 2010), he argues that the 
same principles influence decision making in healthcare, thus changing what is 
perceived as an appropriate balance between the desires of the patient and the 
views of the doctor. 
This reorientation therefore invites fresh debate over the appropriate moral 
balance between the autonomous desires of those seeking medical assistance on 
one hand, and the responsibilities endowed upon those providing it on the other 
(Schwartz, 1992; Graber & Tansey, 2004). This is pertinent in respect of 
enhancement. For example a doctor may believe, if an individual desires a medical 
intervention which is not medically necessary and may damage health, that there 
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is a strong justification for refusing assistance irrespective of the fact that this may 
thwart the autonomous desire of the person seeking it. In the case of EPO the study 
participants frequently adduced the dangers of extra-therapeutic uses of the drug 
as a scenario in which this would be justifiable. C5 offered the following 
justification in relation to the salient issue of EPO for enhancement in sports: 
‘If the rules were just ’allow athletes to use EPO’ harm would come - athletes would 
overdo it, and make their blood count too thick, and then get strokes and thromboses 
and things and that would be very bad, so there is a sort of pragmatic reason why we 
wouldn’t just open the floodgates’ 
Given certain conditions, therefore, a justification for medical paternalism may be 
evident, since if patients were permitted to make decisions that would harm them 
this would be an abrogation of the doctor’s duty to care. Following Loewy (2005) 
in extending this argument, if a medical decision were sanctioned that does turn 
out to be harmful this may threaten the patient’s autonomy in the long run. 
Recognition of the tension between autonomy and paternalism emerged within the 
study. A typical reaction to this, from C12, advocated seeking some balance 
between the two according to a model of what Entwhistle (2010) have also called 
‘shared decision making’: 
‘Autonomy is not, cannot be the cardinal value or the be-all-and-end-all. It cannot 
be... if you give someone a kind of consumerist kind of autonomy you leave them high 
and dry, you give them information but you don’t give them support, and you also 
can’t deliver on that if they choose to do things you don’t want to do or can’t 
afford...to what I would have in the middle, which is what I’d call...shared decision 
model, where you combine the patient’s expertise in their existence, if you like, with 
the clinical expertise in disease management...’ 
Given EPO’s risk profile at supra-normal haemoglobin levels, for example, no 
participant fully endorsed its deregulation for enhancement purposes. When 
abstracted from the EPO case, however, there was some degree of recognition in 
principle for a more liberal view. S6 stated that, assuming the use of a medical 
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product for enhancement would have no negative societal impact and was paid for 
by the user rather than the state, no moral objection would remain in principle. 
According to his view ‘the individual has to weigh up the risk and benefit’, rather 
than the doctor. In these circumstances C11 suggested that the medical profession 
should not police all aspects of behaviour which may be personally harmful to 
individuals, and that ‘we can’t live in a nanny state’.  S3 also defended in principle 
the right to enhance using a product such as EPO if one’s personal circumstances 
necessitated it: 
‘...supposing you did a very hard job, a very tough physical job, and you had no choice 
but to do that job, and EPO would make you better at doing that job, make your daily 
grind a bit more tolerable, then I don’t see why you wouldn’t use it’  
The position adopted here by S3 is of central relevance to the ethical debate about 
enhancement. Central to this view is the recognition that someone may be healthy 
but nevertheless have a legitimate need relative to their circumstances that could 
be met via medical assistance. This is the basis on which Daniels (2000), Savulescu 
(2006), Bostrom & Roache (2008), Harris (2009), and Sandberg & Savulescu 
(2011) have constructed their arguments in favour of allowing access to 
enhancements. It does not follow from the professional judgement that someone is 
healthy according to present criteria of illness or disease that their needs could not 
be met using medical means.  
S3’s statement is consistent with the position advanced by the authors listed above 
that someone may be healthy but nevertheless be deficient relative to their 
circumstances. This is a conception of needs that is vindicated by a critical realist 
approach, as in its commitment to a mind-independent ontology it holds that the 
world will impose constraints on us that cannot be removed simply by 
epistemologically reconceptualising our account of it (Bhaskar, 1975; Sayer, 2000; 
Easton, 2010). Whether or not the needs of the person in S3’s example are 
considered ‘medical’ has no effect by itself on the fact that the person is physically 
limited relative to his circumstances without assistance.  
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S3 suggested that it would in principle be reasonable for the person in his example 
to seek and receive medical assistance. This position adopts a balance between 
autonomy and paternalism that does not stop with a decision not to assist 
following a clinical judgement that no ‘medical need’ is present. Rather it accepts 
that there may be cases in which an autonomous desire to enhance can be 
perceived as reasonable and acceptable in principle from a medical professional 
perspective. 
6.6) Risks and Benefits 
Irrespective of the degree of theoretical sympathy displayed towards enhancement 
in general, in the case of EPO a widely held view was that the risks associated with 
its use for enhancement is too great for its use sanctioned for these purposes. Thus 
some degree of paternalism was favoured in employing the ‘doctor knows best’ 
model described earlier by C1. This implies the view that the moral acceptability of 
enhancement is not uniform, and is dependent on relevant factors related to risk 
which pertain on a case-by-case basis. 
6.6.1) Contextual Determinants  
A balancing of contingent risks and benefits in individual cases was a significant 
determinant of moral status. Quotes from C1 and C2 provide examples of this 
attitude: 
‘...just because you can buy Viagra on the internet does that mean we should just sell 
Viagra in Boots? The answer is no, because some people would harm themselves with 
it...there are there are examples where relaxing prescribing restrictions might be 
good...for instance something like the morning after pill is probably a good example 
of that. Is it a good thing to make the morning after pill more accessible? I would say 
if it reduces unwanted pregnancies in teenage girls yes it probably is...’ 
‘I think you have to take a case by case basis and the scenario of the individual and 
the society - what’s the impact, what’s the short term and what’s the long term…?’ 
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Consistent with this approach S11 rejected ‘a blanket principle about how [people] 
should and shouldn’t use drugs’, and that, with respect to certain unspecified health 
choices ‘there is a degree of autonomy that people need to be allowed to make those 
choices’.  S3 implied that the use of enhancements is in fact to some degree normal, 
stating that ‘in normal life it’s not a problem...we all use drugs and different things at 
certain times’. S9 acknowledged as acceptable and ‘perfectly understandable’ that 
individuals may wish to alter aspects of themselves with which they are unhappy 
and if it is possible to do so, even if they have no clear medical need to do so. 
Each example here endorses the views of Caplan & McHugh (2004), Kamm (2006), 
and Kahane (2011) that the moral status of enhancement in general should not be 
assumed before taking into account the context of specific instances of it. Hence 
they recommend that judgements must be balanced, and achieve some level of 
rational equilibrium. S11 implied that since each case will be different, so the 
appropriate response will differ correspondingly, and that personal autonomy 
must be adopted as a consideration within any judgement. S3 suggested that some 
attempt at consistency must be made between medical decision making and the 
freedoms that we are able to enjoy outside of a medical context. S9 recognised that 
clinical judgements must take account of the fact that certain desires for self-
modification or improvement in those who are not necessarily considered to be ill 
are reasonable and comprehensible.  
6.6.2) Limits of Practice 
We can pursue the implications of S3 and S11’s position concerning the ‘normality’ 
of the desire for improvement by examining related claims made by C2, C5, S6, and 
S8. In relation to what falls inside and outside of the ‘medical gaze’ (Foucault, 
1963), these four suggested in different ways that whether someone should or 
should not be permitted to access enhancements is a question which currently falls 
outside the remit of most medical professionals. 
C2 argued that, institutionally speaking, medicine typically aims to rectify 
statistically abnormal functioning in individuals who ‘fall outside the norm’ when 
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compared to ‘95% of the population’. Since, by contrast, statistically normal 
functioning was not considered to generate a need, a corollary of this is that 
decisions concerning the prescription of enhancements would on a current view of 
its responsibilities be external to the medical professional. Developing this S6 
offered the following suggestion: 
‘Your question of enhancement in the normal population or in someone that wants to 
do it for the fun of it, that really shouldn’t be up to us because we’re doctors, we’re 
physicians, we treat people that are ill, so that’s our concern. People who are well, 
maybe there should be another group of people who deal with those, because 
ethically we’re not trained for that’  
This implies a belief that it is intrinsic to the profession of medicine that it treats 
deficiency. The claim here is that, whilst it is incumbent on the medical profession 
to provide benefits for people who fall within certain agreed parameters of need, 
they are not responsible for making decisions about assistance that fall outside of 
these parameters, irrespective of the potential benefits. C6’s suggested response to 
this challenge in the form of a parallel service providing enhancements has been 
considered within the literature (Chaterjee, 2004; Pellegrino, 2004; Goffete, 2006) 
as a possible outcome of a proliferation in enhancement technologies. 
The suggestion being made by S6 is understandable and defensible as far as it goes. 
It is nevertheless vulnerable to critiques which show that no absolute line can be 
established between cases which it would and would not be incumbent on the 
medical profession to consider.  The reason for this is that it presupposes already 
having come to a settled conclusion about what counts as the difference between 
health and illness, and therefore by extension, the difference between therapy and 
enhancement. As we have seen in Bess’ (2010) ‘moving target’ account, however, it 
is not clear how this can be done with any degree of permanence. 
It is legitimate for medical practitioners to reject the consideration of a moral 
dilemma on the basis that it is too distantly connected to current medical practice 
to be relevant at present. However, since the norms which sanction these practices 
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may not remain static, there is no guarantee that the boundaries of practice can be 
insulated from having to adopt these new norms indefinitely (Mechanic, 1973; 
Hesslow, 1993; Stempsey, 2006; Serna, 2012) 
6.6.3) Ambivalence 
I showed in the literature review that a study by Hotze et al (2011) is to date the 
only major empirical study on attitudes of physicians towards the prescription of 
enhancements. The study found that around two thirds of the participants were 
ambivalent towards the use of enhancements in principle (Ibid. p. 8), assuming 
that they are safe to use and equally accessible to all. Significantly, just over half of 
the participants believed that most medical interventions could themselves be 
construed as enhancements (Ibid. p. 8). The first of these findings, namely 
ambivalence with respect to enhancement in principle, was reflected unanimously 
within the EPO study. Moreover, similar conditions of risks and benefits were 
adduced as countervailing reasons that would influence the moral status of a 
decision to provide or allow enhancement. 
The presence of ambivalence amongst medical professionals has two implications. 
Firstly, despite the institutional parameters which circumscribe practice, the 
identification of a strong distinction between therapy and enhancement is shown 
to present a challenge. This challenge is not restricted only to philosophers 
concerned explicitly with logical classifications of this kind, but to those engaged in 
medical practice as well. I qualify this observation, however, in stating that it was 
only a challenge to the participants in conceptual terms when they reflected on the 
issue theoretically. The theoretical challenge did not affect their work in practical 
terms.  
Secondly, Wasson (Ibid, p. 22), in her response to Hotze et al, argues that in view of 
the difficulty in clearly separating therapy from enhancement, questions 
concerning the medical legitimacy of enhancements ‘will not go away’. Wasson 
argues that the therapy / enhancement ambiguity will continue to exert pressure 
on the institutional boundaries of medicine and the extent to which they do or not 
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serve a sufficiently broad range of ends, because the kinds of developments that 
enhancement appears to offer are likely to be desirable to many. 
A similar view concerning their desirability is also advanced elsewhere (Chaterjee, 
2004; Pellegrino, 2004). If Wasson’s analysis with respect to autonomy is correct, 
we see the relevance of society’s expectations of medicine to its institutional 
character. Participants C1, C9, and S11 made reference to this in different ways. C9 
stated that ‘society evolves a choice’ about what it wants from healthcare; S11 
similarly stated that ‘the whole thing has evolved...it’s all historical’; and C1 claimed 
that: 
‘...medicine operates within society and...what we do as doctors or healthcare 
professionals is influenced by what society deems to be acceptable and appropriate, 
and the way that doctors have behaved has changed in the past few decades’ 
Implicit here is the claim that the institutional character of medicine is partially 
determined by an agreement between: the kinds of services society wants, expects, 
or desires; the kinds of services and benefits the medical infrastructure is willing 
to provide; and the temporality of medical technological developments which 
determine what is possible.  To the extent that this agreement plays a role in 
defining what institutional form medicine ought to take, society’s expectation of 
healthcare must play a role in determining what medicine institutionally does and 
does not sanction, and those states of relative health for which it is considered 
reasonable to receive assistance. It is clear that norms of health are not static, and 
that these are connected closely to changes in social norms. Thus, these changes 
must play a role in the practices that constitute what is and is not medically 
available given a particular context.  
6.7) Justice 
6.7.1) Private and Public Access to Enhancements 
Vos & Willems (2000) claim that what one may reasonably expect is causally 
connected to what is technologically possible and available. In turn what is 
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available is influenced by a range of factors, one of which is market pressure. The 
pressure that this exerts is ethically contentious since it may have a bearing on the 
just allocation of resources according to need, as Shickle (2000), Koch (2010), 
Fukuyama (2002) and others argue. Pellegrino (2004) has argued that widening 
subsidisation to include enhancements would threaten the ethical integrity of 
medicine, since the extra pressure exerted on limited resources may warp their 
just allocation.  
One alternative might be to allow only private access to enhancements, so as not to 
divert public resources away from those with more severe needs. Indeed it is 
improbable that all enhancements could ever be state-subsidised, so were 
enhancements to be legalised some stratum of private provision seems inevitable. 
A persistent objection to the private availability of enhancement technologies 
within the literature is that the benefits would accrue to those who could afford 
them, and limited medical resources may be diverted away from those who need 
them the most (Fukuyama, 2002; Pellegrino, 2004; Koch, 2010).  This worry was 
reflected in the study. Examples from C1 and S2 illustrate this: 
 ‘...if you want to make it freely available you would then see the diversion of 
resources into something that was of little demonstrable benefit, and away from 
areas of healthcare perhaps where we could say this is clearly a good thing’ 
‘What do I think about people buying something that we wouldn't normally offer 
them on the National Health Service? Well that depends on the fundamental reason 
why we wouldn't normally offer them – is it because we think it is of no benefit to 
them, or is it because we think the benefit is not one that the National Health Service 
can afford? If we genuinely think that the thing might be deleterious or of no benefit 
then I think people who might be persuaded by less scrupulous to spend their money 
on acquiring those things need to be educated that there really is no point...I would 
like some system in which somebody else who couldn't afford that would also benefit 
in turn...’ 
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This criticism was voiced within the study by C1, C5, C8, C13, and S2. Given that 
some enhancements would inevitably be available only privately, this model is 
likely to obtain if enhancement were to proliferate. This entails a system in which 
availability of enhancements is split between the public (state-subsidised) and 
private sectors. If such a system were implemented, in which the focus of resource 
allocation is the improvement of conditions for the worst off rather than restricting 
the liberty of the better off, it would imply a prioritarian model of distribution 
(Parfit, 1997; Brown, 2007; Arneson, 2000).   
6.7.2) Enhancement and Prioritarianism 
The principle guiding prioritarianism is that benefits to the less well off are more 
important than to those who are better off, and must therefore take priority (Parfit, 
1997; Brown, 2007). Rather than attempting to achieve this by curtailing the 
freedoms of the better-off, the primary aim therefore would be the provision of 
enhancements for people with the greatest need. Thereafter a secondary aim 
would be the realisation of conditions under which everyone else could become 
better off (Savulescu, 2006) and enhance themselves if they wished. Both pro and 
anti-enhancement positions can be advanced in response to this.  
One way to understand this is to start at the observation that treatment thresholds 
for EPO have changed. P1 reported that a constant reduction in the price of the 
drug has meant that ‘over the past ten years we have seen a massive transformation 
from it being very restricted to it being freely available’. This reduction in turn 
means that it has become possible to treat more patients at a lower threshold of 
severity, and consequently it can be administered before patients develop 
symptoms that make them feel unwell. As S1 explained: 
‘...we have a whole anaemia service...they have huge block contracts with 
manufacturers...nowadays we don't allow anyone to become anaemic. We will 
introduce the EPO before they start to feel unwell, before the haemoglobin gets too 
low...they'll never come to us and say “wow that's great stuff, you really made me feel 
better”...we will have stopped them becoming ill and they'll never be aware of that’ 
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This demonstrates the causal influence of market forces upon the generation of 
new norms. The new norm has brought the initial treatment threshold closer to 
the point at which an intervention would be considered ‘enhancing’ rather than 
‘therapeutic’. This observation lends support the arguments made by Lin & Allhoff 
(2008) and Scripko (2009) that enhancement is an unavoidable concomitant of 
advances in therapy, since in seeking to reduce or eliminate causes of ill-health 
these advances, when successful, necessarily bring about new norms in terms of 
what one can reasonably expect when receiving medical assistance. The new norm 
in this case has increased overall access to EPO for people with anaemia, thus 
reducing prioritarian injustices in cases where a decision must be made between 
two people with anaemia of differing severity. As C7 observed regarding allocation 
of EPO shortly after its introduction: 
‘10 people got EPO and if you were the eleventh you had to wait for someone to be 
transplanted or die before you could have it...tangibly an unfair situation’ 
If maximising the benefit to all those in need is a legitimate goal of justice, it 
follows from C7’s statement that the cost reduction in EPO has contributed to its 
realisation. For example, if we were to consider these kinds of decisions about 
enhancements from a Rawlsian perspective (Allhoff, 2005) behind the ‘veil of 
ignorance’ (Rawls, 1971), it would be rational to prefer to be in a system in which 
the cost of an enhancement was sufficiently low that as many people who could 
benefit were able to do so. Following this, a prioritarian approach may suggest 
some conditions under which the inclusion of enhancements within the medical 
framework could be justified (Parfit, 1997, p. 214): 
‘...if I am worse off than you, benefits to me matter more. Is this because I am worse 
off than you? In one sense, yes. But this has nothing to do with my relation to 
you...benefits to the worse off matter more, but that is only because these people are 
at a lower absolute level. It is irrelevant that these people are worse off than others. 
Benefits to them would matter just as much even if there were no others who were 
better off’ 
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Imagine the following scenario. Person A has serious renal anaemia and needs EPO 
to meet the normal tasks of daily living. Person B does not have renal anaemia and 
can meet most of the normal tasks of daily living, but has a physically arduous job 
and would derive a valuable performance benefit from using EPO. If there are 
sufficient resources to supply EPO to both, no injustice would accrue to A simply 
because, having received it, he would be unable to engage in the same kind of 
employment as B. 
Consequently situations can be conceived in which a drug could justly be 
administered for both therapeutic and enhancement purposes, were sufficient 
resources available. Both A and B would benefit from being enhanced from and to 
different physiological baselines, and yet A, whose functioning remains weaker, 
does not suffer any injustice. This is because the benefit that he receives is 
absolutely valuable, rather than being merely instrumentally valuable because it 
confers a positional advantage over someone else. 
It is relevant here to recall S3’s justification for the enhancement use of EPO in 
certain circumstances, that if someone had a job that was especially physically 
arduous ‘and EPO would make you better at doing that job...then I don’t see why you 
wouldn’t use it’. Although justifications for the enhancement use of EPO were 
limited and conditional, the conditions stipulated by S3 under which it may be 
acceptable are consistent with a prioritarian approach to their use.  
6.7.3) Calibrating the Market and Limiting Injustice 
Earlier I reported the criticisms made of the market by P1, C3, C4, C6 and C7 in 
relation to its effect on justice. For example C7 claimed that ‘if all doctors were 
ethical people there wouldn't be very much doping’. C5 asserted that ‘no-one’s clean 
in this business’. If their criticisms are reasonable we may have grounds to believe 
the warnings of Parens (1995), Fukuyama (2002), Kass (2003), and Sandel (2004) 
that a private market in enhancements could be corrosive to distributive justice. In 
particular Parens’ ‘schmocters’ (1998) are a concern. These are medical 
professionals providing private enhancement medicine services according to 
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ability to pay, rather than according to severity of need. These practitioners are 
analogous to private cosmetic surgeons, however worries about their practices 
would be proportionally greater if the enhancements that they provide confer on 
the recipient an advantage that could be used for gaining a positional advantage 
over other people. 
The pro-enhancement prioritarian case advanced is predicated on successfully 
being able to harness the market in such a way that it produces just distributive 
ends, irrespective of whether ‘schmocters’ would take advantage of the legalisation 
of enhancement products. The case to the contrary, however, remains sceptical of 
the possibility of achieving this in practice. In relation to EPO specifically C10 was 
sceptical as to the wisdom of extending legal access to include enhancement uses: 
‘People use drugs used for ADD for concentration but they get them on the black 
market, so maybe there’s a market for them to be sold by private doctors – it could be 
something like that, like EPO...there could be a market for it but...there would need to 
be a lot of regulation, and there could be problems with it as well’ 
In relation to enhancement more generally, C8’s earlier remark is pertinent again 
here concerning the risks to fair allocation, were access to enhancements 
permitted. His objection is understandable, since medical resources are always 
limited, and as Nordenfelt (2001) points out, there will only ever be so much that 
any system of subsidised medical care can provide. This is particularly true of 
countries such as the UK with universal, state-funded, healthcare. Given finite 
resources there will always have to be a titration of those resources according to 
need. 
What is problematic, however is that, as C2 explained, ‘there’s always going to be 
this two or two and a half percent outside’ the range of normal statistical 
distribution. Consequently, wherever the treatment threshold lies, it is arguable 
that some injustice will always accrue to that percentage of individuals who are 
denied assistance. If this is true then it would not be possible to eliminate the 
possibility that an analogously ‘tangibly unfair situation’ such as C7 described in 
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relation to historic EPO rationing could occur, however much the boundaries of 
assistance were to be extended. It follows from the finitude of resources that some 
people will always be considered ineligible for help. 
Bess (2000) demonstrates this in a thought experiment involving two boys of 
equal height but of short stature, both of whom are seeking treatment with growth 
hormone. One boy’s shortness is the result of a hormone deficiency caused by a 
prior brain tumour, the other is ‘naturally’ short. The doctor agrees to treat the boy 
with the hormone deficiency, since his shortness has been caused by disease, but 
refuses to treat the other because the cause of his short stature is non-pathological. 
In our society it is advantageous for men that they are tall. Increased height is 
associated with greater mating potential, higher social status, and higher earnings 
(Bostrom & Roache, 2008). If it is important that opportunity is distributed as 
equally across members of a society as possible, and if height is advantageous for 
men, then there is a prima facie justification for allowing both members of the pair 
to increase their height to closer to the norm, since this ought to provide them with 
at least an average opportunity in respect of the advantages of height. Daniels 
(2000, p. 312) points out how such cases are problematic: 
‘Does the concept of disease underlying the treatment-enhancement distinction force 
us to treat relatively similar cases in dissimilar ways? Are we violating the old 
Aristotelian requirement that justice requires treating like cases similarly? Is 
dissimilar treatment unfair or unjust?’ 
I will feed this analysis into the present example. If one were to deny a healthy 
person access to EPO or some other product that could assist them in normal life, 
one could argue that this would count as discrimination of the same kind as the 
doctor who refuses to assist the non-pathologically short boy. In doing so the risk 
would be a failure to respect the demands placed on him and the environment in 
which he finds himself. Even though it might be possible to enhance his 
functioning, he would be prohibited from doing so because it is not deemed 
medically necessary, not because of an absence of need as such.  As I have stated, 
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unconditional endorsement of the enhancement use of EPO was not evident within 
the study. However, there were instances which indicated some degree of 
recognition for the principle being explored by Daniels. S2 expressed this as 
follows: 
‘...each of those are technologies that allow people to do things that they couldn't do 
without technology, and if the erythropoietin allows people to do things they couldn't 
do without it then that may be an advantage if it's really important that they do 
those things...’ 
In this example the ethical acceptability of assisting is not cast as dependent upon 
whether it is an ‘enhancement’ or a ‘therapy’, but upon the question of whether 
some wider equilibrium between risks, benefits, and justice obtains. A further 
relevant perspective on the kind of argument that Daniels makes was also offered 
by C11: 
‘...if the bulk of the population can run up one flight of stairs, and somebody’s 
anaemic and can barely crawl up one flight of stairs then it’s reasonable to give them 
medication that will enable them to at least walk up the stairs, even if maybe they 
can’t run up them’ 
C11’s quote does not pertain specifically to enhancement uses of EPO, but 
nevertheless it is analogous to Daniels’ argument. Here the justification for 
providing assistance is grounded in the observation that even if to do so would not 
enable the recipient to perform at the highest possible level, it would at least 
reduce the disparity in their ability relative to the majority of society. If this 
justification is reasonable, there are grounds for accepting Daniels’ conclusion that 
the cause of the boy’s limited stature is irrelevant. Insofar as to increase his height 
closer to the mean would improve his life there is a prima facie reason for 
assisting, whether or not his height would entail this assistance to be classified as 
‘therapeutic’ or ‘enhancing’. 
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6.7.4) Biological Inequalities 
Sandberg & Savulescu (2011) offer a sustained defence of enhancement that is 
congruent with this aspect of the debate. They ground their defence in the 
observation that the natural distribution of capabilities is uneven. An observation 
of this kind was made by S2 in his straightforward claim that ‘we are not 
fundamentally equal’.  
However, the argument being discussed here stands in contrast to the ‘arms race’ 
position of Sandel (2004), Koch (2010), and Fukuyama (2002). Their 
interpretation is that the liberty to enhance would exacerbate, rather than reduce, 
existing inequalities since the benefits would accrue to the rich. Proponents of this 
line of argument also hold that if enhancement were sufficiently widespread it 
would result in a devaluation of given ability, since individuals would feel coerced 
to enhance themselves in order to ‘keep up’ (Chandler, 2012). 
There is indeed evidence in the case of strictly rule-governed activities such as 
competitive sport that worries of this kind are legitimate (Mignon, 2003; 
Schneider, 2006;). Objections consistent with this were articulated in the study. S2 
expressed concern that the introduction of enhancements to sport is likely to exert 
coercive pressure on athletes to do so, and that this ‘creates a downward spiral in 
terms of behaviour’. Similarly C4 offered an argument grounded more explicitly in 
the ethical problems associated with economic disparities in access to 
enhancements: 
‘...if you’re using it for competitive purposes, the chances are your income is related to 
your success, and your income is inversely related to your payment...you’re cheating 
your competitors out of their income...’ 
In relation to this concern over justice in access C8’s earlier statement concerning 
their widespread private availability of enhancements is relevant once again in 
stating that ‘I philosophically don’t like the idea of there being better access to any 
sort of healthcare dependent on ability to pay’. This kind of economically-grounded 
objection can be responded to, however, by pointing out that such a worry 
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concerns the system of distribution for enhancements, rather than the 
enhancements themselves. Allhoff (2005, p. 44) has made this argument in relation 
to genetic enhancements and the differences between libertarian and Rawlsian 
models of distribution: 
‘...the obvious point is that genetic enhancement procedures alone will not lead to 
unjust results...If we can determine what constitutes a just distributive scheme, then 
genetic enhancement...can be distributed according to the principles of that scheme’ 
EPO is one of few products with a relevant history of enhancement use. This 
history has been ethically troublesome, since it has only been used for cheating by 
those athletes with the means to access it. It does not follow from this, however, 
that biomedical enhancement as such is ethically contrary to justice. This can be 
seen if we consider the following statement from S2 in relation to the conditions 
under which one should or should not be permitted access to biomedical 
enhancements: 
‘...what do you do about the 20 stone rugby forward versus the 15 stone rugby 
forward? What do I do about the fact that I need glasses to read anything?...there are 
all sorts of things like this that just aren't equal and at what point do you say “we'll 
normalise these ones, but we can't normalise those ones”?’  
In both examples inequality exists, and normalisation is construed as eliminating 
the inequality between the individuals by enhancing each relatively deficient 
individual.  Whilst it is uncontroversial to receive a prescription for glasses to 
correct sub-normal vision, it is not clear that medical assistance would be available 
for the 15 stone rugby player wishing to increase muscle mass, despite the fact that 
he may be at a relative disadvantage. 
Two ways to adjudicate present themselves. The first is by appeal to the existing 
criteria for medical treatment, and yet these are, as we have seen, contingently 
defined. Given the vulnerability of accounts of normal functioning to change, the 
criteria provide no a priori justification for weighing only in favour of assistance 
for eyesight enhancement, only a conventional one, despite the presence of a 
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relative need in both cases. Consequently, assuming it were possible to implement 
the mechanisms for ensuring access to enhancements to those who would derive 
the greatest benefit from them, the ends of justice may be served by being open 
rather than closed to the possibility of allowing the use of certain enhancements.  
A second way to adjudicate would be by reference to the contextual difference 
between the two. In the case of the rugby player, to intervene may enhance the 
lighter player’s chance of success in the match. It may, therefore, potentially make 
the difference between winning and losing. In the case of poor eyesight no single 
issue of victory is at stake in the same way. To have one’s eyesight enhanced may 
no doubt confer an advantage, but it is not obvious that the advantage is gained at 
someone else’s expense. This insight is redolent of the thought experiments of 
Daniels (2000) and Bess (2010) concerning the two short boys, as well as the 
assumptions of priotarianism (Parfit, 1997, Brown, 2007). 
6.7.5) Enhancement, Competition, and Variable Moral Status 
This observation relates to an important ethical issue which arose in both the 
literature and the study – namely, that of justice with respect to competition. 
Whether or not an enhancement is or is not morally permissible may depend in 
part on the nature of the activity being engaged in, and whether or not its use has 
been explicitly forbidden. The use of biomedical enhancements in sport is objected 
to on the basis that it confers an unfair advantage over the non-user, and that 
insofar as it does so it constitutes cheating, which is morally objectionable. As 
Greely et al claim (2008, p. 703): 
‘In the context of sports, pharmacological performance enhancement is indeed 
cheating. But, of course, it is cheating because it is against the rules’ 
The use of EPO, for example, by cyclists in cases such as that of Lance Armstrong24 
and David Millar25 has been widely condemned on this basis. This condemnation is 
                                                          
24 http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/18/sports/cycling/lance-armstrong -confesses-to-using-drugs-
butwithout-details.html?_r=0 
25
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/hardtalk/9571648.stm 
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based on the existence in sport of ‘regulative rules’. Schermer (2008) holds that it 
is only the presence or absence of a regulative rule which affects the ethical status 
of enhancement in sport. She argues that since not all conceivable means of 
maximising or enhancing performance are forbidden, it can only be considered 
ethically problematic to engage in those that are. To explicitly forbid EPO in sport 
makes its clandestine use morally unacceptable, since (typically) athletes compete 
voluntarily, and in doing so tacitly agree not to break those rules. According to this 
argument, it is cheating in the sense of breaking a rule which is unethical, not 
enhancement as such. 
A widespread condemnation of enhancement in sport was evident across the study 
for reasons consistent with Schermer’s argument. This condemnation was typically 
unequivocal. S9, for example stated that: 
‘I don’t approve of breaking the law, so when there’s a law against using drugs in 
sport I think the law should be obeyed’ 
C7 offered an equally unambiguous criticism: 
‘...you're a professional sportsman and that is the rules of your professional sport and 
if you don't stick to them it's cheating and therefore it's bad’ 
A distinction was frequently drawn, however, between the use of enhancements in 
‘competitive’ and ‘non-competitive’ scenarios. The most common reference made 
was to the notion of a ‘level playing field’ in sport, and the moral importance of 
protecting it (C1, C4, C5, C7, S1, S2, S5). Thus, one way to distinguish between 
acceptable and unacceptable use of enhancements may be by reference to the 
context. In rule-governed scenarios such as sport where one person’s success 
entails another person’s loss, if the use of a product is explicitly forbidden, then 
there is a prima facie reason to state that a doctor should not provide it and the 
sportsperson should not use it, since the advantage that this confers will be unfair. 
This is the kind of justification adduced in the two examples just given. 
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If, by contrast, the circumstances are such that a performance enhancement 
advantage can be achieved without any apparent corresponding loss to someone 
else, a principled objection to the prescription and use of an enhancement is more 
difficult to defend. This line of argument has been made within the literature by 
Allhoff (2005) and Harris (2009) who argue that enhancement could only be 
ethically unacceptable to the extent that it causes harm or produces injustices. A 
view of this kind was advanced in particular by C10, C12, S2, S3, and S6 to the 
effect that, all other things being equal, if the use of enhancement will not result in 
an unfair advantage leading to an injustice, it is not obvious that its use would be 
morally unacceptable. C12, for example, stated that: 
‘I don’t have an intrinsic moral objection to someone taking a drug in and of itself, 
the moral objections come if they’re taking the drug to gain an advantage over other 
people unfairly’ 
Similarly, C11 drew a distinction between competitive and non-competitive uses: 
‘...if you have three glasses of wine and you feel more relaxed at the end of that it’s not 
that different to taking some EPO and giving yourself a bit of a boost...you could have 
the argument that some people really want to have the stimulation and the buzz and 
they understand the risks and they’re prepared to do it and pay for it, but it shouldn’t 
be part of competitive sport’ 
A contrast is evident here when reconsidering the earlier examples of beta-
blockers for reducing nervousness in professional musicians in the absence of an 
anxiety disorder (S11); and the hypothetical use of EPO by a healthy individual 
with a very arduous job (S3). In both cases an enhancement would be used by 
professionals to gain an advantage in their work, and would be justified on this 
basis. However, one can argue that maintaining one’s employment is inherently 
competitive (Capp, 2011; Temkin, 2012; Chandler, 2012). If this is true it 
underlines a nuance present in the conditions that constitute ethically acceptable 
use. Sahakian & Morein-Zamir (2010, p. 200) make the following claim concerning 
competitive circumstances. The claim relates specifically to cognitive 
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enhancement, however in addressing competitive circumstances it is more widely 
relevant:  
‘Another concern is that the use of cognitive enhancers may be considered cheating, 
allocating an unfair advantage over others in particular circumstances such as in 
competitive situations or test taking’ 
This claim is problematic because it assumes that competitive environments are 
homogeneous, and it does not allow for differences between scenarios that might 
alter the moral status of the use of an enhancement.  Many normal circumstances 
in life are competitive to some extent, but the use of enhancement is not ethically 
uniform across them. The examples relating to work given by S11 and S3 are cases 
in point. In these examples it is not obvious that the provision of an enhancement 
is necessarily ethically unacceptable, because the fact that it could assist these 
individuals in meeting the demands of their job is an adequate justification for 
providing it. In this respect the fact that keeping one’s job may be competitive does 
not, by itself, count against the ethical acceptability of prescribing or using an 
enhancement to help in doing so. 
One might object that this conclusion is too general because the jobs themselves 
are clearly different, and thus heterogeneous not just with the work of the 
professional athlete, but with each other. S3’s labourer would use EPO simply to 
boost his or her endurance in a physically intensive manual job, whereas S11’s 
musician is being assisted in what he or she has been highly trained to do. The 
difficulty with this view, however, is that despite the jobs being different, to appeal 
to the level of skill required for doing the job as a reason to provide an 
enhancement in only one of the two cases would be discriminatory. This would 
arbitrarily favour one of the pair whilst penalising the other on the basis of the 
physical capabilities or skills that they do or do not happen to have. 
Equally the two may appear disanalogous because clear beneficiaries are present 
in the S11’s musician case that are absent in the case of S3’s labourer. If using beta-
blockers improved the musician’s performance by enhancing his or her ability to 
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deal with the pressure of the situation this would presumably increase the 
audience’s enjoyment. Again, it is not clear why the labourer should be denied 
assistance and discriminated against. In this instance he or she is being penalised 
arbitrarily for having a job with an insufficient number of obvious and immediate 
beneficiaries. Discrimination of this kind would be still more unjust if it turned out 
that the labourer had dependents. If this were the case then more-or-less 
immediate beneficiaries would be present and it would be irrelevant here that the 
kind of benefits that they receive would be socio-economic rather than the 
aesthetic benefits experienced by the audience. 
Despite the differences between these two cases, a competitive element is present 
in each. If the analysis of these cases is correct it therefore highlights a nuance in 
the relationship between competition and the moral status of enhancement that 
should be made clear. For example ‘work’ is a heterogeneous category, because 
forms of work are diverse. It is reasonably straightforward to judge, as C11 does, 
that it is wrong for a professional cyclist to use EPO in the competitive 
circumstances of his or her work because it is explicitly forbidden in an activity 
that is entered voluntarily. Judgements are less obvious in relation to S11’s 
musician seeking performance enhancement via beta-blockers or S3’s labourer 
seeking it via EPO. 
Although the context of professional employment supplies some element of 
competition, it is not obvious why it would be wrong for either the musician or the 
labourer to enhance themselves. It is also unclear, despite this similarity, whether 
the other factors supervening on the two competitive scenarios affect the moral 
acceptability of allowing or denying enhancement in each case. The most that we 
can conclude, therefore, is that if it is acceptable to enhance oneself in some 
competitive environments, then the presence of competitive circumstances as such 
cannot be adduced as a reason why allowing access to enhancements might be 
unjust in the way that Sahakian & Morein-Zamir suggest. 
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6.8) Naturalness and Artificiality 
The concept of ‘the natural’ is ineffective on its own for distinguishing between 
morally acceptable and unacceptable uses of medical technology, since as 
Savulescu (2006, p. 11) notes, ‘nature allots capabilities with no eye to fairness’. S9 
made a similar observation in relation to ‘people who think that we shouldn’t 
reinvent nature’, demonstrating that if this approach is adhered to strictly, ‘you 
wouldn’t take someone’s appendix out, you’d let them die’. Consequently, objections 
to enhancement that appeal too strongly to interference with nature are 
inadequate.   
Objections arose within the study which appealed to concepts of naturalness and 
artificiality as a reason why the use of enhancements would be morally 
problematic. Although objections made on this basis were relatively rare, 
assumptions about nature follow from a conception of normality, and thus 
implicitly underlie much of relevance within the enhancement debate. I will 
therefore show here how ‘the natural’ alone cannot be successfully adduced as a 
reason not to allow enhancements.  
Certain ethical positions found within the data were defended by reference to 
categories of ‘natural’ and ‘artificial’ that, whilst being treated as objective and 
mind-independent, in fact reveal themselves to be epistemological categories that 
have been subjectively imposed on the world.  These examples are clear instances 
of the ‘epistemic fallacy’ that critical realism highlights as false. In mistaking claims 
about one’s perceptions of the world for claims about the world itself, ontology and 
epistemology are conflated. Once it has become clear how this conflation occurs in 
appeals to nature, we can show how it is that certain judgements are rationally 
more defensible than others. We can then recast an account of the moral status of 
enhancement in a more balanced and coherent way. 
6.8.1) Appeals to Nature 
The weakness of appeals to nature has been recognised even by nominal 
opponents of human enhancement. Parens (1995), for example, adopts a nominally 
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sceptical position towards enhancement but is aware of the vulnerability of the 
concept of ‘nature’. It is possible to imagine theological arguments that object to 
certain biotechnological modifications as unacceptable interference with God’s 
will, but a degree of equivocation is displayed even in analyses of this kind 
(Hanson, 1999; Al-Hayani, 2007; Hefner, 2007).  
In recognition of the problems of appeals to nature, it is important not to use the 
‘unnaturalness’ argument as a straw man, since enhancement poses ethical 
challenges irrespective of the vulnerability of the appeal to naturalness. Moreover, 
several interviewees recognised that since all medicine may be construed as 
interference with nature, objections to enhancement on this basis alone will be 
inadequate. The failure of this objection is neatly summarised in the earlier quote 
from S9 concerning the interference with nature required in removing someone’s 
appendix to prevent them from dying. 
Nevertheless, several trenchant critiques of enhancement have been made on this 
basis, and insofar as there are uniting themes running through these, one of the 
most frequent is the intuition that certain applications of biotechnology in some 
morally important sense ‘go too far’ (Parens, 1995; Kass, 2003; McKibben, 2003; 
Sandel, 2004; Kamm, 2006; Koch, 2010).  
The most salient example of a confused appeal to ‘nature’ or ‘the natural’ among 
my interviewees related to athletic enhancement and the purported difference 
between (illegal) EPO use and other (legal) methods of hypoxic training. High 
altitude training (Levine, 2006) and the use of low oxygen chambers (Spriggs, 
2005) in sport are legal, whilst EPO use is forbidden26, even though all share the 
goal of increasing the oxygen carrying capacity of the blood (Joyner, 2003). In two 
instances it was argued that that the key distinction justifying the difference in 
legal status was determined by relative ‘naturalness’. C4 claimed that: 
‘...the EPO that we give is not a natural product...it’s a pharmaceutical, that’s what I 
mean by unnatural, compared to just going up to altitude is just something that 
                                                          
26 http://www.wada-ama.org/Documents/World_Anti-Doping_Program/WADP-Prohibited-
list/2013/WADA-Prohibited-List-2013-EN.pdf  
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humans do...you can just climb a hill...sure enough you might need to get a plane 
somewhere, but it’s pretty much achievable in nature to go up to altitude and train 
there, whereas giving yourself Aranesp for one month, bought from a dodgy doctor, is 
not achievable in nature’ 
C3 claimed that the difference was constituted by the artificiality of exogenous EPO 
when compared to taking advantage of the low oxygen content of high altitude 
environments in order to achieve the desired performance enhancement: 
‘...there’s a difference between drug products that have been manufactured, a 
chemical that you take, versus something that is more natural. A bike is a human 
creation...I see all of those things like lifestyle modifiable things, like exercise, taking 
exercise, changing the way you eat, riding a bike...it’s mechanical but it’s human 
being powered’ 
Dealing with C3’s quote first, he accepts that both a bicycle and synthetic EPO are 
manufactured, but suggests that the difference between the two is that the bike 
must be powered by human effort alone, rather than with ‘artificial’ assistance. The 
implied claim here is that, were the cyclist to use EPO, power would be supplied by 
other, ‘artificial’, means beyond that which the unenhanced cyclist could apply, and 
that this would be morally suspect. 
The claim is vulnerable, however. For example it is not the case that a cyclist is 
going to win the Tour de France simply by using EPO – it is still going to make a 
difference how hard he trains (which may include legal methods of hypoxic 
training) in combination with EPO use; how naturally gifted he is; how mentally 
committed he is to achieving victory, and so on (Savulescu et al, 2004; Miah, 2006; 
Savluescu & Foddy, 2010). All means used to enhance performance will contribute 
to how effectively he can power the bike. To illustrate this further we can take a 
longer perspective and connect it with C4’s argument. 
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6.8.2) Broad and Narrow Conceptions of the ‘Natural’ 
Bacon (1620), Barilan & Weintraub (2001), Warnock (2003), and Soper (2010) 
give accounts in which nature is explicitly understood as being prior to humans, 
and as providing the conditions for their existence. According to these accounts 
nothing happens which nature does not permit. Another way of expressing this is 
to say that everything which occurs obeys nature. Warnock (Ibid, p. 450) writes: 
‘...the natural world long predates humanity, but, as we have learned to understand, 
its laws are discoverable and gradual in their operation. We did not make them.’ 
If we apply this to the present example we can say that once we discover the laws 
underpinning the systems that we wish to manipulate we may then take advantage 
of these discoveries. Variations in the oxygen concentration of the air are prior to 
the invention of exogenous EPO. However they are also prior to the technological 
means for travelling easily to places where we could derive a benefit from training 
at altitude, the use of which is apparently morally unproblematic according to C4. 
In this respect it is misleading to distinguish one route to successful enhancement 
as being obviously more or less 'natural' than another.  
The ability to overcome the limitations of unassisted human ability - whether this 
is the aeroplane required for flying to the Andes, or the knowledge of amino acid 
chains required for being able to engineer new ones – depends on first correctly 
apprehending the system that we wish to manipulate or control. If we 
misunderstand gravity the plane will not fly; if we misunderstand how the kidney 
works then man-made erythropoietin will not successfully raise haemoglobin. On 
this view none of the modes of travel listed above are distinctly more or less 
‘natural’ than the creation of synthetic EPO. There are immovable physical 
constraints which determine what may and may not be done, as Bacon (1620, bk. 
1, aph. 3) states: 
‘Human knowledge and human power meet in one; for where the cause is not known 
the effect cannot be produced. Nature to be commanded must be obeyed; and that 
which in contemplation is as the cause is in operation as the rule.’ 
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Perhaps the problem can be resolved by further clarification. It would after all be 
possible to forgo aeroplanes, boats, cars and so on in the pursuit of altitude 
training – it is for convenience that athletes choose to use vehicles to reach these 
altitudes, rather than ‘naturally’ going on foot. It could therefore be argued that we 
can in principle go and train at altitude without technological assistance, whereas 
access to an exogenous boost of erythropoietin will always depend on the prior 
existence of the technological means required to produce it. This objection is 
vulnerable, however, because – again - it sets the boundary between ‘natural’ and 
‘unnatural’ at an arbitrary point. 
In C4 notes that one ‘might need a plane’. A plane is, presumably, an ‘artificial’ 
creation, and yet its artificiality is considered irrelevant to the perceived moral 
difference between altitude training and EPO use. This inconsistency underlines a 
difficulty in C4’s claim concerning ‘availability’ in nature. We might ask where, if 
not in nature, do Aranesp27 (a widely used EPO product) and the raw materials for 
its invention and production reside? If nature is the source of availability for the 
raw materials of both EPO and aeroplanes, it is not obvious why one should be 
considered more or less natural than the other. 
One objection to this line of argument would be to point out that modes of 
transport are not categorically equivalent to medical enhancement technologies 
such as EPO with respect to their relation to ‘nature’. EPO is literally incorporated 
into the body, whereas the other technologies referred to are not, and in virtue of 
this obvious difference it may appear that they are too different to bear 
comparison. 
The criticism is descriptively accurate insofar as it reminds us that one technology 
is external to the body and the other is internal. However, even if one accepts the 
observation, it is not obvious what is significant about this difference unless the 
term ‘enhancement’ can only be used to describe one intervention and not the 
other. To the extent that both are technological innovations which extend ‘given’ 
human ability in useful or valuable ways, they enhance. Moreover despite the fact 
                                                          
27 http://www.aranesp.com/  
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that EPO is medical in nature and an aeroplane is not, it is hard to see why this 
difference in particular has any bearing on the relative ‘naturalness’ of their use. 
The account of nature implied in these cases therefore cannot withstand too much 
scrutiny. To the extent that nothing physical can exist which contravenes the laws 
of nature, everything physical must be constituents of nature. On this view the 
relatively narrow conception of nature implied by C3 and C4 collapses into a wider 
one. Here a boundary between the ‘natural’ and ‘unnatural’ has been identified 
according to the perceptions of particular socially embedded individuals with 
contextually bound views and values. Whilst we must concede that our own 
perceptions are also subjective and thus remain critical of them, we must 
nevertheless be aware that distinctions of the kind outlined have been imposed 
rather than discovered.  
It is possible to achieve greater logical consistency if all medical interventions are 
understood as having a shared aim of modulating ‘given’ functioning in some way. 
This interpretation was suggested by S2 and S9. Of particular relevance, again, is 
S9’s argument concerning the ruptured appendix that all medical interventions are 
in some way artificial. If it would constitute poor medical practice not to remove 
the appendix because it would result in a preventable death, S9’s position 
highlights how inconsistent accounts of the difference between biomedical 
interventions according to their relative ‘naturalness’ are not helpful on their own 
as justifications for certain interventions but not others. 
6.9) A Critical Realist Analysis of Appeals to Nature 
I will now return to critical realism as a method of analysis, and lay out some initial 
thoughts to be developed further in the conclusion. What will become clear is that 
a critical realist analysis demonstrates why arguments such as those of C3 and C4 
are misleading.  Claims about the moral unacceptability of performance 
enhancement via EPO use when compared to ‘acceptable’ methods of achieving the 
same end such as altitude training appeal to what these individuals perceive to be 
a substantive difference in the ‘naturalness’ of the two methods. 
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This difference is grounded on more foundational assumptions or beliefs about 
what is entailed by the concept of ‘nature’. In doing so they posit an ontological 
difference between altitude training and using EPO – to do the former is ‘natural’, 
whilst to use the latter is ‘unnatural’. It is this postulated ontological difference 
which lays the ground for the further claim that it is morally acceptable to do the 
former but not the latter, and the (nebulous) implication that ‘natural’ methods are 
‘good’, whilst ‘unnatural’ methods are ‘bad’. 
According to C3 and C4 an ontological difference appears to be clear. Under 
analysis the difference dissolves, however. In its account of epistemic subjectivity 
critical realism holds that the statements of C3 and C4, and the perceived 
ontological differences that they identify, are informed by a backdrop of personal 
beliefs, values, and norms which are relative to each. That a claim is made about 
the world, however, does not mean that the claim is correct. It is in virtue of this 
observation that the elision between ontology and epistemology highlighted by 
critical realism is visible. If we apply this insight to the therapy / enhancement 
distinction, the elision will be visible again. 
Whether interventions are carried out in the name of therapy or enhancement they 
aim to improve health and / or functioning in some way. Whether the intervention 
is understood as a therapy or an enhancement, is an epistemologically relative 
matter which may depend on any number of contingencies. By contrast we can 
make the non-relative ontological realist observation that functioning exists along 
a spectrum, irrespective of these categorisations. Thus, a critical realist analysis 
highlights the division between the shared ontologically objective aspect of 
therapy and enhancement (i.e. the improvement of health and / or functioning) 
from the way in which the two are subjectively categorised. In doing so the 
conflation made between these discrete ontological and epistemological aspects is 
brought to the surface. A quote from C7 will help to develop this further: 
‘...there is a sort of nomenclature for this which is that there are quite a few 
substances which are naturally occurring substances and you can either take them in 
replacement doses which mimic what you should have naturally, or you can take 
201 
 
them in pharmaceutical doses, which are doses that then have effect over and beyond 
just replacement’ 
Medical nomenclature is an institutional construction. What the nomenclature 
captures or does not capture is not fixed, since it is subject to change and 
reclassification. The reference to ‘...what you should have naturally...’ is also 
revealing. The term ‘should’ is normative because it makes a claim about what 
ought to be the case. When coupled to the concept of haemoglobin replacement it 
implies a positive evaluation of species-typical or ‘normal’ functioning. This is 
congruent with the analysis of Toulmin (1975), Lennox (1995), and Nordenfelt 
(2006) that value judgements are cloaked in assessments of health which 
otherwise have the appearance of being merely descriptive and value-free.  
Following this we can see that transitive (moveable, flexible, value-laden, socially 
contingent) epistemological categories determining who may or may not receive 
medical assistance supervene on the underling ontologically objective and 
intransitive category of improvement, or enhancement per se. Given these 
transitive epistemological and intransitive ontological features, a critical realist 
analysis is thus helpful in understanding the contested therapy / enhancement 
distinction and its correspondence to more basic ontological facts about human 
functioning. 
6.10) The Therapy / Enhancement Distinction 
A range of viewpoints was put forward concerning the reality of the distinction and 
the ways in which it can and cannot be defended. As with the ethical analysis, I will 
consider these in light of theoretical positions on the distinction found within the 
literature. 
6.10.1) As Ambiguous and Unstable 
On several occasions enhancement was distinguished from therapy by reference to 
norms of different kinds. C4, S2, and S3 gave accounts grounded in the kinds of 
biostatic norms defended by Boorse (1975); Lennox (1995); and Wakefield (1995). 
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S1 and S11, by contrast, justified their accounts by reference to socio-cultural 
norms as characterised by Benedict (1934); Lewis (1954), and McKeown & Lowe 
(1974). In some cases participants used both kinds of norms as a justification for 
upholding the distinction, for example in the accounts of C2 and C12. 
However, as we saw in the literature review, judgements may change concerning 
whether a state is or is not considered to be normal (Vos & Willems, 2000; 
Wiseman, 2004; Stempsey, 2006). To the extent that the distinction is grounded in 
judgements about normality which may change, any account that appeals to a 
norm risks relativity and so will not provide a static foundation for constructing an 
account of the distinction that is firmly anchored in reality. A more fundamental or 
objective account is available via an analysis that can successfully negotiate these 
contingencies without relying on them for its definition. 
When discussed in purely theoretical terms C2, C5, C9, C11, C12, S2, S4, S7, S9, and 
S11 indicated that the therapy / enhancement distinction is difficult to 
substantiate as a matter of logic alone. For example C2 contended: 
 ‘I don’t think you can define what normal physiology is, and I don’t think you can 
define what enhancement is either’ 
This difficulty was compounded by instances in which medical classification and 
nomenclature are themselves ambiguous, for example in C12’s statement that: 
‘We do have good objective measures, but we have a definition of health that is 
woolly, that is not easy to pin down...there’s bound to be a grey area between what is 
enhancement and what is treatment...the cut off in most people’s minds would be that 
if you are not treating a pathology then you’re talking about enhancement, but that 
doesn’t take account of the fact that the idea of what is and is not pathological is very 
fluid’ 
These cases tacitly correspond to scepticism concerning the logical validity or 
relevance of the distinction voiced by Savulescu (2006) and Harris (2009). 
According to the view that they adopt, therapy must be understood as a relative 
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category which is supervenient on the more basic and intransitive underlying 
concept of enhancement. Savulescu writes (2006, p. 304): 
‘Enhancement is, indeed, a wide concept. In the broadest sense, it means “increase” or 
“improvement.” For example, a doctor may enhance his patient’s chance of survival 
by giving the patient a drug.’ 
The claim here is that insofar as it is synonymous with the general concept of 
health improvement, enhancement per se necessarily includes the central aim of 
therapy. On this view enhancement is such a ‘wide concept’ that it logically 
subsumes the category of therapy. If this argument is correct then no complete 
account of therapy can be disaggregated and understood entirely on its own terms. 
This is because any such account would unavoidably entail the goal of improving 
health, and thus by extension ‘enhancing’ it, irrespective of the state of health from 
which this is done. 
Support for this view was evident from C2, C5, C9, C11, C12, S2, S4, S7, S9, and S11. 
Each of these participants suggested that under close examination a clear logical 
difference between therapy and enhancement dissolves. S9 used the example of 
cosmetic dentistry, which is administered under the auspices of standard clinical 
practice but has been the subject of debate concerning its status as a therapy or an 
enhancement (Morley, 1999; Gordjin & Chadwick, 2008), as an analogy to describe 
how it is that the distinction can be become unclear: 
‘...my wife is an orthodontist and some of her patients have teeth that they don’t like, 
they’re transformed by having orthodontic treatment, it changes their whole 
approach to life, it changes their whole character and undoubtedly improves their 
quality of life, so that’s a cosmetic practice for which there are real and genuine 
physical and mental health gains’ 
Similarly, C3 and S11 used beta-blockers as an analogy. These are often legally 
prescribed by doctors to healthy people in certain professions, for example music 
or acting (Foddy & Clayton, 2004; Schneier, 2006; Gorman & Gorman, 1987), in 
order that they can respond effectively to nervousness caused by public 
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performances associated with their work. Despite that the seeking and receiving of 
beta-blockers is a standardly ‘medical’ encounter, S11 reported that the granting of 
assistance by prescribing them does not require the identification of any anxiety 
disorder: 
‘The problem here is definitions...So for a person a bit of anxiety or performance 
nerves is completely normal, and it’s probably normal for most people, so on the basis 
that it’s a normal reaction to a particular situation I think it’d be wrong to call it a 
medical condition – it’s not a disease, it’s not lack of health in any way, and it is 
performance enhancing in some way’ 
This ambiguity in differentiation was also recognised elsewhere in the study, for 
example in C12’s statement that the notion of what is considered pathological is 
‘fluid’ in nature. This corresponds both to evaluative philosophical models of health 
such as those put forward by Agich (1983), Engelhardt (1986), and Nordenfelt 
(1993), as well as constructionist accounts (Blaxter, 1978; Jordanova, 1995; Rose, 
2010). Thus the kind of justification for the inclusion of an ‘enhancement’ 
procedure under the normal auspices of medicine offered by C13 and S11 in 
relation to beta-blockers tacitly appealed not to statistically informed criteria of 
the difference between normality and abnormality, but the subjective criteria of 
patients or the kinds of interventions that it is considered socially acceptable for 
doctors to provide. 
6.10.2) As Clear and Defensible 
In contrast to these accounts C1, C4, C8, S3, and S6 adhered strongly to the basic 
reality of the therapy / enhancement distinction. This was most clearly 
demonstrated in instances such as S3’s statement that ‘health is just being not 
ill...getting better than normal isn’t necessary or needed’; C3’s reference to the 
clearly debilitating symptoms of anaemia which justify clinical assistance from 
EPO such as ‘lethargy, fatigue...breathlessness on exertion, angina...’; and S6’s simple 
assertion that in cases of enhancement ‘there’s no medical need’. Participants 
grounded this adherence by an appeal to normal functioning and its validity for 
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discerning between those who do and do not require medical assistance. C4, for 
example, offered the following account: 
‘...you have an indication for it and therefore it’s therapy...if you’re an athlete there’s 
no indication so it’s not a therapy, so it can only be an enhancement’ 
This was reinforced by S3: 
‘…you can very clearly distinguish between being ill and being normal...getting better 
than normal isn’t necessary or needed, whereas getting better from being ill is’ 
S6 extended this characterisation by making a distinction between procedures 
carried out for the remediation of an objective need, and those sought just for their 
subjective desirability: 
‘There’s no medical need, it’s for the aesthetic pleasure of the individual or whatever 
you want to call it’ 
Again, this view finds theoretical support, for example in the biostatic accounts of 
health of Boorse (1975) and Wakefield (1995), as well as in the critiques of 
enhancement offered by Fukuyama (2002) and Sandel (2004). This view can be 
broadly summarised by S3’s claim that ‘health is just being not ill’. 
A related issue of consistency across the group was that medicine’s primary 
commitment should be to the reality of differences in severity of need, such that 
resources can be directed according to those needs, even if a strict delineation 
between therapy and enhancement is logically unstable. This position was 
defended at some point by all the participants, irrespective of the diversity of their 
individual views about the a priori validity of the therapy / enhancement 
distinction. Quotes from C5 and S6 summarise this position: 
 ‘it’s not part of medicine’s remit to do that, so we just sort of duck out of that 
one...we’ve got to operate within boundaries’ 
 ‘...we’re doctors, we’re physicians, we treat people that are ill, so that’s our concern...’ 
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The prioritisation of needs in a hierarchy represented the way in which these 
participants understood the boundaries of their practice. Recognition of a scale of 
real needs of varying severity was perceived to be necessary in order that 
resources can be titrated appropriately. For example S2 gave the following defence 
of such a hierarchy: 
‘...we're in a cash limited system, so we can't provide everything that might be of 
tangible theoretical benefit...I'd like people who really need something to have access 
to it, and then there would be a titration downwards in which people who didn't 
really need it should have less and less access to it to a point where if it was of no 
discernible benefit they shouldn't have any access to it at all’ 
C4 stated that with respect to the difference between therapy and enhancements 
he was ‘drawing an artificial line in the sand’. Despite this, however, he ultimately 
defended medical need as an objective way of distinguishing between whether an 
intervention would be therapeutic or enhancing: 
‘...you have an indication for it and therefore it’s therapy...if you’re an athlete there’s 
no indication so it’s not a therapy, so it can only be an enhancement’ 
This position finds support within the literature (Daniels, 2000; Buchanan, 2000; 
Buchanan et al, 2000). In these cases attempts have been made to reconcile the 
practical ethical need to ensure distributive justice with the logical vulnerability of 
the therapy / enhancement distinction which may threaten it. The widespread 
defence of the reality of medical needs offered within the study is no doubt useful 
for developing normative recommendations concerning the governance of any 
access to enhancements. 
Despite its practical utility, however, this standard does not sever the intrinsic 
connection between therapy and enhancement which follows from their shared 
goal of improvement. Nor do demands of justice of themselves do anything to 
strengthen or refute the a priori weakness of the distinction. I stated that Bess 
(2010) characterises enhancement as a ‘moving target’ because it is ‘pegged’ to a 
shifting definition of normality. Similarly Harris (2009) contends that since the aim 
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of all therapies is to enhance, it is not rational to appeal to the distinction as the 
final arbiter of decisions to treat.  
Moreover despite the primary ethical responsibility to allocate resources 
according to need, the presence of this responsibility does not of itself resolve the 
question concerning the logical validity of the distinction. Although it allows for the 
ranking of a hierarchy of needs, it does not give any indication as to where in the 
hierarchy the line can be drawn between normality and abnormality. 
6.11) A Priori Vs Empirical Justification 
A tension exists between purely a priori and purely conventional justifications for 
or against the therapy / enhancement distinction, neither of which is fully 
satisfactory on its own. Furthermore a dogmatic adherence to one is likely to 
relegate the importance of certain features of the other. This is undesirable, as both 
kinds of justification contribute to the ethical integrity of medicine as an 
institution. What is required is an understanding of practice which reflects a 
balance between theoretical and institutional values. Indeed this demand 
summarises the normative rationale which has driven the empirical turn in 
bioethics (Molewijk et al, 2004; Borry et al, 2005; Ives & Dunn, 2010), and for this 
reason both should be incorporated when seeking to understand ethics in practice. 
The conventional criteria used to justify medical assistance do not refute its logical 
continuity with therapy. Rather, they delimit those services which medicine will or 
will not provide under its auspices, according to a balance between i) prevailing 
norms of health; ii) the amount of resources available relative to medical needs; iii) 
what is technologically possible and available; and iv) the balance of risks and 
benefits which pertain to providing assistance. These factors are contingencies, 
and in this respect interventions are sanctioned according to a set of criteria that 
are always vulnerable to change. Consequently, decisions about the appropriate 
boundaries of practice must be substantiated by more than an assumption that 
therapy and enhancement are discontinuous simply because they are 
conventionally treated that way in practice.  
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One response to this may be to suggest that the logical weakness of the therapy / 
enhancement distinction need not be terminally problematic, even though it causes 
problems for the a priori delineation of one concept from another. The data 
indicate good, defensible, practical justifications for appealing to these contingent 
criteria as reasons for allowing or denying access to medical products. These 
criteria are examined in more detail later in this chapter, although an example of 
how clear justifications were made is found in the following quote from S6. The 
quote expresses the importance of safety when intervening medically, irrespective 
of whether the intervention is therapeutic or enhancing: 
‘From a research clinical point of view we know clearly that EPO has the potential to 
harm in supra-normal conditions, so I don’t think from a physical point of view it’s a 
good thing to stress the body by taking drugs which take one outside the bounds of 
normality’ 
S6 thus separates the intrinsic moral acceptability of enhancement per se from 
practical considerations of safety which would count against prescribing a specific 
product for enhancement purposes. In this respect S9’s reflection on the 
relationship between therapeutic and enhancing applications of technology also 
yields a valuable insight: 
‘It is a philosophical question...I suppose they’re different aspects of the same thing as 
they are capitalising on technology to be able to make you do something better, and I 
suppose there’s nothing wrong in theory with that, and there are then the safety 
aspects and the practicality of injecting yourself with needles carries risk in different 
ways...so I think there are some practical difficulties. In principle I suppose there’s no 
particular difference’ 
These views justify the granting or denial of assistance according to the level of 
risk involved, rather than whether the assistance would count as therapy or 
enhancement. This justification is anchored in a central responsibility of medical 
practice, namely that the physician does no harm. In this respect justifications such 
as this have the ethical advantage that they circumvent the question of whether it 
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would be acceptable for them to prescribe enhancements, because beyond a 
certain threshold the risk of harm over-rides any countervailing considerations. 
6.12) Changing Norms 
This issue of contingencies is important. In particular its relevance derives from 
historical changes in norms of health. As we saw earlier, what is considered socially 
normal, and what is statistically normal are neither necessarily static nor congruent 
(Rayner et al, 2010; Moravcsik, 1976; Amundson, 2000), and are frequently 
technologically, economically, culturally, and socially mediated. Given that the 
therapy / enhancement distinction is nominally underpinned by a norm of health, 
and norms of health are vulnerable to change, this compromises the integrity of 
distinctions made on this basis once a particular historical scenario and its 
contingencies no longer obtains. C11 made the following observation: 
‘Look at caffeine...it’s a relatively new drug – it’s only been around for three or four 
hundred years, but because it’s been around before we started regulating everything 
there’s no rules about being allowed to drink two or three cups of coffee before you 
go into an exam...it’s historic isn’t it – wine has been around for ages, it’s part of our 
natural psyche and culture, and erythropoietin is very new’ 
Similarly S2 observed that the characteristics of a system such as erythropoiesis, 
which determines the haemoglobin content of the blood, were set during a 
historical epoch in which norms of human life were very different. Although 
certain environmental threats to health and life that were present during this 
epoch have since receded, our erythropoietic system has not altered in 
correspondence with this. He suggested that the normal haemoglobin content of 
the blood is now higher than necessary, given the less immediately dangerous and 
more sedentary nature of modern human life. S2 stated that haemoglobin content 
has been: 
‘...set by evolutionary pressure...we're now living in a time of plenty...now very people 
in our society are encountering sabre-tooth tigers that maul them, cause them to lose 
a pint and a half of blood but then still leave them with enough energy to run 
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away...would be a heavy evolutionary pressure without any resuscitation available, 
at least in the western world’ 
Haemoglobin content is correlated with the risk of thrombosis, and this risk 
increases with proximity to restoration at a species-typical level. The ideal 
therapeutic target when balanced against this risk is slightly lower than 
statistically normal. (Smith et al, 2003; Ehrenreich et al, 2004; Strippoli, 2004; 
Drueke et al, 2006; Remuzzi & Ingelfinger, 2006; Miskowiak et al, 2008; Sargin et 
al, 2010). When asked about why this is the case, a typical response was that the 
reasons are not yet fully understood (C2, C3, C5, C6, S2, S4, S9). C6 suggested that 
the reasons may be ‘multi-factorial’: 
‘...there's various things at play...in an adult male a normal haemoglobin should be 
around 13...people who have a normal haemoglobin delivered by EPO have worse 
outcomes, whether that be mortality outcomes or increased events such as stroke.  
Also it's less clear that we see symptomatic improvement.  So going from six to nine 
brings about significant symptomatic and functional improvement.  Going from 11 to 
13, there's much less good evidence that you actually improve anything.  Certain 
individuals yes, but actually at that point we're probably increasing the risk without 
improving any benefits’ 
This view lends support to Koch’s argument (2010) which foregrounds the need 
for caution when attempting enhancement. Despite the rapidity with which 
biological knowledge advances, he contends that our understanding of biological 
systems may not always be detailed enough for us to intervene safely. This also 
lends tentative support to Bostrom & Sandberg’s (2009) argument that health 
cannot necessarily be inferred from species-norms, since these norms may not 
always represent an ideal balance of risks and benefits throughout time. If they are 
correct, then given fluidity in norms of health, what may be considered therapeutic 
from one perspective may appear to be ‘enhancing’ from another. An example of 
this can be seen in C2’s observation of changing socio-historical norms: 
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‘…in the last 30 years probably we’ve evolved even quicker, mainly because of the 
technology...we will evolve even more – we have to survive...for progress you need 
enhancements...there will be enhancements’ 
Similarly,  and consistent with the findings of Gunga et al (2007), Brookhart et al 
(2008), and Chapman et al (2010), S4 explained that since haemoglobin content is 
partially controlled by the oxygen content of the air relative to altitude, so norms of 
health are also geographically mediated: 
‘...if you asked them to go and exercise in Ethiopia or somewhere where hypoxia level 
is much higher, they can reach these target haemoglobin much easier. And there is 
one interesting study which shows that patients who are on dialysis who are living on 
high altitude, their EPO requirement is lower, because it stimulates their own EPO, 
you see? And somebody looked at the survival of these patients and it was clear that 
the survival was better’ 
The challenge, then, is to understand whether or not the therapy / enhancement 
distinction can be substantiated on a more solid basis, beyond varied and changing 
norms which define it contingently and empirically.  We need not necessarily 
assume that any one kind of justification is ‘better’ than the other, rather, a 
comprehensive account of the therapy / enhancement would take account of both 
a priori and inductively derived knowledge. Although it may be that good 
justifications for the reality of the distinction can only be made empirically, this is 
only a problem if we believe that a priori, deductive, knowledge is superior in some 
way to empirical or inductive knowledge. 
A possible consequence of awarding too much weight to the deductive weakness of 
the distinction would be a correlative weakening of the justification for allocating 
resources according to significant and empirically verifiable threats to health. For 
example C9 claimed that the development of EPO therapy for renal anaemia is ‘out 
on a limb’, and is a rarity in that it has ‘felt like a proper cure in medicine’ alongside 
‘syringing ears, correcting cataracts, surgically removing a cancer before it's spread, 
and insulin for diabetics'. It would be an ethical weakness of any attempt to dissolve 
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completely the difference between therapy and enhancement, because the 
conclusion of a total dissolution would be to hold that no single health need is 
intrinsically more serious than any other.  
One of the logical weaknesses of the therapy / enhancement distinction is its 
reliance on the concept of normal health, which is ambiguous under analysis. The 
price we may pay for not attaching sufficient weight to empirically identifiable 
aspects of ill-health on the basis that the concepts involved are logically ambiguous 
may be a high one, however. If the logical vagueness of the term ‘normality’ is 
appealed to as a reason why the therapy / enhancement distinction should be 
discarded completely, there is a risk of sanctioning injustices to people whose 
functioning quite clearly  deviates from a prevailing norm in a way that threatens 
their health, functioning, or wellbeing. As S6 notes: 
‘...you know we all have two legs so if you’ve got one leg then that would clearly be an 
abnormality. There are obvious abnormalities, and there are nuanced 
abnormalities...you’ve got clear obvious abnormalities like patients who had two 
kidneys and now has no kidneys functioning and wants therapies to enhance their life 
and their life span’ 
This quote demonstrates clearly that views from within the medical profession 
which defend the reality of the therapy / enhancement distinction on the basis of 
empirical rather than a priori evidence are strong, persuasive, clearly defensible, 
and should be taken seriously. Thus what is of interest here is that the primary 
means of justification advanced in favour of the therapy / enhancement distinction 
in the study are different to the kinds of arguments and justifications employed in 
philosophical argument. 
S6’s reflection on the way in which he distinguishes between those needs which 
require assistance, and those which do not, illustrates this. He suggested that 
intuition has an important role to play in medical decision making which may be 
relegated in importance within philosophical analysis: 
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‘You see, philosophy I understand as using logic and reason to try and dissect a 
problem to get to an answer – I don’t know, does philosophy allow for one’s instinct 
to play a role in decision-making?’ 
Pursuing this difference between inductive and deductive bases of judgement, the 
claim that there is no essential difference between therapy and enhancement just 
because they are irreducibly logically connected is counter-intuitive. Indeed, the 
difference between health and illness does appear to be real and non-trivial. 
Returning briefly to a critical realist approach to this problem, if one adopts the 
critical position view that the world beyond the mind is ontologically objective 
(Bhaskar, 1975; Archer, 1998; Sayer, 2010; Easton, 2010), one can commit to the 
view that certain physio-biological states are genuinely physically limiting to 
different degrees. This view is accurate irrespective of whatever judgement of 
relative health is made about them (Bhaskar & Danermark, 2006; Owens & Cribb, 
2011). S1’s account of treatment before and after the introduction of EPO offers a 
clear justification for adopting this position: 
‘...going back twenty years patients with renal failure would often be very anaemic, 
they'd be pale, they'd be tired and breathless, they couldn't exercise...when EPO came 
along all of a sudden really their lives were transformed’ 
Observations such as this present a challenge for pro-enhancement positions that 
appeal strongly to the logical continuity between therapy and enhancement. 
Empirical features of ill-health used in medical decision making must, it seems, be 
awarded weight. If they are not then it is incumbent on the pro-enhancement case 
to show how erosion of a legitimate hierarchy of needs can be resisted in an 
analysis which foregrounds the logical connection between therapy and 
enhancement. Despite the distinction’s logical weakness, to collapse the distinction 
entirely on this basis may risk worsening the situation of those people whose 
medical needs are already significantly limiting. The problem we face is how to 
reconcile the two forms of justification for and against the reality of the therapy / 
enhancement distinction.  
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6.13) Enhancement’s Place in Medicine 
If we conclude that enhancement has no legitimate place in medicine, we would 
need to reassess borderline cases of enhancement which are already available. One 
example of this is the legal prescription of beta-blockers in the absence of a 
diagnosis of an anxiety disorder mentioned earlier and raised in my study by C3 
and S11. The prescription of beta-blockers in the absence of a disorder was 
considered acceptable by these participants.  
Similarly, in drawing an analogy between the use of beta-blockers in work and the 
hypothetical ‘lifestyle’ use of EPO in sport, C3 claimed that relaxing regulation to 
legalise enhancement use is not necessarily ethically problematic in principle. He 
suggested that moral unacceptability would be caused by other circumstantial 
factors, rather than simply whether one can or cannot legally use a drug for 
enhancement: 
‘...so if there was someone who was an amateur who wasn’t competing but just 
wanted to optimise his performance just for playing tennis in his local club, and he 
was competitive and he just wanted to function in life optimally, I don’t really have a 
problem with him, that’s not very much different from me taking beta blockers to 
stay calm giving a presentation to an international congress, so I don’t have a 
problem that way.  Whereas once it becomes about competition and international 
recognition as you as an athlete then I guess everybody has to have equal access to 
those drugs or nobody has access to those drugs’ 
On the other hand it is possible to give too much weight to the conclusion that the 
distinction between therapy and enhancement is illusory simply because a logical 
analysis demonstrates that ‘enhancement’ of health is the aim in both cases. 
Problems will arise if we reject the need to commit to prevailing diagnostic norms 
simply because they may change. 
 If it were considered equally reasonable to seek assistance for any biomedically 
improvable ‘need’, injustices may accrue to those with more severe health 
problems, as some of those resources would need to be directed to assisting people 
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who, according to current diagnostic criteria, have no need for them. A worry of 
this kind was voiced by C8 in considering the consequences of widening the 
criteria of access to drugs to include enhancement use: 
‘...if you ended up with a situation where it was considered acceptable for there to be 
a cohort of drugs that are prescribed on an as needed basis as they are now, but 
there’s lots of supplementary drugs that people could buy, I guess the temptation for 
the exchequer would be to move more medicines into pot B and have fewer in pot A.’ 
‘allow for more vulnerable people to be preyed upon by marketers’ 
Both interpretations of the distinction thus entail difficulties. In the first case there 
is an inconsistency between the relative legal status of beta-blockers and EPO for 
certain enhancement purposes. Notwithstanding the safety issues associated with 
EPO use, it is legitimate to ask what the principle being applied here is that leads to 
this difference in legal status. 
The difficulty in the second case is related to the first. If legal access to drugs such 
as EPO were widened to include certain enhancement uses on the basis that its 
legal status is presently inconsistent with that governing the use of beta-blockers, 
this would have implications for the fair allocation of finite resources. Market 
pressures may come to bear on policy decisions concerning the appropriate 
subsidisation of medical products that could threaten to divert resources away 
from those who are in greatest need. We are therefore caught on the horns of a 
dilemma. If progress is to be made, some negotiation or reconciliation of these 
difficulties is required. 
6.14) Conclusion 
From the preceding analysis of theory and data we can draw some conclusions that 
can be taken forward and developed in the final chapter of the thesis. The therapy 
/ enhancement distinction was shown to be logically insubstantial under scrutiny. 
To this end I conclude that it cannot serve as a final guide for discerning between 
acceptable and unacceptable forms of medical assistance. Despite this, however, 
the unanimous commitment amongst the study participants to the principle of 
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allocating resources according to need indicates that any revision of the therapy / 
enhancement distinction that is to be tractable with medical practice must retain 
this commitment. 
In the following chapter I will show how these two positions can be integrated into 
a more accurate philosophical account of the relationship between therapy and 
enhancement. Despite underlining the weakness of the distinction between the 
two, this account also recognises a hierarchy in the severity of health needs in 
virtue of which resources should be ‘titrated’ accordingly.  I also conclude on the 
basis of the analysis that whilst it is not possible to completely dismiss conceptions 
of ‘normal’ health, and by extension some idea of the difference between ‘therapy’ 
and ‘enhancement’, these categories cannot be the only arbiters of medical 
decision making.  
On the basis of the above I draw the further conclusion that resource allocation 
should be governed more explicitly by (ontological) need relative to goals, 
resources, and countervailing factors of safety and justice, with correspondingly 
less weight awarded to (epistemological) categorisations of normality, health, 
illness, disease, and whether an intervention is a ‘therapy’ or an ‘enhancement’. 
 6.15) Summary 
In this chapter I analysed the empirical data in terms of relevant theories 
concerning the relationship between therapy and enhancement. I did this for two 
reasons: firstly, to examine whether the data provide any insight into the relative 
accuracy of competing theories; secondly, to investigate how the various theories 
help us to understand the practices and values that determine how the therapy / 
enhancement distinction is understood contextually from within the medical 
profession. I examined the various issues of ethical significance expressed by the 
study participants, as well as views concerning the logical validity of the therapy / 
enhancement distinction. I showed how a critical realist approach can be applied 
to the analysis of these issues, and used this to generate insights that I will take 
forward and use as a basis for conclusions in the final chapter. 
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Chapter Seven: Conclusions 
7.1) Introduction 
In this chapter I will draw some ethical conclusions that arose from the analysis in 
chapter six, and make policy recommendations regarding the legal control of 
human enhancement technologies. I will do this in order to satisfy a twofold aim of 
the thesis as a whole: firstly to refine and advance our understanding of the 
philosophically complex therapy / enhancement distinction; secondly, to develop 
practical ethical responses to the phenomenon of human enhancement in ways 
that will be tractable with clinical and research practices in future. 
First I will addresses ontological and epistemological issues concerning the nature 
of the relationship between therapy and enhancement, and how an account of this 
relationship can be justified. The second part addresses ethical aspects of human 
enhancement with respect to achieving justice in medicine and healthcare 
allocation. I used the theoretical approach of critical realism in analysing the 
theory and the data in chapter six, and I will use it here in developing the final 
conclusions.  
I will situate the conclusions, recommendations, and the revised account of 
therapy and enhancement within the existing literature and provide some 
orientation in terms of their relation to existing theory. The contribution of the 
empirical data in assisting in this orientation will also be explained. Towards the 
end of the chapter we will consider the limitations of the research and potential 
sources of error, and avenues for future research of ethical significance which 
arose from the project. Prior to developing the conclusions, however, firstly I will 
summarise what I have done over the course of the thesis. 
7.2) Thesis Summary 
In chapter one I introduced the therapy / enhancement distinction and explained 
why it is logically problematic. I outlined why the logical weakness of the 
distinction has ethical implications for medical practice in terms of ensuring a fair 
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allocation of resources. I examined the implications of a rapid proliferation of 
human enhancement technologies in future. I explained that ethical policy 
responses would be needed to ensure an appropriate balance between the need to 
protect the prioritisation of medical need according to severity on one hand, and 
the liberty to enhance on the other. 
Having introduced these issues I explained the need for an interdisciplinary 
approach to clarifying our understanding of human enhancement in view of the 
theoretical inconclusiveness of the literature and the relative absence of empirical 
data. I briefly outlined the history, present, and future of enhancement; the nature 
of medical responsibility. Finally I introduced the philosophical approach of critical 
realism as the research methodology to be used in the thesis. 
In chapter two I reviewed the literature of greatest relevance for answering the 
central research questions, namely: how should we understand the relationship 
between therapy and enhancement? And what would be an appropriate policy 
response to the practical ethical challenges that a growth in human enhancement 
technologies might have on medical practice and research? 
These questions informed the selection of the literature to be examined and 
consequently the review focused on: concepts of health, disease, and illness; the 
therapy / enhancement distinction; ethical issues in enhancement; and the history, 
present, and future of enhancement. Since the research was to be interdisciplinary, 
combining philosophical analysis with social scientific data, I included literature 
from across these disciplinary perspectives within the review. 
In chapter three I introduced the philosophy of critical realism as the methodology 
to be used for framing the research. This approach is designed to ‘underlabour’ for 
practices in social science. Its argument for a realist ontology combined with a 
relativist epistemology provides a way of maximising the compatibility of diverse 
or apparently opposed disciplinary perspectives. For this reason it is well 
equipped as an approach for interdisciplinary ethics in which empirical data is 
used as the basis for normative philosophical analysis.  
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I explained and justified the choice of methodology, and gave examples of how it 
can successfully negotiate the epistemological scepticism critiques such as strong 
social constructionism and the naturalistic fallacy. I provided a detailed account of 
how critical realist theory can be used to integrate normative and descriptive 
elements in a way that balances the insights of each and produces rational and 
compelling ethical arguments. 
In chapter four I explained the research methods used in the empirical component 
of the thesis. I gave reasons for using a single case study, rather than several. I then 
offered a brief review of possible enhancement technologies which could be used 
for the empirical study, and I justified the selection of synthetic recombinant 
erythropoietin (EPO) as a critical case’ for enhancement. 
Within this chapter I also explained and justified: the selection of one-to-one in 
depth interviews rather than focus groups; the decision to interview both 
clinicians and scientists in order to achieve insight into contextually-informed 
views about enhancement; and the identification of an appropriate size for the 
study. 
Finally within this chapter I described the construction of the pilot study prior to 
the main study; reported the recruitment process for interviewees, and described 
the interviews; accounted for developments in questioning according to the 
emergence of themes throughout the process; explained the processes of coding 
and data analysis; justified the decision to finish the study after 25 interviews once 
data saturation had been reached. 
In chapter five I reported the main findings that emerged from the empirical study 
and which assisted in answering the central research question of the project. I 
reported the themes of greatest ethical importance to the study participants both 
in relation to enhancement in general, and EPO in particular. I found ambivalence 
towards enhancement to be widely evident, however the professional 
responsibility for ensuring safety and justice were considered to be non-negotiable 
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conditions that would determine the ultimate moral status of a decision to allow or 
refuse access to an enhancement.  
As well as the key ethical findings, I gave an account of views expressed concerning 
the philosophical and logical underpinning of the therapy / enhancement 
distinction. Frequent references to naturalness, artificiality, and their relation to 
normality were also reported in view of their relevance to the research. I cited the 
difficulty in separating completely the clinician and research groups which 
emerged throughout the study as a possible limitation on the clear identification of 
significant differences between the two. 
Having reported the main findings, in chapter six I carried out a philosophical 
analysis of the data. This connected relevant theory from the literature review of 
chapter two with the empirical information provided by the study. After briefly 
restating the research problem, I reported the lack of absolute congruence 
between the data and any one particular theoretical model of enhancement was 
reported. Throughout the chapter I examined and analysed in detail areas of 
partial congruence between the two. 
I analysed the main themes of ethical and philosophical relevance from the study 
in light of competing theoretical perspectives on enhancement. Consequently 
safety, justice, naturalness, normality, and the therapy / enhancement distinction 
itself were discussed in detail. I gave an example of critical realist analysis in order 
to show how it successfully combines philosophical and social scientific 
approaches in preparation for the final chapter in which I will use this to frame the 
conclusions of the thesis. 
7.3) The Therapy / Enhancement Distinction: Good and Bad Arguments For 
and Against 
The investigation was motivated by an ambiguity concerning the logical 
delineation of therapy from enhancement. One response to this ambiguity is to 
conclude that if the distinction cannot be logically substantiated or upheld then we 
should dispense with it, following Harris’ (2009, p. 143) critique: 
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‘It does not draw either a morally significant or an explanatorily significant 
distinction and so fails utterly to be useful.’ 
On the other hand, if practical ethical justifications exist for adhering to the 
distinction or certain aspects of it, then these would weigh in favour of its 
retention, although perhaps in a partial or attenuated form. If arguments both for 
and against are valuable in different respects, then a rational strategy is to 
negotiate a defensible and balanced ‘symbiosis’ (Frith, 2010) of the two. 
Irrespective of the logical weakness of the therapy / enhancement distinction, the 
study participants unanimously viewed their primary role as to help people with 
the greatest health needs.  The beneficiaries of their work were identified as being 
ill, having a disease, or in some state of health which causes poor or subnormal 
functioning. Questions about the place in medicine for interventions that would 
enhance, and the improvement of normal functioning that this implies, were thus 
largely considered as tangential and only peripherally related to the 
responsibilities of practice (C1, C2, C4, C5, C6, C9, C10, C11, S1, S3, S4, S5, S6, S9, 
S10). As Juengst (1997, p. 130) notes, this has the advantage of expressing 
decisions about resource allocation in relatively straightforward terms: 
‘The advantage of the Normal Function account is that it provides one relatively 
unified goal for health care, towards which the burdens and benefits of various 
interventions can be relatively objectively titrated, balanced, and integrated.’ 
This approach has merit insofar as it is consistent with values frequently 
articulated within the empirical study. For example, the participants unanimously 
referred to the moral responsibility incumbent on them for justice and the 
prevention of harm. If it is ethically important to uphold these responsibilities via 
the ‘titration’ (C5, S2) of assistance according to need, then the fact that 
enhancement may be logically consistent with the goals of medicine makes little 
practical difference, because in enhancement by definition we are considering 
people further back in the queue for assistance. 
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There are, therefore, good reasons for endorsing the medical status quo to some 
degree if it is morally important that resources are allocated according to need. To 
the extent that the conventional medical responsibilities outlined are worth 
protecting because they heal, cure, alleviate suffering and prevent harm, we ought 
to accept them as good reasons for not completely re-orientating the existing 
criteria for medical assistance.  
Having said this, although it might be ethically important to allocate resources 
according to need, the fact that this is so does not clarify the logical ambiguity in 
question. A frequent criticism of the integrity of the therapy / enhancement 
distinction is the fluidity and contingency of the concepts used to justify it (Daniels, 
2000; Savulescu, 2006; Bostrom & Roache, 2008; Buchanan, 2009; Harris, 2009). 
In particular statistical norms of health and / or functioning, and their perceived 
value are not socially, culturally, geographically, or historically constant (Lewis, 
1953; Barilan & Weintraub, 2001; Alvarez, 2008). Despite the prevailing 
commitment to the sick displayed by the study participants, it was clear that the 
fluidity and contingency of health concepts was also frequently recognised (C1, C2, 
C5, C9, C11, C12, C13, S2, S5, S6, S9, S11). 
If the technological development that this implies is extrapolated into the future 
then any account of the therapy / enhancement distinction which appeals 
inflexibly to contemporary norms is likely to become decreasingly recognisable as 
change occurs (Harris, 2009; Bostrom & Sandberg, 2009; More, 2013). Taking a 
very long historical perspective with respect to previous human norms, we may 
conclude as Jones does (2006, p. 78) that ‘compared with hunter-gatherers we must 
seem like posthumans’. If this process of change continues to occur without end, the 
practical utility of conventional distinctions such as the one drawn between 
therapy and enhancement will decrease. 
7.4) Emphasising Need and Limiting the Therapy / Enhancement Distinction 
If the practical utility of the therapy / enhancement distinction decreases in 
correspondence with advances in medical technology, some means other than the 
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distinction will have to be used for guiding a fair allocation of resources. My 
recommendation is that in order to do so decisions should be grounded not in 
subjective and changing epistemological categories such as ‘therapy’ and 
‘enhancement’, but in ontologically objective aspects of human functioning.  
If it is possible to identify and measure human needs, rational judgements 
concerning the extent of the limitations that they impose can be made (Bhaskar, 
1993; Sayer, 1997; Archer, 1998), such that they can be ranked in a hierarchy or 
continuum. If this is done effectively it can be used as a basis for the fair allocation 
of resources without placing any particular emphasis on where the threshold of 
‘normality’ is drawn upon it.  
Viewed from this perspective the actual needs of some will always be greater than 
others, irrespective of the logical strength or weakness of the therapy / 
enhancement distinction. If it is right that there should be a correspondence 
between needs and resources then people further up the hierarchy will always 
have a stronger prima facie claim on medical assistance than those below them no 
matter how normal and abnormal health are defined. The retention of a hierarchy 
of need is therefore necessary from the point of view of achieving a just allocation 
of medical resources, irrespective of the reality of the therapy / enhancement 
distinction.  
Nevertheless the logical weakness of the distinction is significant for other reasons. 
In showing therapy to be a supervenient category on the fundamental concept of 
enhancement the ambiguity underlines the contingencies of medical practice. The 
medical infrastructure, its classifications, its treatment criteria and nomenclature 
are socially constructed artefacts (Freidson, 1970; Press, 1980; Gillett, 1994; 
Jordanova, 1995;  Gursoy, 1996; Kleinman, 1997) tasked with the realisation of 
goals such as healing curing, caring, the prevention of illness and disease, the 
restoration of normality, and improvement of health and wellbeing (Lewis, 1976; 
Moravcsik, 1976; Kleinman, 1979; Fleischauer & Hermeren, 2006) (C1, C2, C4, C7, 
C8, S1, S3, S6). Decisions made by medical professionals about whether to grant or 
deny assistance in order to achieve these goals are ‘institutional facts’ (Searle, 
224 
 
1995) about what the medical profession happens to do within a particular 
context.  
It is for this reason that the categories of ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ are unstable and 
vulnerable to change. Actual health needs vary in severity, however the ways in 
which these gradations are categorised as ‘normal’, ‘abnormal’, ‘healthy’, ‘diseased’, 
and so forth are not static (Mechanic, 1973; Frake, 1977; Good, 1977; Unschuld, 
1978; Amundson, 2000; Stempsey, 2006) (C2, C11, C12, S11). To the extent that 
these categories are not static, any distinction between therapy and enhancement 
that is grounded in them will be similarly vulnerable. Consequently, the therapy / 
enhancement distinction is only substantial to the extent that the account of 
normality that underlies it can be upheld.  
Given the logical porosity of health concepts and the recognition of this within the 
empirical study (C2, C5, C9, C11, C12, S2, S4, S7, S9, S11) I conclude that 
enhancement is logically (at least) minimally consistent with the goals of medicine. 
For this reason pro-enhancement arguments that argue for an institutional 
reorientation of medicine such that it becomes more open in principle to the 
possibility of sanctioning enhancements in practice are justifiable, providing that 
an appropriate balance obtains between other morally relevant factors such as 
safety, cost, the size of benefits, and the effects on other members of society. 
These supervening factors are important, for despite its weaknesses the therapy / 
enhancement distinction has some heuristic value insofar as it implies real 
differences in the severity of health needs. For example let us assume that a non-
negotiable principle on which to base resource allocation is that resources should 
be allocated according to needs irrespective of one’s position concerning the ethics 
of using or sanctioning the use of human enhancements. To the extent that therapy 
and enhancement represent poles of medical assistance at the lower and upper 
boundaries of a hierarchy of needs, then the fact that these poles contribute to the 
structure of this hierarchy implies that they can play a (limited) role in 
determining the fair allocation of resources. 
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Recognising the hierarchy of needs to which the poles of the distinction 
correspond will partially satisfy some of the criticisms levelled at enhancement in 
terms of the potentially deleterious impact that it could have on the fair allocation 
of resources if it were to proliferate (Daniels, 2000; Fukuyama, 2002; Kass, 2003; 
Sandel, 2004; Pellegrino, 2004; Koch, 2010). Importantly, however, it is not the 
distinction itself which should be retained, but rather the assumption underlying it 
according to which health needs are understood as real and of varying severity.  
By combining the logical case against the therapy / enhancement distinction with 
the foregrounding of the needs of the sick in arguments in favour of it, we can 
integrate these advantages into a revised approach to enhancement that derives a 
benefit from both. Although the therapy / enhancement distinction is logically 
insubstantial, this does not mean that judgements about the relative severity of 
health needs are irrational. Consequently accepting the weakness of the distinction 
need not have a corrosive effect on proportionate resource allocation. 
Approaching the problem in this way allows for greater flexibility in deciding what 
forms of assistance are possible and appropriate. Relative to a wide conception of 
human needs and balanced against the available resources this approach builds an 
acceptance of fluidity between health categories into its reasoning about the 
appropriate threshold of medical assistance.  
7.5) Recasting Therapy and Enhancement: A New Theoretical Model  
I propose a refined theoretical model that pays less attention to the therapy / 
enhancement distinction as such, and decreases the emphasis on whether states of 
health deserving assistance are ‘normal’ or ‘abnormal’. Instead I recommend an 
increasing emphasis on the straightforward question of whether a need (broadly 
construed) can or cannot reasonably, safely, and fairly be met via medical 
assistance. 
For example, if an enhancement would safely confer significant enough health 
benefits, and sufficient resources were available after all more pressing needs had 
been met, I argue that no substantial moral argument remains for withholding 
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access to it in principle (Bostrom & Roache, 2008; Harris, 2009; Sandberg & 
Savulescu, 2011). This would hold true even if assistance is not used to treat 
sickness or illness because, as Scripko (2010, p. 296) observes, ‘enhancement 
technologies will often fulfil medicine’s goal of promoting health’. 
Although unconditional endorsements of an expansion of medical services to 
routinely consider the provision of enhancements in the way I have described 
were not evident in the study, there was some conditional support. The responses 
of C3, C4, C9, C10, C11, C12, S2, S3, S4, S6, S9, S11 indicate that this model need not 
conflict with the conventional ethical responsibilities of medical practice as such, 
as long as all more severe or limiting health needs had been met prior to decisions 
about supplying enhancements. 
A corresponding characterisation of health needs as varying in severity underpins 
the approach I recommend. My proposal, however, is that resources should be 
allocated according to judgements about the extent to which a need limits health 
and / or functioning, rather than how the form of assistance happens to be 
categorised.  
7.5.1) A Realist Account of Needs 
For the reasons I gave in chapter three, the model that I propose is realist in nature 
because the needs that underpin the model are understood to impose limitations 
which do not alter according to the epistemological category into which they are 
placed. They are prior to categorisation and hence they should be considered as 
real. The study findings show that the participants did not typically associate need 
with ‘normal health’, however this disassociation is only accurate to a limited 
extent. 
That someone is not ill or free of disease does not mean that they have no needs. 
There are tasks which I am physically or intellectually unable to perform, even if I 
am in a state of good and normal health. I therefore have needs relative to those 
tasks if I wished to carry them out. If I wished to be a professional basketball 
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player, I would need to be significantly taller than I am. Powell & Buchanan (2011, 
p. 10) capture this insight in observing ‘the ubiquity of suboptimal design’. 
If I am too short to be a professional basketball player, it is irrelevant whether or 
not I am considered healthy, or whether I am viewed as normal or abnormal, since 
none of these categorisations have any effect on my height or resolve my physical 
need. If this approach is applied to the full range of human ability we can construct 
a realist hierarchy of needs that encompasses all functional states, from those 
which immediately threaten life or severely limit health, to those which do not but 
nevertheless impede an individual’s capacity to live his or her life in the way that 
they desire.  
7.5.2) Needs and the Fact / Value Distinction 
If we believe that medical resources ought to be allocated in such a way that those 
with the greatest need are always ‘first in line’ for assistance, then we cannot also 
believe that these states are value-neutral. Unless the limitations imposed by a 
need are judged negatively it is not obvious why assistance ought to be provided. 
Therefore in order to allocate resources according to needs, not only must we a) 
treat these needs as real; but we must also b) judge them as evaluative states in 
order to make normative conclusions about what constitutes an appropriate 
response to them. 
Scepticism about the possibility of doing so, however, underpins the is / ought 
problem and by extension the apparent and more general difficulty that this 
problem poses for the rational incorporation of empirical data into ethical analysis 
(de Scheer & Widdershoven, 2004; De Vries & Gordijn, 2009; Brassington, 2013).  
As I explained in chapter three, this fallacy can be negotiated by showing that 
needs can impose limitations that should be removed, all other things being equal, 
if it will confer a benefit (Sayer, 1997).  This is a view consistent with the positions 
adopted by Toulmin (1975), Agich (1983), and Lennox (1995) concerning the 
intrinsically evaluative nature of different functional states. It is redolent of Hare’s 
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(1986, p. 176) summary of this view that ‘If I have bad eyesight...I ought to go to the 
oculist and he ought to prescribe spectacles if they will make my eyesight better.’ 
The belief that health states are not value neutral is one that was reflected 
unanimously in the study data, and is also a premise of the arguments which form 
the remainder of the conclusions. The principle articulated widely within the study 
was that the presence of states which cause suffering or compromise health, 
functioning, ability, or wellbeing provides a rationally compelling moral reason to 
provide assistance. In this respect the theoretical model that I advance is 
consistent with the views expressed in the study.   
7.5.3) Judging the Acceptability of Enhancements 
A model of resource allocation whose primary criterion is actual need rather than 
perceived normality provides a more stable basis for such decisions in the face of 
conflicting accounts of health. In particular it provides greater stability in the event 
that acceleration in medical technology increases the options for effective human 
enhancement as predicted by Bostrom (2005), Kurzweil (2005), Bostrom & 
Sandberg (2009), and Harris (2009).  
The question of whether or not medical assistance is classed as ‘therapy’ or 
‘enhancement’ is relegated in importance. Anchoring decision-making primarily in 
actual needs and reducing the importance of whether the recipient’s health and / 
or functioning is considered normal thus provide greater flexibility if technological 
changes becomes increasingly rapid. Consequently the decision-making process 
for someone seeking medical assistance would be as follows: 
1) Is the technology available for safely meeting this person’s needs as required? 
2) Could this be done without diverting resources from someone with a greater 
need? 
3) If the answer to 1) and 2) is ‘yes’, assistance is justifiable even if it is ‘enhances’ 
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We can apply this decision making process to the case of EPO and examine the 
results. Imagine that someone seeks EPO to enhance their endurance or exercise 
capacity for a professional or lifestyle purpose, and is not using it for competitive 
advantage in circumstances where its use is forbidden.  S3’s hypothetical example 
of someone with an arduous manual job for whom the use of EPO would enhance 
performance and ‘make their daily grind a bit more tolerable’ is relevant here. 
If a nephrologist judges that usage can be monitored and the amount required is 
small enough to be safe, then assuming the provision of assistance would not 
deprive someone whose needs are greater, there is no obvious reason why access 
should be denied. By contrast, if the risk to health were too great, and / or if the 
drug were to be used for positional gain alone in a context such as competitive 
sport, then assistance should be denied. Note that whether assistance is granted or 
denied, however, it is not whether assistance is ‘therapeutic’ or ‘enhancing’ that is 
of central ethical relevance (Savulescu, 2006; Harris, 2009; Sandberg & Savulescu, 
2011). 
In the example given here the conditions of acceptability also closely resemble 
justifications given in the study for the acceptability of cosmetic plastic surgery 
(S6, S9, C8, C12). In these cases there was a clear separation between the 
participants’ personal views of cosmetic plastic surgery, and their opinions 
concerning what its legal status should be. Although several were critical of the 
aesthetic motivations which drive the industry and the private surgeons who work 
within it, they did not believe it should be illegal or think that cosmetic plastic 
surgery was ethically unacceptable as such. 
Although the participants registered little objection to enhancement in principle, 
the provision of medical assistance to people who they perceived to have no need 
that would warrant it was typically viewed as a kind of practice that they neither 
identified with nor wished to engage in. Since no policy presently exists with the 
explicit aim of co-opting enhancements into standard medical practice and 
budgeting decisions it may be relatively easy for them to separate judgements of 
hypothetical ethical acceptability from practical ones in this way. It is, however, 
230 
 
unclear whether they would express similarly ambivalent views if such policies 
were introduced that would impinge on their current practices and values.   
7.5.4) Advantages of the Model 
The model that I recommend does not undermine the professional medical 
principle of prioritising the needs of the sick. In this respect acceptance of the 
logical reducibility of therapy to enhancement need not threaten the just allocation 
of resources. There are real physio-biological differences in health and functioning 
between, for example, an 80 year old person with renal anaemia receiving EPO and 
a professional athlete wishing to use EPO for a competitive advantage (S1). To the 
extent that the health needs of the 80 year old are more severe than those of the 
athlete, it is the difference between these two needs which should determine the 
allocation of resources. Consequently the model achieves three aims: 
1) It clarifies the relationship between therapy and enhancement by 
disaggregating the fact that they are logically continuous from the ethical 
primacy of allocating medical assistance according to need. 
 
2) In clarifying this relationship this approach achieves a balance between 
enhancement theory and the study data which protects the ethical integrity 
of conventional medical practice. 
 
3) Given changes in norms of health, and enhancement anomalies such as 
beta-blockers and cosmetic surgery, the account is a guide for judging the 
acceptability of providing assistance to enhance in other cases, should 
similar challenges emerge in future. 
This provides a tentative account of how enhancement could be fairly 
institutionalised in a way that takes into account both the implications of the 
logical weakness of the therapy / enhancement distinction and the practical 
demands of distributive justice. Despite enhancement’s logical continuity with 
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therapy there would still be a need to ensure that resources are allocated 
according to need even if enhancements were to be legally permitted. 
In view of the fluidity of norms of health, less emphasis would be placed on 
whether medical assistance restores ‘normality’ or boosts it. A commitment to 
health needs as real and limiting would be retained, however. In doing this it 
would be possible to reduce the philosophical problems which result from strong 
adherence to the distinction. It would also recognise as legitimate the desire to 
enhance as long as countervailing issues of justice would not result in negative 
outcomes for people whose health needs are greater.  
7.5.5) The Persistence of Normality 
Although my approach has the advantage of circumventing some of the practical 
difficulties associated with the delineation of therapy from enhancement, it does 
not completely avoid conceptual complications involved in the clear identification 
of normality in relation to health. Undoubtedly some conception of normality is 
unavoidable when considering resource allocation, because many subjectively 
valued goals will be consistent with the expectations and structure of society 
(Benedict, 1934; Kleinman, 1979; Press, 1980). For example most people, by 
definition, live ‘normal’ lives, since for something to be normal is for it to be similar 
to the other instances of which it is a class (Canguilhem, 1975; Mordacci, 1995; 
Kovacs, 1998). 
One response to this challenge is to consider concerns raised over ‘medicalisation’ 
and the de facto reclassification of normality as abnormality via the inclusion and 
legalisation of treatment for it under the auspices of medicine (Illich, 1976; Conrad, 
1982). Concerns about medicalisation are understandable, but they are misleading 
in one respect, because ‘medicalisation’ is ubiquitous. For example headaches are 
normal, but there is no stigma associated with going to buy ibuprofen, a medicine, 
to remove them. Birth control is also a medical intervention but, notwithstanding 
certain religious objections, the ‘medicalisation’ of this aspect of life is not 
especially controversial. Similarly, judgements about whether to allow the use of 
232 
 
an enhancement must be made on a case by case basis according to whether or not 
there are good reasons to be concerned about their availability.   
Furthermore talk of medicalising ‘normality’ depends on having first decided what 
‘normality’ is. This cannot be done reliably because, as Holm (2008, p. 9) points 
out, an alternative conception is always available if one just changes one’s frame of 
reference, and hence there is ‘no way of getting a neutral and uncontroversial 
measure of statistical normality’. The concern over ‘medicalisation’ is that it 
reclassifies something which genuinely does not require medical assistance as an 
‘abnormality’ that does, and in doing so stigmatises the individual concerned. 
However Amundson’s (2000, p. 43) comment, raised in the literature review, that 
‘variation is ubiquitous’ is relevant here. He underlines the normative character of 
the concept of normality, and criticises it by reference to Hacking’s claim that it 
‘uses a power as old as Aristotle to bridge the fact/value distinction, whispering in 
your ear that what is normal is also right’. 
A way to resist this, therefore, is to deliberately reduce the institutional 
significance of the therapy / enhancement distinction and the threshold of 
normality that it implies. If instead we were to adopt an approach in which the 
broad aim of distributive justice is simply to provide assistance up to as high a 
threshold as resources will permit, then discrimination relating to conceptions of 
normality can be limited. 
I showed in chapter two that numerous accounts of health have been advanced, 
and it is a limitation of the model I recommend that it does not, ultimately, prove 
beyond doubt how ‘normal’ functioning should be understood. In view of this the 
presence of some conception of normality in any decision concerning the 
allocation of resources is unavoidable. Consequently we must also accept that 
because norms of health necessarily constitute the conceptual dividing line 
between therapy and enhancement, as long as we have a conception of normal 
health we will not be able to dispense completely with assumptions about the 
meaning of the therapy / enhancement distinction. 
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What we can do, however, is attenuate the importance and influence of the 
distinction in recognition of the fact that norms are not static and fluctuate in their 
reliability. If the approach that I advance works, it does so precisely because it 
wishes to reduce the stigma associated with ‘abnormality’ and engender a wider 
consideration of all the needs that are present across the whole of society and what 
can be done to meet them. 
7.6) Regulating Enhancement 
Hypothetical recognition was evident within the study that there are personal 
circumstances in which it may be reasonable for someone to allow the use of 
medical products for enhancement (C4, C9, C11, C12, S2, S3, S6, S9, S11).  As the 
study data indicated, however, the safety profile of the product and the kinds of 
purposes for which it would be used influenced the perceived ethical acceptability 
of granting assistance. 
Buchanan et al (2000), Bostrom (2004), and Kamm (2009) adopt a similar view to 
in relation to the second of these conditions, namely that an enhancement should 
not be permitted if it confers only a ‘positional’ advantage to the user over non-
users, for example in the case of EPO use in professional sport. By contrast, 
however, these authors endorse the legalisation and regulation of enhancements if 
they would confer an absolute or intrinsic advantage that ‘can raise the absolute 
quality of each person’s life even if there is no change in relative advantage’ (Kamm, 
2009, p. 112). Bostrom & Roache (2008), Bostrom & Sandberg (2009), and 
Sandberg & Savulescu (2011) have identified cognitive enhancers in particular as 
candidates for conferring this kind of benefit.  
If the advantages conferred by a particular enhancement would be a) beneficial to 
health; b) intrinsically valuable rather than valued only because they increase one 
person’s advantage over another; and c) would not divert resources away from 
people whose health needs are more severe or otherwise exacerbate inequalities 
in any socially corrosive way, there is a prima facie justification for allowing their 
private use. 
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Furthermore, if an intervention satisfied the first two of these criteria to the extent 
that it would benefit a sufficiently large proportion of society to receive it, there 
would be grounds for subsidising that intervention, even if it would be viewed as 
an enhancement rather than a therapy according to current classifications. In 
relation to the case of cognitive enhancements, Bostrom & Sandberg (2009, p. 331) 
list several examples of where welfare and public health related measures have 
been implemented beneficially: 
‘Many extant regulations are intended to protect and improve cognitive function. 
Regulation of lead in paint and tap water, requirements of boxing, bicycle, and 
motorcycle helmets, bans on alcohol for minors, mandatory education, folic acid 
fortification of cereals...’ 
Indeed if enhancements are judged according to whether they can act as a 
supplementary benefit to worthwhile pursuits and choices, as is implied by this list 
of examples, their control via appropriate regulatory policies ‘will allow people to 
build human capital alongside other activities’ (Nam, 2012, p. 5). Viewed in this way 
there would be circumstances in which the legal control of enhancements could be 
considered acceptable. Moreover the study data indicates conditional acceptance 
of their legal use from the perspective of medical professionals working in the 
context of a society with mixed public and private healthcare such as the UK, 
assuming that they would be safe to use and beneficial in the ways outlined here.  
7.6.1) A Prioritarian Approach 
In view of the private and public components involved in the provision of medical 
services, I recommend an approach to enhancement that aims to harmonise these 
forms of access. This approach is consistent with the theory of prioritarianism 
discussed in chapter six, and furthermore is one that is largely tractable with the 
views expressed within the empirical study. Parfit (1997, p. 214) summarises the 
prioritarian position: 
‘If it is more important to benefit one of two people, because this person is worse off, 
it is irrelevant whether these people are in the same community, or are aware of each 
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other’s existence. The greater urgency of benefiting this person does not depend on 
her relation to the other person, but only on her lower absolute level.’ 
According to this definition a prioritarian approach would be applicable to the 
socio-economic and political model of a country which has a mixture of both public 
and private healthcare provision, such as the UK (Freidson, 1970). A prioritarian 
approach to enhancement would have three advantages. 
Firstly, it would protect the normative, needs-orientated integrity of conventional 
medicine in a way that was unanimously viewed as central to the ethical integrity 
of medicine by the study participants. Secondly, it would protect the ‘negative 
liberty’ rights (Berlin, 1969) that are highly valued in liberal societies (Hayek, 
1960; Galston, 1999). Thirdly, it would in principle allow the subsidisation of or 
legal private access to certain enhancements if there were an equilibrium between: 
the benefit to the recipient when weighed against the risks; the available 
resources; and people whose health needs are greater or who would benefit more 
from using the enhancement instead. 
A prioritarian system, whilst not eliminating relative inequality, could be used to 
reduce absolute inequality by providing enhancements according to need in the 
same way as conventional medicine. Thus, it is not necessarily the case that 
prioritarian inequalities would be unjust. They may be unjust, but injustice is not 
necessarily entailed simply by the presence of a relative inequality (Parfit, 1997; 
Arneson, 2000; Brown, 2007). Indeed prioritarianism may be harnessed to deliver 
the ends of justice, assuming that we have correctly identified the relevant needs 
and effectively calibrated a system of provision, distribution, and access to achieve 
this fairly. As Sandberg & Savulescu (2011, p. 104) have argued: 
‘A fair go entails that each person has a legitimate claim to some enhancement or 
medical intervention when that intervention provides that person with reasonable 
chance of reasonable extension of a reasonable life and / or a reasonable 
improvement in its quality...Enhancement would not necessarily result in injustice or 
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unfairness. If managed the right way, it could reduce natural inequality, injustice, 
and unfairness.’ 
Nevertheless the legalisation of products for enhancement use would have 
implications for justice that should be considered. Given a legal market in 
enhancement the benefits would inevitably accrue to those with the economic 
means to access them because, as Buchanan et al (2000, p. 340) observe, ‘Markets 
enable the lucky, less vulnerable participants to detach their fortunes from their 
unlucky fellow citizens’: once an enhancement is made legal it would be impossible 
to prevent private access to it. 
Even if attempts were made to prevent this the task would be impossible – no 
completely ‘leak-proof’ (Fukuyama, 2002, p. 188) policy could be designed due to 
the scale and complexity of the task. The risk associated with this, raised in the 
study by C8 and S2, is an exacerbation of inequality between people who could 
derive a benefit from the enhancement and could afford to buy it, and people who 
could not or did not meet the criteria for receiving it via public subsidy. 
This concern has been voiced particularly strongly in relation to the possibility of 
genetic enhancement in which there is a risk that a gulf may emerge between 
enhanced and unenhanced humans that cannot then be reversed (Shickle, 2000; 
Fukuyama, 2002; Kass, 2003; Koch, 2010). The permanent nature of these changes 
and the entrenchment of advantage that it would entail would be more damaging 
than, for example, the ‘gap’ between people who elect to have cosmetic plastic 
surgery and people who do not. 
Indeed there is evidence in the study data concerning the rapid and widespread 
uptake of EPO within sport following its introduction to the market that these 
kinds of worries are not merely hypothetical but actual (C5, C7, S1, S4, S5).  The 
thriving black market in EPO referred to by C3, C8, S2, and S9 lend support to the 
belief that a demand exists for enhancements which could be used by individuals 
for purely positional gain.  Similarly C7, C8, and S9 were concerned about the 
possibility of inequitable policies being implemented as a result of the economic 
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pressure that the pharmaceutical industry could exert on policy makers in the 
event of a legal market in enhancements emerging. 
These are all legitimate concerns. However it is important not to assume that any 
deleterious effects which could occur would necessarily do so because the 
enhancement itself is intrinsically ethically unacceptable. For example it is equally 
plausible that these effects could result from badly designed or poorly 
implemented policies. One should not infer from the fact that the provision of an 
enhancement may result in social injustice to the conclusion that if it did so it 
would necessarily be the enhancement that is responsible. 
For example the study data indicate that it would, on balance, be unwise to widen 
access to EPO given its characteristics. Similarly however, if flu or measles 
vaccinations were only available privately this would be a problem because of an 
unjust model of distribution. If this was the case and the only people who caught 
flu or measles were those who could not afford the vaccination, this would be a 
failure of policy rather than the technology.  If an enhancement is available that 
could be sufficiently beneficial, it is incumbent on policy makers to ensure it is 
managed appropriately and used to maximum benefit. 
7.6.2) Enhancement’s Relation to Medicine: Two Interpretations 
The approach to enhancement that I have developed requires an ongoing 
reappraisal of the correspondence between the ethical principles of medicine and 
its actual practices in order to ensure that the optimum satisfaction of needs 
relative to resources is achieved. Despite providing greater flexibility than the 
conventional model in deciding who may or may not receive assistance, any 
decision to allow and provide enhancement may lend some immediacy to concerns 
about the drive to ‘expand the category of illness’ (Fox, 1977, p. 18) and the 
subsequent ‘medicalisation’ of normality (Illich, 1976; Conrad, 1982) mentioned 
earlier. Any institutional reconfiguration to allow or provide enhancements as a 
matter of course would imply a relaxation of what medicine legitimately may do, 
and would therefore imply one of two possible interpretations: 
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1) The boundary of ‘therapy’ itself is being moved to include ‘enhancements’ such 
that the latter are tacitly recast as the former. 
2) A distinction is still made between ‘therapy’ and ‘enhancement’ by appeal to a 
norm of health, but it is accepted that medical assistance may reasonably go 
beyond therapy.  
This difference between these is subtle, but significant. On the first reading, 
‘therapy’ is recast to include certain states currently considered normal. Here 
states presently considered normal are medicalised, because interventions that 
were previously understood as conferring supra-normality would be brought 
under the auspices of conventional practice. A possible outcome of this, as Conrad 
& Potter (2004, p. 200) point out, is that it would constitute a de facto 
reclassification of health as deficiency in which ‘a wide range of conditions or 
behaviours can be defined as a medical problem, as some kind of disorder in need of 
treatment’ . 
Moreover, if Fukuyama (2002), Kass (2003), Sandel (2004), and Koch (2010) are 
right that perceived deficiency implies the normative assumption that such states 
should be rectified, then to recast the definition in this way may inhibit ‘sympathies 
that an openness to the unbidden can cultivate’ (Sandel, 2004, p. 6) by recasting 
states that do not require improvement as abnormal. Concerns related to this 
emerged in the study, for example in C8’s worry about ‘the protection that would be 
available to people’ in an enhancement market. Given that a private market in 
enhancement would be commercially driven he was critical of sanctioning policies 
in which ‘preying on the weak’ by the manufacturers of enhancements would be 
legally permitted. 
On the second interpretation, a distinction would still be made between therapy 
and enhancement, and as such adherence to a present norm would persist. The 
departure here would be that in legalising access to enhancements, an admission 
would be made that it is reasonable for medical professionals to provide them. In 
this respect a concession would be made to the arguments of Bostrom & Roache 
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(2008), Harris (2009), Scripko (2009), Sandberg & Savulescu (2011) that the 
conferral of supra-normality can be a legitimate practice of medicine. This would 
be significant, since it would broaden the remit of medicine beyond its 
conventional boundaries. Here again, however, some conditional acceptance was 
evident within the study from S2, S3, S6, C9, C11, assuming that the circumstances 
were appropriate and that it would be safe to do so.  
Policy responses would differ according to which of these two interpretations we 
favour. Assuming the UK’s model of healthcare provision we would be considering 
circumstances where some people pay privately for medical care, but in which 
universal healthcare is also freely available for all. According to the first 
interpretation, the legalisation and inclusion of certain enhancements under the 
banner of therapy would necessarily entail some degree of subsidisation. On the 
second interpretation no subsidisation of enhancements would follow inevitably, 
since as the existing threshold of normality is still being adhered to as the trigger 
for medical assistance, it would not prima facie be incumbent on the state to 
provide them. It may, however, follow secondarily from this model that some 
subsidisation would be necessary.  
An example of this widely referred to in the literature that I have already 
mentioned is the potential expansion of cognitive enhancements (Chaterjee, 2004; 
Greely et al, 2008; Wasson, 2011). If the arguments of Greely et al (2008), Bostrom 
& Roache (2008) are correct that cognitive enhancers, unlike EPO, could be widely 
beneficial, providing non-positional goods in a way that the exclusively positional 
benefits of EPO use in sport largely do not, then a case for subsidisation may 
present itself on two counts. 
Firstly, it would be necessary in the interests of justice to offset the advantages 
accruing to those who can afford to access the products privately. Secondly, if the 
benefits that they offer for people at the lower end of the normal range of cognitive 
ability were great enough, their subsidisation  would be justifiable under certain 
circumstances despite their being considered extra-therapeutic (Sandberg & 
Savulescu, 2011; Housden et al, 2011).   
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7.6.3) Consequences of Legalisation 
Whether a) a distinction is maintained between therapy and enhancement by 
adherence to a norm; or b) (some) enhancements are recast as interventions that 
are sufficiently consistent with the goals of medicine that a doctor may provide 
them, the consequences for any legalisation of access are significant in each case. 
According to both interpretations the codification of enhancement in law and 
policy would change the parameters of medical decision making. 
If a move were made toward the legalisation of some enhancements, then on the 
first model it would be necessary for medical training and education to be altered 
(Pellegrino, 2004; Drabiak-Syed, 2011). The biomedical model, which acts as a 
heuristic for treatment at present, nominally excludes ‘normal health’ from those 
states considered in need of assistance. Thus, were any enhancements to be 
brought under the auspices of medicine, relevant re-categorisations would have to 
be reflected in the training of medical professionals and the ‘evolving role of 
physicians’ (Chaterjee, 2004, p. 972).  
On the second interpretation changes to training would also be required, although 
the form of these may be different. According to this view the therapy / 
enhancement distinction is maintained, with enhancements being privately legally 
available, but not typically provided under conventional healthcare. Thus, training 
would have to reflect the fact that some people may seek enhancement (in a 
similar way to those who seek cosmetic surgery, for example), and therefore that 
the private provision of such an extra-therapeutic private service is a potential 
career option. 
The second model in particular is worth investigating further. A suggestion put 
forward within the enhancement literature by Pellegrino (2004), Chaterjee (2004), 
and Goffete (2006) is that a potential response to enhancements may be the 
establishment of a parallel service providing ‘enhancement medicine’ alongside its 
conventional practices. This would be analogous in some ways to cosmetic surgery 
at present. 
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7.6.4) ‘Enhancement Medicine’ as a Parallel Institution? 
This idea was explored by C6 and S6. The justification for a parallel institution was 
grounded in a position expressed by S6 in his claim that ‘we’re not ethically trained 
to do that’.  This is revealing, since it implies the view that enhancement medicine 
would be different in its values from that of medical practice at present. Similarly, 
C8’s anomalous claim that enhancement has ‘almost no connection at all’ to 
medicine is contrary to the claim that there is an intrinsic continuity between the 
two. Thus, one potential response to a widespread demand for enhancement 
would be to design an explicitly different kind of institution such that the 
structural integrity of conventional medicine and its treatment criteria remain 
intact. 
Parens (1998) warn of a scenario in which private enhancement practitioners or 
‘schmoctors’ provide extra therapeutic medical assistance for profit rather than 
egalitarian or prioritarian motivations. Pellegrino (2004, p. 2) makes a similar 
warning that this scenario is likely because within private medicine - unlike the 
trenchantly pro-NHS motivations expressed by the participants in this study - 
‘Enhancement will also appeal to the physician’s self-interest’. Moreover the 
inevitability of a parallel private market in enhancements may mean that the 
governance situation is more complex than simply applying a prioritarian model of 
resource allocation. Given the local context of the UK in which the majority of 
healthcare provision is publicly-funded and therefore rationed, the ‘counterweight’ 
(Buchanan et al, 2000) of the state would be needed to prevent these kinds of 
scenarios from occurring or limit their impact. 
One might ask whether the fact that enhancements could be socially beneficial is a 
good enough reason by itself for creating the conditions in which such a market 
could thrive alongside their public subsidisation, or whether the possibilities for 
justice are too high a price to pay. Several responses are available. None of them 
guarantee the prevention of negative consequences; however they outline respects 
in which worries may be overstated or misplaced. 
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Firstly, assuming we judge decisions about legalisation on a case by case basis and 
employ the appropriate calculus of safety, risks, benefits, and justice, these 
decisions need not be undesirable. The possibility persists, but this would depend 
on the kind of enhancement being considered rather than the fact that it is an 
enhancement as such (Bostrom & Sandberg, 2009; Scripko, 2010; Sandberg & 
Savulescu, 2011) 
In order to maximise the potential benefits and prevent the exacerbation of 
inequalities between those who could pay for them privately from ‘disengaged 
purveyors of quality of life elixirs’ (Chaterjee, 2004, p. 972) and those who could 
not, subsidisation in certain cases would be necessary even if these interventions 
were understood as existing beyond the boundaries of conventional medical 
practice. Consequently it would be difficult to implement this policy unless medical 
professionals were to accept that some enhancements may be routinely available. 
According to my data this policy would presently be resisted, and it would be a 
matter for further investigation to discover whether this view is held more widely. 
Given that all of the participants interviewed were medical professionals practising 
within the NHS in the UK, their professional orientation must follow the model and 
decision making criteria used within that context. If it is true for a doctor working 
exclusively within the NHS to say ‘we’re not ethically trained for that’, it may be that 
medicine is not institutionally prepared to sanction the legalisation and provision 
of enhancements, and the challenges that this would entail. Consequently, even if 
one accepts the pro-enhancement arguments that call for the inclusion of 
enhancements within the calculus of medical resource allocation, the reorientation 
and institutional changes required would take considerable time and effort. 
In view of the reluctance displayed amongst the study participants the 
establishment of a parallel service of enhancement medicine is one way in which a 
proliferation in enhancement technologies could be managed, despite the criticism 
levelled at this kind of service by Parens (1998), Pellegrino (2004), and Chaterjee 
(2004). According to the study data it is one that may on balance be preferable to 
medical professionals currently working within a framework such as the NHS than 
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the inclusion of enhancements within this framework. In the longer term, however, 
if enhancements were to emerge that could confer widespread benefits and one 
were serious about harnessing them to these ends, purely private availability 
would be untenable. 
A reason why the complete separation of ‘therapy’ from ‘enhancement’ would be 
untenable in the longer term if enhancement were to proliferate relates to a) 
changes in medical ethical norms and b) advances in medical technology. For 
example, Bostrom & Sandberg (2009, p. 332) argue that increasing autonomy will 
go hand-in-hand with a growing ability to personalise medicine as medical 
knowledge and technology improve. They therefore predict a re-orientation of 
medical care towards a model of health maintenance and improvement rather than 
remediation because: 
‘Preventative and enhancing medicine are often inseparable, and both will likely be 
promoted by these changes’. 
If people continue to live more healthily for longer, this will inevitably re-shape 
medical care in such a way that some ‘enhancements’ are available to everybody 
because a personalised approach would become the standard. 
We do not know the extent to which this might occur; however it is one scenario in 
which the kind of internal reorientation of medicine that I propose might occur 
naturally and gradually in a way that also reflects changing social norms, rather 
than one which is forced through by policy. In this respect it is clear that the ethical 
and policy debate has broader implications for justice in society that extend 
beyond an internal re-examination of the relation between enhancement and 
appropriate medical practice. I will now consider some of these social implications.  
7.7) Enhancement and Social Justice 
If an enhancement were to be legalised it would be impossible to prevent private 
access to it. Consequently we might prefer to decide against legalisation, 
particularly in the case of powerful enhancements, on the basis that it would carry 
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too great a risk of the most economically fortunate to increase the positional 
advantage over others.  Would it be acceptable that an already privileged few could 
become better off than before? Since a private market in enhancements will follow 
from their legalisation, how is their use to be controlled and restricted to ‘genuine’ 
cases alone? 
One way of approaching this is to consider what tools society already employs and 
governs via policy to improve humans from their ‘natural’ state. One example is 
literacy (Maddox, 2008; Bostrom & Roache, 2008; Bostrom & Sandberg, 2009), 
which is not only considered desirable both intrinsically and positionally, but is 
also an ability that one is legally obliged to acquire. In this respect the enforcement 
of education can be viewed as state coercion, although it is acceptable in view of 
the scale of its benefits (Bostrom & Sandberg, 2009, p. 331): 
‘ For literacy, the enforcement is both direct, in the form of mandatory basic 
education, and indirect, in the form of severe social penalties for failure to acquire 
reading and writing skills...Despite these enormous and partially coercive pressures, 
and despite the fact that literacy profoundly changes the way the brain processes 
language...literacy is not deemed to be problematic.’ 
Despite socio-economic inequalities in the standard and supply of education, its 
mandatory provision is preferable to no education or to it being non-obligatory. 
This is because, as Maddox (2008, p. 191) notes, the capabilities that it provides 
are ‘future oriented’, and in general anybody for anybody who becomes literate this 
‘enhances their wider freedoms and agency’. If acquiring literacy is beneficial 
because of the advantages that follow from it, then under a wide conception of 
enhancement, individual enhancements need not be unjust. Rather, decisions 
about whether an enhancement would be socially desirable must consider many 
variables. 
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Irrespective of technological classification, decisions about legality and availability 
should also be broadly congruent with society’s wishes and norms28. Fundamental 
changes to medical provision should not be permitted without this kind of 
mandate. As C2 stated, ‘for progress you need enhancements’, but negotiation is 
necessary to ensure that medical assistance reflects the values that society wishes 
to uphold because ‘we should do it in a way which is responsible and which doesn’t 
have any adverse effects on that individual or to the society’.  
Although it is true that healthcare practices are institutionally defined, C1 pointed 
out that ‘medicine operates within society...what we do as doctors or healthcare 
professionals is influenced by what society deems to be acceptable and appropriate’. 
Hence to the extent that this claim properly represents the relationship between 
medicine and society, the institutional practices of the former cannot be 
completely evaluatively distinct from the latter. 
The example of literacy shows that an intervention may be so widely beneficial 
that it is in a society’s interests to legislate for it. It is a contingent matter as to 
whether or not interventions are medical in nature. Literacy is an enhancement of 
cognition that is not medical in nature, but it does contribute substantially to our 
social welfare arrangements. By contrast, vaccination is a service that is medical in 
nature but this too overlaps with social welfare because as Dawson (2011) points 
out, it provides a significant public good in limiting or eradicating disease. Whether 
we describe it as enhancement or a therapy is irrelevant – its utility overrides 
these issues. Thus, if other technologies were to emerge that are medical in nature 
and similarly or more beneficial in terms of social justice, there would be good 
reasons to legalise these as well. 
The pharmaceutical industry and Parens’ ‘schmoctors’ are potential concerns, 
because their primary concern will be profit rather than meeting severe health 
needs or working towards widespread public health benefits. Indeed concerns 
over the primary motivation of the pharmaceutical industry appeared regularly in 
                                                          
28
 Notwithstanding hypothetical instances in which it may be rational to refuse to mandate something 
irrespective of its popularity, for example a highly addictive and dangerous drug. 
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the study data. The appropriate response to this concern, however, is to 
recommend that enhancements are not assumed to be homogenous, of marginal 
utility, or necessarily for positional advantage alone such that they should be 
excluded from decisions about subsidisation. The study data indicate that EPO is, 
ultimately, unlikely to satisfy these conditions. However this is only true of EPO. 
Other potential enhancement products should be taken seriously and analysed to 
determine whether they could be harnessed to provide a net benefit to society, and 
thus whether they are better candidates for legalisation and subsidisation.  
Given this analysis, I argue that a rational approach to an enhancement technology 
would be to pose the question ‘are there things we can do to benefit society and 
enhance the healthy living of its members?’. If the answer is yes then its inclusion 
under policy should be considered, irrespective of whether it is presently 
understood as a therapy or an enhancement, and thus nominally interior or 
exterior to the boundaries of medical practice. Medicine is part of society and not 
isolated from it. It is an institution that everybody has to use and as such should 
reflect society’s values. The porous boundary between medicine and welfare / 
public health is particularly relevant to enhancement because this must be brought 
into any calculus about what forms of medical assistance should be legal and on 
what terms.  
7.8) Situating the Model and Balancing Logical Ambiguity with Practical 
Value 
Various theoretical positions found in the literature reflect aspects of my data in 
different ways. For example Juengst (1997), Lin & Allhoff (2008), and Scripko 
(2010) argue that enhancement and therapy are continuous to the extent that 
some of the goals of the former are served by the latter. Some recognition of this 
view was evident within my data in relation to discussions of borderline 
enhancements such as beta-blockers and cosmetic plastic surgery (C3, S11, S9). 
Similarly C2 stated directly that enhancements are essential for progress, and 
identified his smartphone as a ‘proper enhancement’. In doing so he offered 
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opinions redolent of transhumanist views concerning the indispensability of 
technological enhancement to human life (Bostrom, 2005; Harris, 2009; More, 
2013), and the symbiotic integration of mankind with his innovations (Clark & 
Chalmers, 1998; Clark, 2004; Kurzweil, 2005).  
Undoubtedly there are other similarities to be found, however some are more 
relevant than others in terms of providing orientation towards to the specific aims 
of this thesis. In this thesis I have attempted to put forward ethical conclusions that 
are not only theoretically significant but also practical and applicable. For this 
reason it is not necessary to situate the conclusions exhaustively within the whole 
of the literature. I have identified four theoretical positions which reflect the 
conclusions that I have arrived at and the approach to enhancement that I 
recommend. The location can be summarised as the intersection of four quotes - 
from John Harris, Norman Daniels, Nils Holtug, and Germund Hesslow. 
I conclude that the therapy / enhancement distinction is, ultimately, of only limited 
utility, since it is logically ambiguous and the categorisations of the relative health 
of different states may fluctuate, given the likelihood of ongoing changes in health 
norms (Hare, 1986; Shickle, 2000; Boyd, 2000; Stempsey, 2006; Bostrom & 
Sandberg, 2009; Bess, 2010; Serna, 2012) (S2, S11, C2, C11). 
I argue that ‘enhancements’ can have morally acceptable, beneficial uses insofar as 
they would improve health and / or functioning; however a condition on this must 
be imposed. Given the primacy of assisting people whose health needs are greater, 
a condition of ethical acceptability of enhancements is that this does not divert 
medical resources away from being able to meet those needs successfully 
(Pellegrino, 2004; Allhoff, 2005; Brownsword, 2012), (C9, C11, C12, S2, S3, S6, S9). 
Despite recognition of this by the study participants, a practical ethical 
commitment to providing medical assistance according to need overrode any 
logical consequences entailed by the logical weakness of the therapy / 
enhancement distinction. However as I have argued, it is possible to uphold the fair 
allocation of limited resources by reference to need alone, without relying on the 
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therapy / enhancement distinction too heavily as an arbiter of distributive justice. I 
therefore concur with Harris’ (2009, p. 154) argument that: 
‘The overwhelming moral imperative for both therapy and enhancement is to prevent 
harm and confer benefit. Bathed in that moral light, it is unimportant whether the 
protection or benefit conferred is classified as enhancement or improvement, 
protection or therapy.’ 
Despite this the therapy / enhancement distinction is a useful, though limited, 
heuristic for practical purposes of justice. The distinction implies a hierarchy of 
needs that can be prioritised such that the available resources can be ‘titrated’ (S2) 
in a way that favours those whose needs are most urgent or severe. Therefore, as 
long as not too much is expected of the distinction and its logical vulnerability is 
kept in mind, some conditional institutional retention of the hierarchy represented 
by the distinction is desirable. Consequently I suggest that an appropriate balance 
with my data is also reflected in Norman Daniels’ (2000, p. 309) analysis of the 
therapy / enhancement distinction: 
‘...the treatment-enhancement distinction by itself does not specify the boundary 
between obligatory and nonobligatory medical services. Some obligations derive 
from considerations beyond the primary rationale, and the primary rationale 
includes a respect for reasonable resource constraints.’ 
A flexible approach focusing squarely on need qua need which does not 
automatically exclude an enhancement from policy consideration simply because it 
is an enhancement has two advantages. It enables medical professionals to retain 
their commitment to prioritising assistance to those with the greatest health 
needs. It also sanctions access to certain enhancements in principle if the benefits 
that this would confer were sufficiently great and the resources were available. 
The implication of such an approach is that decisions to legalise or subsidise 
enhancements should only be made once greater needs have been met. This is 
reflective of the argument that Holtug (1999, p. 143) makes in relation to genetic 
enhancements: 
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‘...justice sometimes gives us a pro tanto reason for making genetic enhancements 
available; however...justice generally gives us stronger reasons to perform other tasks 
such as providing treatments for people with severe diseases...’ 
Nevertheless assuming that this condition can be met, by reducing the emphasis on 
whether or not assistance treats disease or illness for the reasons I have given, the 
view I take is similar to Hesslow’s (1993, p. 7) theory of health. Recognising the 
relativity of health concepts he recommends placing greater emphasis on whether 
it is possible to safely assist and confer benefits, rather than whether a state of ‘ill-
health’ as such is the object of assistance: 
'...disease is so frequently associated with demand for treatment...that it is generally 
practical to use the disease label as a justification for medical intervention. I have no 
quarrel with this everyday usage of the term “disease”, but we must not let it mislead 
us into thinking that it is having a disease per se that is crucial rather than the 
potential benefits of treatment...’ 
The key condition that would have to be observed in order for the recommended 
approach to work would be regular re-assessment of whether the balance between 
needs and resources was being met optimally at all times. This re-assessment 
would not necessarily exclude the possibility of assistance on the basis that its 
recipients are receiving an ‘enhancement’ rather than a therapy, however, because 
according to the revised model it would be recognised that norms of health 
fluctuate and categorisations may not remain static. What would be of greater 
importance is whether, when balanced against other morally relevant factors, it is 
possible to assist someone safely in a way that does not disadvantage others. 
7.9) Contributions of Critical Realism to Empirical Bioethics 
A persistent issue of controversy in moral philosophy is whether ethical 
judgements are true in the sense that they genuinely show that someone else 
ought to do X; or whether such judgements are merely perspectival, only relatively 
true to individuals, and closer in nature to rhetoric (Archer, 1998) or expressions 
of taste (Hartun, 1954). Expressed in simpler terms, Toulmin (1960) explains this 
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in pointing out that the fact that I like to eat a cream bun provides no compelling 
reason for you to eat one as well – it merely provides information about a 
preference.  
The controversy is acutely controversial when moral reasoning is based on 
empirical data, since a diverse variety of contextually-bound moral viewpoints 
strongly indicate a plurality of ethical norms (Evans-Pritchard, 1951; Marshall, 
1992; Kleinman, 1999) rather than a single ethical norm about which there can be 
no disagreement. An observation that moral norms are plural, however, is not 
especially helpful if practical ethical solutions are sought. Irrespective of the 
presence of a spread of opinions it is not possible to advocate one particular 
response or course of action unless we have some set of values according to which 
that response can be rationally defended.  
This tension is brought sharply into focus in empirical bioethics. On one hand, 
insofar as bioethics is a sub-category of moral philosophy it attempts to produce 
conclusions that are normatively compelling. This is to say that it must be able to 
provide a non-relative justification for why someone should act in a particular way 
(Archer, 1998; Southwood, 2008; Kolodny, 2008; Harris, 2012). On the other hand, 
the descriptive and interpretive nature of social science research emphasise the 
relativity and context-bounded nature of truth claims. 
If truth claims really are relative (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Von Glasersfeld, 
1990) then the kinds of rational normative arguments developed using this 
approach cannot be action-guiding in the way that they claim to be. For ethical 
analysis to have any value it must be able to go beyond the description of 
individual moral viewpoints and show in non-relative terms whether they are true 
or false, or as Railton (1986, p. 165) explains, it must demonstrate: 
‘...that moral judgments can bear truth values in a fundamentally non-epistemic 
sense of truth; that moral properties are objective, though relational; that moral 
properties supervene upon natural properties...’ 
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Since the aim of ethical analysis is to enable moral progress, it is incumbent on any 
philosophically driven analysis such as this to show how progress could be 
possible. In this respect critical realism is valuable because it provides the means 
for discerning between better and worse justifications for a claim, statement, or 
belief. We can again recall Hare’s quote (1986) concerning the rationality of 
seeking assistance from an ophthalmologist in the event that he develops ‘bad’ 
eyesight in support of this: if one’s eyesight limits one’s abilities there is a good 
reason for seeking to improve it. 
This is redolent of Sayer’s (1997) stepwise account of critical realist ethical 
analysis in which he shows that the presence of a need entails the judgement that, 
all other things being equal, it is reasonable to seek to meet that need. The 
entailment is grounded in the recognition that, were it I who was in need rather 
than someone else, it would be rational, all other things being equal, for me to do 
the same. Whether or not assistance in fact should be granted would depend on 
whether meeting the need would produce deleterious effects for others, and in the 
event that it would assistance can be denied. 
The critical realist position holds that the ontology of the world imposes physical 
limitations on our abilities. It is not disputable, for example, whether I would float 
or fall to the ground if I were to jump out of a window (Easton, 2010). Similarly in 
relation to Hare’s position (1986), if I cannot see clearly because of the physiology 
of my eye there can be no disagreement about whether or not this is the case. 
Whether or not the ability to see clearly is categorised as a fault, a variation of 
normality, or a disease, is an epistemically relative matter. What is not relative is 
the fact that the physiology of my eye affects the clarity of my vision. Critical 
realism makes this difference clear, and in doing so grounds the basis for our 
ethical judgements explicitly in ontological states of affairs rather than in 
contestable epistemic categories (Bhaskar, 1993; Sayer, 1997; Archer, 1998). 
If a need is present which can be met via medical assistance then how we 
categorise this need is not of primary ethical relevance, even if I have ‘normal’ 
eyesight and wish to have it ‘enhanced’. In chapter six I gave an example of critical 
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realist analysis being used to used to show when epistemological accounts of  the 
relative ‘naturalness’ of EPO and other technologies were used as a basis for 
drawing misleading moral distinctions. As the analysis showed, although the views 
of the participants was understandable, it became clear that the differences in 
‘naturalness’ were not objective ontological differences that were apprehended, 
but subjectively epistemic categorisations that had been imposed on the world.  
The significance of this for applied ethics research is that it makes explicit what 
there is in virtue of which discourse, argument, disagreement, and knowledge is 
possible and applicable. The critical realist analytic approach adopted in chapter 
six showed how knowledge is constituted by both inductively and deductively 
derived sources of information. In this way critical realism vindicates the ability of 
logical analysis to yield the kinds of non-relative truths necessary for the 
justification of normative conclusions, whilst also giving an account of the physical 
world that is not reducible to my perceptions of it and thus not beyond rational 
scrutiny by others. 
It is this which enables us to circumvent the conventional, contingent, and 
changing epistemological categories of ‘therapy’ and ‘enhancement’ and ground a 
defence of the ethical allocation of resources in ontological characteristics of the 
world. These characteristics are, as I have argued, whether a need can be met via 
medical assistance, and whether to do so is safe, equitable, and does not cause 
injustice to others.  
7.10) Limitations of the Investigation 
7.10.1) Scope of Study 
The first limitation relates to the scope of the empirical study. The data on which 
the philosophical and ethical analyses are based derive from two small groups of 
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medical specialists commenting on enhancement in the context of just one product. 
Concerns about the generalisability of the findings may therefore be valid29.  
Due to the constraints bearing on the project, it was only possible to carry out a 
limited empirical study with the aim of advancing conclusions that can be 
generalised analytically, rather than statistically. Furthermore all of the 
participants were employees of the NHS and consequently the data represent only 
the views of professionals who have chosen to work in state-funded rather than 
private medicine. Given the issues relating to justice and the market raised over 
chapters six and seven in particular it would be useful to investigate the views of 
professionals who have chosen to work privately. In order to find out whether the 
views expressed in this study were themselves representative of the field or 
anomalous, further large scale studies would need to be carried out.  
Having said this, my aim in this project has been primarily a philosophical one. It 
was motivated by a conceptual ambiguity, and the aim was therefore not to report 
what medical professionals think about enhancement with any claims as to the 
generality of these views. The purpose was to deepen our understanding of the 
concept of human enhancement, and to use the data as contextually informed 
information that could refine theory. The data were used as a point of departure 
for conceptual analysis, rather than for the development of a general theory about 
medical professional understanding of the therapy / enhancement distinction. 
7.10.2) Heuristic Judgement 
Despite the advantages of the refined account of therapy and enhancement that I 
have advanced, it is vulnerable in certain respects and so does not solve all 
potential difficulties relating to the distinction. The most significant of these is that 
it is a heuristic for medical decision making, i.e. a ‘rule of thumb’, rather than a 
theoretically infallible method for doing so. In this respect it shares a weakness 
with the heuristic that has been the target for analysis and revision in this thesis. 
This is the conventional reading of the distinction which holds that the two 
                                                          
29
 Although the use of critical realism as the philosophical methodology offsets some of the limitations 
of the study, for the reasons previously given. 
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concepts can be clearly identified because one restores normality and the other 
confers supra-normality. 
The standard therapy / enhancement distinction is, as indicated in chapter one, 
itself a heuristic for medical decision making. In extreme cases it is effective, for 
example with respect to a cancer patient receiving chemotherapy compared to an 
athlete receiving EPO. It is far less effective in more borderline cases, however, for 
example someone seeking cosmetic plastic surgery or beta-blockers in the absence 
of disease. This is because in more borderline cases a persuasive argument can be 
made to show that it is either a therapy or an enhancement. 
The primary aim of this thesis was to clarify the relationship between therapy and 
enhancement and find a way to circumvent the difficulties associated with having 
to use heuristics. In one respect the approach I recommend is partially, but 
significantly, successful. According to the new model that I have developed it is not 
important whether an intervention is ‘therapeutic’ or ‘enhances’. This is because, 
following a critical analysis, we have been able to separate the objective 
ontological character of needs from the subjective epistemological categorisation 
of those needs.  
According to my approach a bodily state need not be categorised as ‘healthy’ or ‘ill’ 
in order to be recognised as being a need for which, assuming an equilibrium of 
other ethically relevant factors,  it would be reasonable to grant assistance. The 
advantage of this is that it does not rely too heavily on fluctuating conceptions of 
health, and instead emphasises characteristics of health which are objective and 
mind-independent, for example an observation as to whether person X can 
perform activity Y.  Despite these advantages, however, although it resolves the 
heuristic that it was intended to resolve, it simultaneously replaces it with another. 
The new heuristic relates to making contestable ‘rule of thumb’ judgements about 
the ethically relevant supervening factors which would weigh in favour or against 
the use of a particular enhancement. 
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For example, according to the new model it will be permissible to allow or provide 
an enhancement if a) it is safe to do so; and b) to do so would not produce any net 
deleterious effects by diverting resources away from someone whose needs are 
greater. Predicting the accuracy of a judgement made about these two conditions 
will always involve some degree of uncertainty. We cannot know exactly what the 
risk will be of using a medical product, and a decision would be made on the 
probability that the benefits will outweigh those risks.  
Similarly, given that it is impossible to identify and factor in every socio-economic 
variable affected by a decision to provide medical assistance, the decision that it 
would be acceptable to permit enhancement in a particular case would inevitably 
rest on a judgement that it would produce no deleterious effects on others, but 
only to the extent that relevant variables can be used and weighed. Given also that 
effective enhancement is a new phenomenon, the predictions that one can make 
about the long-term social and medical effects of an expansion in enhancement 
technology might have are very limited. 
Viewed from this perspective the model that I have developed and defended 
cannot completely escape the possibility that it is vulnerable to error in ethical 
decision making. Insofar as it employs a heuristic there will always be borderline 
cases where the acceptability of a judgement may be contested on the basis that 
certain outcomes will be unpredictable and different individuals may weigh the 
various morally relevant factors which come to bear on a decision in different 
ways. There may, indeed, be controversy regarding how different kinds of need are 
to be weighed against each other in order to ascertain whose needs are more 
acute. 
Despite this heuristic weakness and the potential source of error that it entails for 
ethical decision making, however, I suggest that it nevertheless represents an 
advantage over the conventional understanding of the therapy / enhancement 
distinction. This is because the heuristic employed in the conventional distinction 
will be too inflexible to cope if advances in medical technology accelerate 
significantly. The decision to provide medical assistance turns on the identification 
256 
 
of a norm of health of one kind or another – this could be a norm in statistical, 
social, or experiential terms or any variant or combination of these. 
The distinction is only meaningful and effective for medical decision making to the 
extent that the norm is static, however. The more rapidly norms change, or the 
more diverse they become, the less useful the distinction will be in distinguishing 
between whose functioning is sufficiently ‘abnormal’ or ‘dysfunctional’ that 
assistance should be granted. If human enhancement technologies cause a 
significant enough diversification in health norms, or if they are sufficiently 
effective that they generate new norms at an increasingly fast rate, they will reduce 
the utility that the conventional ‘therapy / enhancement distinction’ has for 
underpinning decisions about the allocation of medical resources. 
Consequently, although the refined account developed here employs a different 
heuristic, in reducing reliance on the epistemological categories of ‘therapy’ and 
‘enhancement’ and instead emphasising the objective ontological character of 
needs it is better equipped to deal with a rapidly changing technological 
environment. For this reason I argue that the weakness associated with the new 
model is a price worth paying because to the extent that it is explicitly needs-based 
my approach is consistent with a crucial ethical feature of conventional medical 
practice. Furthermore it shows how enhancement could be employed to deliver, 
rather than inhibit, wider ends of justice in society. For this reason it also effective 
in anticipating the potential changes that expansion in human enhancement 
technologies may produce in future. 
7.11) An Avenue for Future Research: Enhancement and Public Health 
EPO has a narrow and well defined range of enhancement uses which are only 
likely to appeal or be beneficial to a marginal community of professional athletes. 
Moreover since its enhancement use in this context offers only a positional 
advantage, the risk of its performance benefits being unethically exploited is high. 
However there may be products with enhancement potential that offer benefits 
which are a) much wider in scale across a population, and b) intrinsic, or valuable 
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for their own sake, rather than just positional. The enhancement application of 
certain drugs to improve cognition may be one example (Sandberg & Savulescu, 
2011), and vaccination is a clear example of another (Dawson, 2011). 
Vaccination can be legitimately construed as an enhancement, since it boosts 
species-typical immunological resistance to illness caused by exposure to a 
pathogen: without it the threat would be greater (Juengst, 1997; Bostrom, 2008). It 
can of course equally be argued that it is a therapy, since it very clearly prevents 
harm (Holm & McNamee, 2010; Dawson, 2011), hence its present inclusion within 
a range of standard medical services. Vaccinations can offer widespread intrinsic 
public health benefits. If it is the case that vaccinations can be understood as an 
intrinsic good rather than a positional one, then perhaps its (relatively) 
unproblematic medical legitimacy is connected to its public utility30.  
Following this we may ask whether there are analogous cases within the present 
debate about enhancement. If, for example, it is true that the enhancement of 
cognition would be widely beneficial because of the intrinsic and non-relative 
benefits that it confers (Bostrom & Roache, 2008; Harris, 2009; Sandberg & 
Savulescu, 2011) in the same way that it is intrinsically beneficial to receive an 
enhancement of one’s normal immune response in order to prevent illness, then a 
comparison with vaccination may be valid. Thus, if the comparison between the 
two holds sufficiently strongly, we can make the tentative hypothesis that the 
provision of or access to certain enhancements (which may in principle be 
cognitive, physical, or genetic) may be considered a legitimate goal of public health, 
given an appropriate balance between benefit, cost, safety, and justice in access. 
To take this one step further, I advance a similarly tentative but more general 
hypothesis that a medical intervention’s status as a therapy or an enhancement 
becomes irrelevant beyond a certain threshold of public health utility. Certainly in 
the case of vaccination it can be argued that once the benefits on offer are 
sufficiently widespread, medicine can institutionally co-opt it without difficulty 
                                                          
30
 Notwithstanding debates over the safety of certain vaccines, e.g. the alleged but disproven 
connection between autism and the MMR vaccine. 
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even if it can be legitimately understood as an enhancement, because its positive 
impact on health and ability to reduce suffering is so large.  
This study and its tentative recommendations about the conditions under which 
the legalisation of enhancements could be socially beneficial may be useful as a 
starting point for a fuller investigation. Such an investigation would inevitably 
need to consider questions of distributive justice if the intrinsic or positional 
nature of enhancement use has a bearing on whether particular interventions can 
be judged as ethically acceptable. EPO identifies itself as something which offers 
very little in terms of public health benefit when used as an enhancement. This 
assists, however, in clarifying what characteristics a product should have to be 
considered seriously in terms of enhancements that may be beneficial to public 
health. Given the scale of importance of public health medicine, moreover, such an 
investigation may be needed and justifiable. 
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Faculty of Medicine and Dentistry 
Committee for Ethics (FCE) 
University of Bristol Faculty of Medicine & Dentistry,  
First Floor South, Senate House,  
Tyndall Avenue, Bristol 
BS8 1TH 
Tel: 0117 331 8197 
  
Mr Alex McKeown 
University of Bristol 
 
20
th
 December, 2011 
Dear Alex, 
Application number: 111208 
Title: ‘An investigation into how the concept of ‘enhancement’ is understood by clinicians, medical 
researchers and engineers’ 
Your application has been granted full approval and you may commence your study. 
The FCE expects to be notified of any significant deviations from this research proposal. The FCE also 
expects to be notified of any unforeseen ethical events which may arise during the course of this study.  
On completion of this study the FCE and the peer reviewers would like to see a report of the outcome.  
Yours faithfully, 
David Jessop 
Chair, Faculty of Medicine and Dentistry Committee for Ethics 
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APPENDIX B: PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
 
Participant ID:  
Consent Form 
'An investigation into how the concept of 'enhancement' is understood by clinicians, medical researchers and 
engineers’ 
 
Researcher: Alex McKeown                            Please initial box 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet dated     
…............for the above study and have had the opportunity  to consider the information,  
ask questions, and have had these answered satisfactorily. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw                                     
at any time, without giving any reason. 
 
3. I understand that some things I say may be quoted word-for-word in      
publications or at academic conferences but that my identity will be withheld. 
 
4. I agree for the interview to be audio-recorded.        
 
 
5. I agree to take part in the above study.        
        
 
 
      
_______________________________ ______________________________ ______________________________ 
Participant  Date    Signature 
 
 
 
_______________________________ ______________________________ ______________________________ 
Person obtaining consent Date    Signature 
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APPENDIX C: PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Date:  
ALEX McKEOWN 
'An investigation into how the concept of 'enhancement' is understood by clinicians, medical 
researchers and engineers' 
INFORMATION SHEET  
About the Researcher 
My name is Alex McKeown. I am a PhD student at the Centre for Ethics in Medicine at the 
University of Bristol, in the School of Social and Community Medicine, although I am 
actually based in London. I am supervised by Professor Ruud ter Meulen and Dr. Helen 
Lambert. This study has been reviewed and approved by the Faculty of Medicine and 
Dentistry Ethics Committee at the University of Bristol. 
Invitation 
I am inviting you to take part in a research study which will form a part of my PhD thesis. 
Please take time to read the information contained here carefully before you decide 
whether to agree to take part. The information here will help you to understand why this 
research is being carried out and what your participation would involve. If you have any 
questions, please feel free to get in touch with me via the details on this form. 
The study in which I am inviting you to participate aims to understand how clinicians, and 
medical researchers and engineers understand the concept of 'human enhancement'. I am 
asking these questions because of the emergence of controversial questions surrounding 
the use of medical technologies for purposes beyond the purely medical or therapeutic. 
This field is relatively new and advancing quickly. Further investigation is required in 
order to understand the concept of human enhancement itself, and how we should 
manage these technologies as they continue to develop and advance. 
Before you decide if you would like to take part, please read this information so that you 
understand what is involved and why the study is being done. 
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Why have I been invited? 
I have invited you to take part in an interview for this research study because your work 
involves the use of a medical product (Erythropoietin) which, in other contexts, is 
sometimes used 'off-label' for 'enhancement' purposes. I would like to hear your opinions 
on human enhancement, health, and medicine and the conceptual and ethical questions 
raised by them. I am seeking your independent view as a medical professional with 
knowledge in this field of medicine, and not necessarily as an employee of the NHS.  For 
this study I will be interviewing between 20 and 30 participants in total. 
Do I have to take part? 
You do not have to participate in this study if you don't want to – it is entirely up to you. 
After reading this sheet I hope you will have enough information to decide whether or not 
you would like to participate. 
If you decide that you would like to participate, I will ask you to sign a consent form to 
show that you have agreed to take part in an interview. I will then give you a copy of the 
consent form. You need to sign the consent form and return it to me if you wish to take 
part, however you are free to change your mind after you have signed the form and can 
withdraw from the study at any point if you wish. You will not have to provide any reason 
for this if you choose not to. If you do withdraw, any information that you have already 
provided will be destroyed. 
After the interview I will ask if you are happy for your response to be included in the 
research project. At this point I will ask you if you would like to read over what you have 
said once the interview has been typed up.  
What will happen if I take part? 
I will talk to you about your understanding of human enhancement in relation to medical 
products developed for clinical or therapeutic purposes. I will also ask you about your 
views and opinions of human enhancement more widely, and of developments in medicine 
that may make it possible to enhance human in the future. The information that you 
provide will be used for my research and will be included in my PhD thesis. Any 
information that you provide will be anonymised before any public use – whether in my 
thesis, in academic journals, or when presented at conferences. 
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If you agree to participate, the interview will be digitally recorded and then typed up. Your 
name will not appear on the recording or on the typed copy of the interview of the 
interview. You may refuse to answer any questions put to you, and you can end the 
interview at any point if you wish. The interview is likely to last between 30 and 60 
minutes. It can be held anywhere that is convenient for you. 
What are the possible benefits / disadvantages of taking part? 
The benefit of your participation is that you will be helping a study whose goal is to 
improve our understanding of  human enhancement and its implications. The possibility of 
human enhancement raises many ethical questions, and the information that you give will 
help to provide a framework for the better understanding and resolution of these 
questions.  
At the end of the interview I will ask you if you would like to receive a summary of the 
results of the study when it it is completed. I do not anticipate that there will be any 
disadvantages to participating in the study. 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
You will not be identified in any published material but your occupation (e.g. clinician, or 
researcher / engineer) may be reported together with the quotations. I will not disclose 
anything you tell me during the interview to anybody not involved in the study. I aim to 
publish the results of this research in academic journals. This may include using direct 
quotations of your speech, though your identity will not be revealed. I will give you the 
opportunity to review this typed copy of your interview to indicate anything that you do 
not want me to quote. 
The interview recordings and typed copies will be kept in password-protected files on the 
University of Bristol network, and also locked in a filing cabinet. A coding key will be kept 
which links the interview data to the participant information. This will be for my use only 
so that I can return the typed copies to you for checking. Once this has been done the 
coding key will be destroyed. Only I (the researcher) will have long term access to 
identifiable information. Data will be kept for no longer than 12 months after the study has 
finished, at which point it will be destroyed. 
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What if there is a problem? 
If you take part, I hope that you will find it a positive experience and will value the 
opportunity to give your opinion. If you do have a concern about any aspect of the study, 
however, please feel free to speak to me or my supervisors and we will do our best to 
answer your questions. Contact details for all of us can be found at the end of this sheet. 
Who is organising and funding this research? 
The research is being organised by myself, by Ruud ter Meulen (Chair and Director of the 
Centre of Ethics in Medicine at the University of Bristol), and by Dr. Helen Lambert 
(Reader in Medical Anthropology in the School of Social and Community Medicine at the 
University of Bristol).  
I am funding the research myself.  All research carried out in the name of the University of 
Bristol is looked at by the Committee for Research of the University of Bristol to protect 
your safety, rights, wellbeing, and dignity. 
Contacts for further information 
If you have any questions about the research, please contact: 
 
Mr Alex McKeown     Professor Ruud ter Meulen 
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APPENDIX D: BREAKDOWN OF STUDY PARTICIPANTS 
 
Interview Sex Group Code 
1  Male Renal Scientist S1 
2  Male Clinical Nephrologist C1 
3 Male Renal Pharmacist P1 
4  Male Renal Scientist S2 
5  Male Clinical Nephrologist C2 
6  Male Clinical Nephrologist C3 
7 Male Renal Scientist S3 
8  Male Clinical Nephrologist C4 
9  Male Clinical Nephrologist C5 
10  Male Clinical Nephrologist C6 
11  Male Clinical Nephrologist C7 
12  Male Renal Scientist S4 
13  Male Renal Scientist S5 
14  Male Clinical Nephrologist C8 
15  Male Clinical Nephrologist C9 
16  Female Clinical Nephrologist C10 
17  Male Renal Scientist S6 
18  Female Clinical Nephrologist C11 
19  Male Renal Scientist S7 
20  Female Renal Scientist S8 
21  Male Clinical Nephrologist C12 
22  Male Renal Scientist S9 
23  Male Renal Scientist S10 
24  Male Clinical Nephrologist C13 
25  Male Renal Scientist S11 
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APPENDIX E: INTERVIEW TOPIC GUIDE – CLINICIAN GROUP 
 
1) Description of the product 
1.1) Can you tell me a bit about how you use EPO in clinical practice? 
1.2) What does EPO do? 
 What is its biological action?  
 What is its therapeutic aim?  
1.3) How is EPO administered? 
 And how frequently is it used? 
 Dosing? 
 Nursing practice? 
1.4) What conditions do you treat using EPO? 
1.5) Roughly how many people receive EPO? 
 Regionally / Nationally? 
 Over what period of time? 
1.6) Are there any particular groups by whom EPO tends to be used predominantly? 
 Any particular age group? 
 Difference in prevalence between men and women? 
 Particular characteristics of EPO users, or restrictions on who can use it, e.g. 
children? 
2) Impact on Users 
2.1) How effective is EPO? 
2.2) What are the effects of EPO on the physical symptoms of users? 
 How long does this last? 
 Are there any side effects? 
2.3) Does EPO have any wider impact on users, beyond the alleviation of symptoms? If so, 
what are they? 
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2.4) Are there any risks associated with EPO? If so, what are they? 
3) Background and personal experiences 
3.1) Could you tell me a bit more specifically about the work that you do here? 
3.2) How did you come to practice renal medicine? 
3.3) What is it that particularly interests you about working in this field 
3.4) Has EPO or its use changed over the course of your work in the field, and if so in what 
ways? 
3.5) Do you anticipate any changes in EPO or its use in future? 
 Do you think EPO use will grow, or be replaced by other therapeutic alternatives? 
 If so, why? 
 What do you think about this? 
4) Enhancement and Ethics 
4.1) Do you face any particular challenges in the course of your work involving EPO? 
 E.g. do you encounter any ethical issues associated with the prescription or use of 
EPO? If so, what? 
4.2) What are your views on the 'off-label' use of EPO as a blood doping product? 
4.3) Why? 
 (Depending on response) How do you think it compares to other, legal, 'doping' 
enhancement techniques such as high-altitude training or the use of oxygen 
chambers? 
 These example are all health-related interventions administered by trained health 
professionals outside a purely clinical context, so do you think it is possible to 
distinguish between medical and non-medical uses of technologies? If so, how? 
4.4) Looking at this issue more broadly, in your view is EPO different or distinct in any     
way from other technologies that are used to improve health, for example: 
 Uncontroversial 'over the counter' products, e.g. vitamin supplements? 
 Everyday uses of technologies, e.g. riding a bike regularly? 
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 (If further prompt needed) Many medical products only have a therapeutic use, 
whereas EPO seems to be something  that can be used by healthy people as well, so do 
you think there is any difference between EPO and other, perhaps less controversial 
forms of health / performance enhancement? 
4.5)  Widening the question a bit further still, in your view is EPO different or distinct from 
any other technology (i.e. not necessarily a medical product), which enables us to do 
something that we wouldn't otherwise be able to, for example: 
 Telephones, for communicating remotely over long distances? 
 Cars, for travelling further and more quickly than our bodies allow us to on their 
own? 
5) Regulation 
5.1) How do you distinguish between medical or health-related products which should be 
provided by the State on the one hand, and those to which private access should not 
be denied on the other? 
 (Depending on their answer) Do you think the current regulation of EPO is 
appropriate, and if so, why? 
5.2) Do you think there are any medical products to which access should be particularly 
tightly restricted, and if so, what are they? 
5.3) If so, why?  
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APPENDIX F: INTERVIEW TOPIC GUIDE – SCIENTIST GROUP 
 
1) Description of the product 
1.1) Can you tell me a bit about how EPO is used? 
1.2) What does EPO do? 
 What is its biological action?  
 What is its therapeutic aim?  
1.3) How is EPO administered? 
 And how frequently is it used? 
 Dosing? 
 Nursing practice? 
1.4) What conditions is EPO used to treat? 
1.5) Roughly how many people receive EPO? 
 Regionally / Nationally? 
 Over what period of time? 
1.6) Are there any particular groups by whom EPO tends to be used predominantly? 
 Any particular age group? 
 Difference in prevalence between men and women? 
 Particular characteristics of EPO users, or restrictions on who can use it, e.g. 
children? 
2) Impact on Users 
2.1) How effective is EPO? 
2.2) What are the effects of EPO on the physical symptoms of users? 
 How long does this last? 
 Are there any side effects? 
2.3) Does EPO have any wider impact on users, beyond the alleviation of symptoms? If so, 
what are they? 
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2.4) Are there any risks associated with EPO? If so, what are they? 
3) Background and personal experiences 
3.1) Could you tell me a bit more specifically about the work that you do here? 
3.2) How did you come to work in renal medicine research? 
3.3) What is it that particularly interests you about working in this field? 
3.4) Has EPO or its use changed over the course of your work in the field, and if so in what 
ways? 
3.5) Do you anticipate any changes in EPO or its use in future? 
 Do you think EPO use will grow, or be replaced by other therapeutic alternatives? 
 If so, why? 
 What do you think about this? 
4) Enhancement and Ethics 
4.1) Do you face any particular challenges in the course of your work involving EPO? 
 E.g. do you encounter any ethical issues associated with its clinical prescription or 
use of EPO? If so, what? 
4.2) What are your views on the 'off-label' use of EPO as a blood doping product? 
4.3) Why? 
 (Depending on response) How do you think it compares to other, legal, 'doping' 
enhancement techniques such as high-altitude training or the use of oxygen 
chambers? 
 These examples are all health-related interventions (typically) administered by 
trained health professionals outside a purely clinical context, so do you think it is 
possible to distinguish between medical and non-medical uses of technologies? If so, 
how? 
4.4) Looking at this issue more broadly, in your view is EPO different or distinct in any 
way from other technologies that are used to improve health, for example: 
 Uncontroversial 'over the counter' products, e.g. vitamin supplements? 
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 Everyday uses of technologies, e.g. riding a bike regularly? 
 (If further prompt needed) Many medical products only have a therapeutic use, 
whereas EPO seems to be something  that can be used by healthy people as well, so do 
you think there is any difference between EPO and other, perhaps less controversial 
forms of health / performance enhancement? 
4.5)  Widening the question a bit further still, in your view is EPO different or distinct from 
any other technology (i.e. not necessarily a medical product), which enables us to do 
something that we wouldn't otherwise be able to, for example: 
 Telephones, for communicating remotely over long distances? 
 Cars, for travelling further and more quickly than our bodies allow us to on their 
own? 
5) Regulation 
5.1) How do you distinguish between medical or health-related products which should be 
provided by the State on the one hand, and those to which private access should not 
be denied on the other? 
 (Depending on their answer) Do you think the current regulation of EPO is 
appropriate, and if so, why? 
5.2) Do you think there are any medical products to which access should be particularly 
tightly restricted, and if so, what are they? 
5.3) If so, why?  
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APPENDIX G: CODING STRUCTURE 
 
 
